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ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of this dissertation research was to examine the influences of cultural 
and performance factors on trust in news media in Serbia. This was done by conducting a survey 
on a stratified random sample of the Serbian population (N=544). Before testing cultural and 
performance theories, this dissertation explored the meanings of trust in news media and trust in 
other people in Serbia, in order to properly operationalize these concepts and establish their 
conceptual equivalence needed for their adequate measurement. This was done by 20 in-depth 
interviews with representatives of the Serbian population. The results of this dissertation study 
showed that both cultural and performance factors play a role in determining trust in news media 
in Serbia. However, the performance explanation, measured as assessments of news media 
corruption, was found to be slightly more powerful than the cultural explanation, measured as 
generalized trust, or trust in people that we don’t know personally. In addition, the results of this 
dissertation study showed that more than 20 years after the fall of Communism and 13 years after 
the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s authoritative regime, the pervasiveness of distrust remains 
present in Serbia. Serbians who participated in this study expressed skepticism about their news 
media and distrust of people they don’t know personally. Conceptualizing trust in news media as 
well as trust in other people in the same way as their Western counterparts, Serbians thought that 
Western standards, necessary for trust in news media and other people to occur, such as fair 
selectivity of news, objectivity, neutrality, accuracy in reporting or sincerity in helping other 
people, were not met or applicable in their country.  
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CHAPTER I: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Trust has been considered a foundation of social order and cohesion that often determines 
nation’s well-being and its ability to organize and compete (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; 
2000). Frequently equated with the notions of reliance, dependence or faith (Barber, 1983), trust 
enables social relations to function on the basis of promise. Thus it becomes essential for stable 
relationships, maintenance of cooperation, and for even the most routine of everyday interactions 
(Misztal, 1988). Presupposing an essential confidence that people place in each other, trust 
reduces uncertainty about the future and the need to continually make provisions for the 
possibility of devious behavior among actors. The presence of trust increases the desire of people 
to take risks for productive social exchange and facilitates everyday life as it fosters acts of 
tolerance and acceptance of otherness. In this atmosphere, daily living becomes easier, happier, 
and more confident (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). 
 A common threshold for classifying countries as democracies is that the governments do 
not rely on coercion but depend on voluntary acceptance of citizens to obey the law and accept 
the decisions of authorities. In this regard, citizens place confidence, under condition of risk, in 
democratic institutions and trust that the government will not misuse its power (Luhiste, 2006). 
New democracies, such as the countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe, have faced a 
difficult task of building this type of relationship. In traditional democracies, common 
knowledge and social representations of political phenomena are formed on the basis of past 
experience (Markova, 2004). In post-Communist societies, where the historical knowledge 
relates to the oppression by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, distrust, uncertainty, and 
skepticism towards all institutions have been widespread and pervasive (Macek & Markova, 
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2004). Studying trust in institutions in post-Communist countries scholars have found that 
citizens’ perceptions of all political institutions stay largely negative (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; 
Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001).  
News media are one of the important institutions in any democratic setting. They are 
expected to survey the world, report and interpret the ongoing events. Especially significant is 
the surveillance of decision makers; the public, who sees journalists as its eyes and ears, expect 
them to scrutinize government performance and report about it (Graber, 2010). Although a 
certain level of distrust towards institutions is a healthy characteristic of a democratic system, a 
very low level of trust could endanger news media’s ability to inform citizens and monitor the 
work of the government (Gaziano, 1988; Muller, 2010). As Bok (1979) stated, “society whose 
members are unable to distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones, would collapse” (p. 
18). 
In recent decades scholars have noted decreasing levels of trust in news media in Western 
societies. A 2011 Pew Research Center report shows that confidence in the news media in the 
United States has been steadily declining since 1985 and reached its all-time low in 2011, when 
66% of Americans thought that news stories produced by traditional media outlets were 
inaccurate (Pew Research Center, 2011). In a more recent survey, credibility ratings for nine of 
13 news organizations tested, including national newspapers, cable news outlets, broadcast TV 
networks, and National Public Radio, have fallen significantly (Pew Research Center, 2012). A 
world-wide survey conducted in 2006 showed that, in the United Kingdom, 64% of viewers did 
not consider that broadcast news media report all sides of the story (BBC, Reuters & Media 
Center Poll, 2006).  
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In Eastern Europe, news media have undergone tremendous changes since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989. They have been confronted not only with the breakdown of the old 
institutional methods of control, but also with the challenge of having to evolve from one stable 
state of the media system to another (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013), from one in which they served 
the government to another in which they ought to control its power. With the process of their 
transformation still not over, news media in Eastern Europe are today facing the challenge of 
regaining public trust, devastated by their role of serving the state under real-socialism 
(Sztompka, 2000). Studies conducted during the 1990s and in the first decade of 2000 show that 
this process might be slow as the skepticism towards news media prevails among the countries in 
the region (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Stompka, 2000).  
Serbia is one of the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, where, during more 
than five decades of Communism (1943-1989) and a decade of authoritarian regime of Slobodan 
Milošević (1989-2000), the state had strong control over its citizens.1 The one-party system 
assumed that Communists were in charge of political and social life and that any counter-
ideologies should be eliminated, usually using the assistance of a strong secret service (Milic, 
2006). During both periods, state news media played a propagandistic role, serving the interest of 
the state rather than citizens. As such, they had been clearly perceived by citizens as part of the 
state apparatus, and their messages were highly doubted or even profoundly distrusted, as was 
the case with Milošević’s media (Glenny, 1996). After the introduction of democracy in the 
country in 2000 (TheMacroDataGuide, 2010)2, media workers in Serbia had the opportunity to 
                                                     
1
 Besides these examples from the recent past, it has to be noted that Serbia has been under several oppressive 
regimes during its history.  
2
 On the Polity IV index, Serbia (then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) moved from autocratic country 
(score -7) in mid 1990s to democratic country (score +7) in 2000, with the ousting of Slobodan Milošević and with 
the consolidation of the democratic government. The Polity index ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full 
democracy), where -6 represents the threshold for autocracy, and +6, the threshold for democracy. More on the 
democracy in Serbia today can be found in Chapter II.   
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learn about Western-style of news media operations through various trainings in the areas of 
reporting, production, and management  (Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010; The Delegation of the 
European Commission to the Republic of Serbia, 2009). However, the complex influence of 
economic crisis, its impact on the media market, low salaries, low ethical standards, self-
censorship, and political and business pressures, have led to low standards in Serbian journalism 
(IREX, 2012). The low journalistic standards and contemporary media practices might be 
influencing trust in news media in Serbia. The cultural legacies of general distrust towards other 
people noted during Communism and authoritarianism might also be impacting news media 
trust. These two explanations about the origin of trust in news media are reflected in two 
theoretical traditions that compete as dominant perspectives about the source of trust in 
institutions: cultural theories, which hypothesize that trust in all institutions is exogenous, and 
performance theories, which hypothesize that trust is endogenous to institutions. The main 
purpose of this dissertation research is to examine the influences of cultural and performance 
factors on trust in news media in Serbia, by conducting a survey on a stratified random of the 
Serbian population (N=544). Before testing these theories, it was necessary to explore the 
meanings of trust in news media and trust in other people in Serbia, in order to properly 
operationalize these concepts and establish their conceptual equivalence needed for their 
adequate measurement. This was done by 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of the 
Serbian population. The rationale for conducting this study is presented below.  
Dissertation Research Rationale 
Due to the history of oppressive rule that destroyed social capital, the conceptualization 
of trust in a post-Communist country might differ from Western perspectives. In Western 
literature, trust has carried a positive connotation of a foundation of social order and cohesion 
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(e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; 2000) necessary for the functioning of governments and 
institutions (Luhiste, 2006), as well as for all stable relationships (Misztal, 1988). Low levels of 
social trust were feared to bring instability and unproductivity (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 
1993; 2000), and in the domain of news media, potential inability to properly inform citizens 
(Gaziano, 1988; Muller, 2010). In Eastern Europe, however, the relationship towards trust has 
been somehow different. Due to the controlling rule of past regimes, distrust in everything and 
everybody that did not belong to immediate circles of family and close friends spread to the 
entire region and might have become part of the cultural heritage (Lovell, 2001; Paldam & 
Svedsen, 2001; Sztompka, 2000; Traps, 2009). During Communism, for example, Eastern 
Europeans perceived generalized trust as “naïve” or even “stupid” (Sztompka, 2000) and thought 
that news media, being part of an authoritarian state apparatus, were sources of lies and 
manipulations (e.g., Sztompka, 2000). Research shows that these beliefs did not disappear with 
the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, as people in the region stayed generally skeptical 
about trustworthiness of people that they didn’t know personally, state institutions, as well as 
news media (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; GfK Croatia, 2012; IREX, 2012; Mishler & 
Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). Having lived in an atmosphere where fear, suspicion and 
intolerance dominated public life, it is not even clear whether the people in the region could 
differentiate trust from fear, risk, or faith (Macek & Markova, 2004). As Mishler and Rose 
(1997) explain, the meaning of trust is different for a Westerner than for a Pole or Ukrainian. 
Even if Americans say they distrust Congress, this does not mean that they endorse its abolition 
or even favor fundamental reforms. In post-Communist societies, Mishler and Rose (1997) note 
that about a quarter of all citizens favor the suspension of parliament, and even more think it 
could happen. 
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One of the goals of this dissertation is to delve into the meanings of trust in news media 
and trust in other people in Serbia, in order to verify whether these concepts in Serbia are 
conceptually equivalent with their Western operationalizations, which have been widely used as 
measurements of trust in news media and other people. By doing so, this dissertation research 
tries to discover the position of Serbians towards their news media and other people, as well the 
characteristics the news media should have in order to be considered trustworthy in Serbia. Trust 
in news media and trust in other people have been studied for a long time in Western literature 
(e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Cole, 1973; Jacobson, 1969; Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Kiousis, 2001; 
Mishler & Rose, 2001; Kim, 2005; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Roper, 1985; Westley & Severin, 
1964), but their meanings have not been qualitatively assessed in Eastern Europe. By exploring 
the meanings of trust in other people and in news media in one of the Eastern European 
countries, this dissertation makes the first step in properly defining the concepts in this region, 
which is necessary for their accurate operationalization and measurement.  
The main goal of this dissertation research is to test the factors that affect trust in news 
media in Serbia. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the levels of trust in news media in Eastern 
Europe have been measured mostly by surveys in the scope of assessing trust in all institutions in 
the region (e.g., Macek & Markova, 2004; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). While these 
surveys have documented levels of trust in the press, television and radio, they have not 
identified the variables that might affect that trust. Cultural and performance theories have 
opposing views of what might influence trust in institutions. Cultural theories posit that 
predisposition towards trust as part of cultural heritage determine people’s attitude towards it 
(e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1990). These theories 
have been supported by a number of psychological studies that have shown that attitudes towards 
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trust are learned during a person’s childhood and formative years (Traps, 2009), have a 
remarkable stability over time (Bjornskov, 2007), and take decades rather than years to adjust, as 
well as by studies that have shown that generalized sense of trust towards other people has been 
positively correlated with trust in political and social institutions (Cole, 1973; Brehm & Rahn, 
1997; Dowley & Silver, 2002; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton, 2001) and news media (Pjesivac 
& Imre, 2013). In contrast, performance theories view trust as endogenous to institutions and 
consider it a consequence of institutional functioning. These theories assume that, simply, 
institutions that perform well are likely to be trusted (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & 
Norris, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). In the domain of news media, these theories have 
indirectly been supported by studies that have found that sensationalized news stories (e.g., 
Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000), biased reporting, serving the interests of political regimes and 
businesses rather than the public (e.g., Liu & Bates, 2009; Open Society Institute, 2005) can hurt 
the believability in news.  
Following the assumptions of cultural and performance theories, this dissertation tests the 
assumption that both generalized trust and journalistic performance play important roles in 
determining trust in news media in Serbia. Although, when tested separately both factors have 
been shown to have effects on trust in institutions, studies that have tested cultural and 
performance theories together have generated ambiguous results: some researchers found that a 
cultural factor prevailed in people’s evaluation of trust in institutions (e.g., Luhiste, 2006), 
whereas others have noted that a performance factor had better empirical support (e.g., Misher & 
Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). Taking into account these contradictory results, this 
dissertation research further examines the strength of the effects of cultural and performance 
factors in predicting trust in news media and tests several extraneous variables that could 
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potentially moderate the relationship between the independent variables and the criterion 
variable. This dissertation also explored, due to the lack of an adequate conceptualization of 
news media performance in the literature, the meaning of this concept among the Serbian 
population. A measure of news media performance was then developed, pretested, and used in 
the survey portion of this dissertation study. 
Understanding where trust in news media originates is important for testing the 
competing theories, but it also has significant implications for the consolidation of new 
democracies. If trust in news media, as one of the important institutions in democratic societies, 
is rooted in deep social norms and is culturally determined, there is little that can be done to 
cultivate, in the short run, trust in them in a transitional society. In other words, if the culture of 
trust is path dependent, it will take decades rather than years to develop trust necessary for news 
media to function effectively. However, if trust originates in the performance of news media, 
new media systems in Eastern Europe can generate increased trust by abstaining from 
unprofessional practices, a change that would not take generations to be implemented (Mishler & 
Rose, 2001). By singling out cultural factors from performance factors, this dissertation tries to 
distinguish between the importance of the past (culture) and the present (performance of the 
media) in evaluating the news media. It therefore adds to the understanding of how strong the 
“habits of the heart” are in a country where 55-years of communism and authoritarianism might 
have severely undermined the trusting disposition of citizens. In this regard, the study adds to the 
understanding of the social character of Eastern European peoples, a variable unfairly ignored in 
the studies of democratic processes in the region (Meštrović, Letica, & Goreta, 1993).  
The next Chapter will present a background on news media in post-Communist countries 
and provide a brief history of Serbia and its news media. It will be followed by a Chapter that 
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delves deep into the literature on the concepts of trust and news media relevant for this study; it 
sets this study’s theoretical framework by providing an overview of cultural and performance 
theories of institutional trust and outlines the study’s research questions and hypotheses. Chapter 
4 explains the methods that will be used for this dissertation research; Chapter 5 describes the 
results of this dissertation research; and Chapter 6 integrates the existing theories with the results 
of this study in order to discuss possible implications of this research for the literature on trust in 
news media in Eastern Europe.   
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CHAPTER II: 
BACKGROUND 
 
News Media in post-Communist Countries  
The landscape of east Europe is a mosaic of different nationalities that have their own 
languages, religions, and cultures. The region that spreads from the border with Russia in the 
east, to Czech Republic in the west and from Estonia in the north to Albania in the south, has 
been, through history, subordinate to empires of Europe: the Ottoman Empire in the south, the 
Russian Empire to the east, and the Austro-Hungarian and Prussian empires to the west. During 
these rules, the peoples of Eastern Europe have struggled to develop or preserve their national 
identities against attempts to assimilate them. Thus, when they obtained independence, most 
after World War I, virtually all were economically behind and politically troubled. Interwar 
leaders, most of whom were authoritarian, were unable to deal with old ethnic issues and new 
demands of development. This increased the vulnerabilities of the countries in the region and 
made them an easy target for German invasion that started with the occupation of Poland in 
1939. World War II proved devastating for the region, with countries such as Poland, Ukraine, 
Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states, suffering great loss of life as well as physical destruction 
(Wolchik & Curry, 2011).   
Although Communist parties came with the 1917 October revolution in Russia and were 
briefly established in 1921 in some other Eastern European states, Communists consolidated 
their power following World War II, after victorious Soviet troops marched in many of these 
countries. The Communist rule intended to put everything under its control and direction. The 
one-party system was established with active mobilizations of the population into Party 
membership. All state institutions as well as companies were put under Communist control. 
Private land and other property were seized from owners, and intellectuals who had connections 
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with the West or who had simply criticized the new power structures were put on trials, sent to 
labor camps, or in worst cases executed (Wolchik & Curry, 2011).      
Under Communism in Eastern Europe, it was generally accepted that news media served 
the state. The Communist party controlled the information that was disseminated through the 
news media, as knowledge distribution was vital for the survival of the ruling ideology (O’Neil, 
1997).  The mass media were usually conceived as gigantic institutions headed by party 
representatives. Journalists were considered to be public officials and censorship and self-
censorship were widespread. Journalistic professionalism, in a Western sense of the word, did 
not exist, but journalism was expected to be carried in accordance with functional necessities and 
Communist party ideology. Thus journalism was considered to be a sort of community 
profession, serving for what was the best for the community defined by the Communist party 
(Gross, 2002). This model of the press was described by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) 
as the Soviet-Communist model. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist thought, Soviet-
Communist model of the press assumed that mass communication systems should be integral to 
the state. Conceived to have an instrumental role, news media were meant to be spokespersons of 
the dominant ideology. Under the tight control of the ruling elites, news media were conveying 
the words of the Communist party to large masses, as it was assumed that the truth was to arrive 
to collective deliberation only by the Party. In that context, only state media were allowed to 
exist (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). It has to be noted though that the level of state 
control of news media varied between countries of Eastern Europe as the system of Communism 
itself was different across the region. In Romania, for example, the classical model of Stalinism 
persisted, whereas in Poland the decay of a pure Communist system that dated back to the 1950s 
allowed for media diversification. In Czechoslovakia, the relaxation of control over media 
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culminated in the late 1960, whereas in East Germany, the Russian invasion of 1968 brought an 
extremely rigid and controlled media system (Sparks, 1997).   
The shift from Communism to the new system represented a fast and dramatic change for 
the region. Within two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the countries that belonged 
to the Communist system had to pass from “state socialism” to capitalism and liberal democracy. 
Political parties emerged and the fundamental legal and institutional structure of the societies 
started to change (Hallin & Mancini, 2013). This shift to a fundamentally different political and 
economic system was reflected in the changes in news media as well (Jakubowicz, 2005). In the 
short period of time, journalists obtained unprecedented freedom from state control, although 
mass media still faced the challenge of transformation from state to private ownership (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2013). Media systems had to face two separate but interrelated stages: transition and 
transformation. As Gross and Jakubowicz (2013) describe, in the transition stage, old political 
and media systems collapse and take with them old methods of controlling the media. For 
Eastern European countries, this represented a transition away from the Communist media 
system. During the time immediately after the transition, old systems of control, which included 
censors, were no longer effective, and many new newspapers and eventually, private radio and 
television stations appeared. It was the time when thousands of new journalists and others, who 
considered journalism as a tool for political advocacy, entered the profession. In the 
transformation stage, the evolution from one stable state of the media system to another is 
expected to happen. In Eastern European countries, the transformation assumed formulation of 
full-fledged media policies that espouse the principles of freedom of speech, conformity with 
Western standards, and the creation of a stable new media system, whatever its nature.  In most 
former Communist countries, both transition and transformation were expected to ultimately 
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create a mass media system that would introduce and support Western type of journalism into 
Eastern European practice (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013).  
However, as the situation in post-Communist countries has been quite dynamic, mass 
media systems have, in the last twenty years, achieved different forms and stages of development 
in various countries in the region. In some countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and the former 
Soviet countries, the changes in media systems were mainly dictated by the ruling elites 
simultaneously with political and social changes. The changes were made at the top level but the 
majority of media professionals remained in their posts and the structures imposed by 
Communist regimes did not experience big disruptions. Media policy and changes were 
negotiated between elite groups without the participation of mass population (Sparks, 1997). In 
other countries, bureaucracy briefly lost control of the change due to disruptive events such as 
velvet revolutions3. In these countries, transition remained in suspension for a considerable time, 
and then moved forward, or even reverted to the previous situation, such as the case with 
Ukraine (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013). In Serbia and Croatia, on the other hand, extreme 
governments took control of the mass media systems for a certain period of time (Sparks, 1997), 
whereas in Slovakia the new government led by Vladimir Mečiar severely attacked journalists by 
legal, economic and even violent pressures, which substantially slowed down the process of 
journalistic professionalization in the country (Johnson, 2013).The media of East Germany were 
absorbed into an already existing capitalist system (Sparks, 1997), whereas in Belarus, state-run 
and strictly controlled outlets dominated the media landscape (Manaev, Manaeva, & Yuran, 
2013). 
                                                     
3
 Civil and/or opposition protests against the regimes in some countries of Eastern Europe, which led to the 
overthrow of the ruling regimes.   
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The variations in post-Communism in the region have created a deficiency of a common 
theoretical model for studying news media in the region. Hallin and Mancini (2004) have 
compared media systems in capitalistic advanced democracies by grouping them into three 
models: the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, the North/Central European or 
Democratic Corporatist Model, and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model. In a later work, the 
authors recognized the need for the development of a new Model which would group Eastern 
European media systems. They found that media systems in Eastern Europe share certain 
similarities with their Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, especially in the domain of 
state intervention in the media sector. In both regions, there is a strong role of the state in 
regulating and funding media as well as in defining news agendas. In both regions, there is a 
formidable connection between party politics and media, reflected in state intervention through 
politically connected private actors in media enterprises. Noting these similarities, Hallin and 
Mancini (2013) argue that in setting theoretical boundaries for media systems in Eastern Europe, 
much more attention should be paid to the role of the state in controlling the media sector, 
through processes of politicized privatizations, advertising and domination over public 
broadcasters. In addition, they recognize that foreign influences have been much more present in 
the development of Eastern European media systems than those in Western Europe. For 
example, both extensive foreign ownership and the importation of Western models of 
professional practice have represented major factors that affected media in Eastern Europe.  
Finally, Hallin and Mancini (2013) argue that a unifying media theory for the region should 
consider the interplay between media, civil society and political parties, taking into account that 
civil society is still underdeveloped in Eastern Europe and that political parties represent more 
authoritative institutions than a bridge between state and civil society.  
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Jakubowicz (2013) proposes that media systems in the region should be studied in 
relationship with socio-political circumstances, as they are, as the author claims, asymmetrically 
interdependent. To explain this association, he uses three criteria: the scope of political and 
administrative control over the media, specific institutional solutions, and normative attitudes of 
political elites. The first criterion assumes that the level of control of the media in the region 
depends on whether the country is democratic, semi-democratic or autocratic. Democratic 
countries are, according to him, those where the process of democratic consolidation and the 
progress of economic reforms are well advanced (e.g., the countries of Eastern Europe that have 
entered the European Union). Semi-democratic countries include, according to Jakubowicz’s 
(2013) classification, the countries that have been less successful in creating a stable democratic 
system, which resulted in violent conflicts, creation of regimes that resemble their socialist 
predecessors, or creation of hybrid regimes that combined liberal tendencies with aspects of the 
socialist past (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan). Authoritarian regimes within Eastern Europe 
differ from Communist dictatorships in some respects but deny their citizens fundamental 
political rights (e.g., Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus). Media freedom and independence is 
higher in democratic countries, where competitive politics and media pluralism prevail, and 
progressively lower in semi-democratic countries characterized by oligarchization, and 
authoritarian countries, where the author notes a return to strict censorship (Jakubowicz, 2013). 
 Especially important for news programs are general media orientations that Jakubowicz 
(2013) sees as being developed in five different directions in Eastern Europe: 1) idealistic 
orientation, endorsing the introduction of direct, participatory communicative democracy; 2) 
idealistic-mimetic, oriented toward the introduction of an idealized Western media system 
involving more elements of citizen participation; 3) mimetic, straight transplantation of the 
16 
 
Western media system; 4) materialist, promoting privatization of all media as a way of 
eliminating state or political control over them; and 5) atavistic, involving continuation of new 
forms of effective command-and-control systems, by allowing political elites to control the 
media. Idealistic and materialist orientations never gained support in post-Communist countries. 
Jakubowicz (2013) writes that democratic post-Communist countries have adopted mainly the 
mimetic orientation, semi-democratic ones a mixture of mimetic and atavistic orientations, and 
the autocratic ones primarily atavistic orientation.  
In terms of specific institutional solutions, Jakubowicz (2013) explains that post-
Communist countries can be categorized with regard to their particular choice of executive 
power structures (presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary), legislature (single or double 
chamber), political parties (adversarial or consociational), and electoral system (majoritarian, 
mixed). The institutional choices correspond with some of the key characteristics of media 
systems in post-Communist countries, particularly in the broadcasting sector, where broadcasting 
regulatory authorities represent a direct extension of political powers. Finally, Jakubowicz 
(2013) notes that attitudes of political elites influence media freedom and independence in 
Eastern Europe. In some countries two major paradigms prevail: liberal, which favors the 
complete withdrawal of the state from the media, and the paradigm of service to national values, 
which assumes that media should be in service of the reconstruction and reinforcement of 
national identity and support national cultures. Despite this duality, political culture in Eastern 
Europe generally favors control of media by political elites, which regard media as tools of 
political agitation and propaganda, a means of political mobilization rather than political 
information (Jakubowicz, 2013).  
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  In Jakubowicz’s (2013) typology Serbia falls under the group of democratic countries 
that are assumed to have fairly stable democratic institutions and media systems that resemble 
either a mimetic one, which imitates the Western style, or a selective-atavistic one, where 
privately-owned print and broadcast media might be beyond the control of the ruling 
establishment,4 but where the public service is still controlled by the state.  
The Case of Serbia  
After World War II Serbia was part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), a one party socialist-communist country composed of six republics and two 
autonomous provinces, each representing different ethnic groups. Under the idea of “brotherhood 
and unity” Yugoslavia incorporated Muslims, Eastern Orthodox, and Catholics; Serbs, Croats, 
Slovenes, Bosniacs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks, 
Checks, Turks, and others. The country was ruled by Josip Broz Tito, who seized power with his 
Communist-led partisans during World War II and governed until his death in 1980. Tito’s ruling 
system was characterized as a form of liberal communism with open borders and heavy 
international borrowing (Cox, 2002). Thanks to the implementation of liberalizing economic and 
political reforms, Yugoslavia had been broadly integrated into international economic, political 
and cultural development. Its unique international position allowed the country to adopt an open 
foreign policy between the two Cold War blocs and to develop special relations with newly 
independent countries by playing a prominent role in the movement of non-aligned countries. 
The country was neither a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization nor NATO, and adopted 
an economic strategy that was socialist but not Soviet, espousing self-management decision 
making within the firms, trying to decentralize the economic decision-making, and liberalize 
                                                     
4
 Other research notes, however, that political and economic influences are exercised over Serbian public as well as 
private media. This will be further discussed later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter III.  
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foreign trade and the banking system. The country’s socialist regime was more open, transparent, 
and accepting of non-Marxist ideologies than any other country in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Its citizens enjoyed opportunities to travel, work, and study abroad, while the literature and 
culture forbidden in the east, from George Orwell’s 1984 to punk rock and neoliberal economics, 
was prominent in the Yugoslav market (Baskin & Pickering, 2011).  
Despite its relative openness, Tito’s Yugoslavia kept control over its citizens. Milovan 
Djilas, a Communist political and theorist turned into one of the most prominent dissidents in 
Yugoslavia, described that the Communist bureaucrats had political control, managerial power 
over state enterprises and nationalized property, and exclusive right of distribution of wages and 
national wealth. According to him, self-management in enterprises represented an illusion of 
some kind of a new democracy, as workers’ management did not lead to the participation in the 
division of profits (Djilas, 1998). Simultaneously, those who openly criticized the Communist 
ideology or opposed the Communist system were publically reprimanded or sent to jails, one of 
which was a notorious prison on the island of Goli Otok [Bare Island], where an estimated 
32,000 male political prisoners were subjected to forced labor (Dedijer, 1984). The entire society 
was pervaded by the infamous secret police UDBA, which was in charge of spying on citizens, 
making lists of regime opponents, and even conducing secret executions of non-loyal citizens 
(Djilas, 1998; Milic, 2006).The activities of UDBA and the presence of Goli Otok scared the 
people to the point that even those who were brave enough to oppose the regime openly, thought 
of committing suicide rather than being sent to labor camps on the otherwise uninhibited island. 
Milovan Djilas, once a senior official in the Communist Party, who turned against the regime, 
described his distress, “The shadow of Goli Otok, the concentration camp (…), loomed also over 
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us. And with it the awful fear, ever suspected, ever dismissed, that there existed a secret, 
inconceivable place of torment for separatists and turncoats” (Djilas, 1998, p. 168,9).   
The news media in Yugoslavia existed both on national and regional levels. Thus, for 
example, each unit of the Yugoslav federation had a radio-television system that functioned 
separately (Veljanovski, 2005), with 180 local stations supplementing the main broadcasting 
institutions. Broadcasters offered news programs not only in the main languages of Serbo-
Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian, but also in minority languages such as Albanian, 
Hungarian, Romanian, Turkish and Slovakian (Paulu, 1974). On the federal level, the daily 
newspaper Borba, the news agency TANJUG, Radio Yugoslavia, and short-lived television 
station Yutel operated as pan-Yugoslav media outlets (Volčić, 2007). News media were, for the 
most part, controlled by the single party – the Communist Party. That control was less rigid than 
in other communist countries, and the freedom of the press was guaranteed by the Yugoslav 
Constitution and other laws (Pešić, 1994). In terms of freedom of expression, Paulu (1974) 
described Yugoslavia as “the most liberal country in the Eastern European bloc” (p. 474). 
Western magazines and newspapers were sold all over the country. There was no pre-censorship 
and bookstores sold books that were not sympathetic to the regime or to Communism in general, 
such as translations of the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn or George F. Kennan’s Memoires. 
Yugoslavia never jammed foreign radio broadcasters and maintained friendly relations with the 
BBC and Voice of America staffs (Paulu, 1974).  
However, freedom of the press was limited. As Pešić (1994) describes, the name, person 
and work of the leader, Tito, was protected from criticism. The Constitution also stated that “no 
one may use these freedoms and rights (…) in order to disrupt the foundations of the socialist 
self-management democratic order” (Pešić, 1994, p. 12). Besides Tito’s name, the basic 
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Communist system was also not to be criticized, the animosities of Yugoslavia’s nationalities 
were not to be incited and foreign intervention was not to be invited by undue criticism of the 
Soviet Union. In addition, “hostile propaganda” was punishable by prison sentence. Thus, 
individuals who wrote critical pieces about the Communist systems in Yugoslavia or in the 
Soviet Union in foreign newspapers or domestic publications, such as academic journals, would 
be sent to jail or the issues carrying problematic articles would be banned (Paulu, 1974). For 
example, once Milovan Djilas openly started criticizing the Communist regime, and was sent to 
jail, he could no longer publish his political or even literary works in Yugoslavia, and had to 
send them to the United States for publication (Djilas, 1998).  
The control over the media was maintained through government and Communist party 
bodies: Ministry of Information and the Federal Executive Council, and through the League of 
Communists with its ideological commissions. The Ministry for Information planned and 
supervised the development of the information network of the country and reinforced the 
ideological activities of the Party. For example, the Ministry carried the budget of the news 
agency TANJUG on its books while the Executive Committee of the government planned it. The 
editors of news media would come to the Ministry for “briefing sessions” on the foreign policy 
line and selection of government policy statements and certain sensitive stories. Although these 
formal controls were somewhat relaxed after the 1956, the government kept a fairly firm control 
of the news media. Thus it still had the right to appoint three members of the Workers Council in 
TANJUG and establish its larger presence through media workers’ membership in the 
Communist Party. Chief editors and media directors were members of the League of 
Communists as well as the substantial number of journalists. In addition, the Party formed its 
“activs” within news organizations. They consisted of a party secretary and a seven-member 
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secretariat that “educated the membership as well as the ‘collective’ [people working in a 
particular news organization] on political and ideological matters (Robinson, 1977). As Tito said 
in 1973, “We Communists have the right to interfere in everything. I am chairman of the League 
of Communists and I have the right to interfere. We have the right to interfere to insure the 
correct implementation of the general policy of the party, the proper development of socialism, 
the proper development of social relations and brotherhood and unity, for which we shed a sea of 
blood” (Paulu, 1974, p. 474).  
Furthermore, it was implied that journalists were supposed to serve the government. As 
Taylor and Kent (2000) write, “journalists were employed by the state, for the state and to serve 
the state” (p. 356). Yugoslavia’s journalistic code of conduct integrated the “responsibility to 
implement the politics of the League of Communists” (Veljanovski, 2005, p. 4) and a journalist 
was defined as a “socio-political worker who, conscientiously adhering to the ideas of Marxism-
Leninist, (…) participates in the establishment and development of socialist self-management of 
society” (Pešić, 1994, p. 12). Tito considered that the press could not be “independent” and 
“autonomous” but saw it as a mechanism for the implementation of a bigger social plan – the 
construction of Socialism on all levels (Paulu, 1974, p. 479). Other doctrines of the journalistic 
code, which did not differ that much from the doctrine of professional journalism in the West, 
offered the possibility for Yugoslav journalists to present their professional work to the world 
(Veljanovski, 2005), especially in the area of foreign news reporting. Thus, news agency 
TANJUG was the eight biggest world news agency and “had gained a reputation which no other 
Communist states’ agencies could approach” (Pešić, 1994, p.13). It offered a news perspective 
alternative to those of news agencies of the major powers, while employing the Western 
journalistic practice. The agency played a pivotal role by being the first to break news of events 
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such as the last day in office of the first legally elected Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice 
Lumumba, before his assassination in 1961; the U.S. ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion of Cuba that same 
year; the US-aided military coup d’état against Chile’s Popular Unity government and its 
democratically elected President, Salvador Allende, in 1973; the U.S. bombardment of Tripoli in 
1986; and the overthrow of the Communist regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania in 1989 
(Vukasovich & Boyd-Barrett, 2012).  
In the matter of domestic affairs, however, the Yugoslav media were state media that 
supported the ruling Communist party. Typical news programming included information about 
party leaders and governmental policies. They were never critical of the government and  
showed the commonalities of the Yugoslavian people rather than differences (Taylor & Kent, 
2000). Any attempts for investigative journalism were thwarted by the state. Media criticism of 
certain events in the society could exist only if condoned by the Party. People who led the press 
and television were carefully chosen, using the loyalty to the Party as the paramount criterion. In 
that sense, Yugoslav Communism exercised strict control role over the news media (Milic, 
2006). Thus, as Paulu (1974) notes, Yugoslavia might have been the most liberal of all Eastern 
European societies but “should not but be equated with typical Western democracies” (p. 474).  
After Tito’s death Yugoslavia continued to exist with rotating leadership and reforms did 
not work well. By 1990, Yugoslav debt to Western banks had grown to $20 billion, 
unemployment reached 15.9% (in the least developed region, Kosovo, it was even 38.4%), and 
inflation rates had substantially grown. With the rising ethnic tensions and the proclamation of 
independence by Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia was on the edge of dissolution; bloody ethnic 
wars ensued leaving around 140,000 dead and millions of displaced (Baskin & Pickering, 2011; 
International Center for Transnational Justice, 2009).  
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Serbia was the biggest of the Yugoslav republics, and after the dissolution of the country, 
stayed in the federation with the smaller republic of Montenegro until 2006, when Montenegro 
declared independence. In December 1990, Slobodan Milošević, a mid-level official, won the 
first multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia since World War II. His newly 
formed Socialist Party of Serbia, the successor of the Communist party of Serbia, won the 
majority of seats in the Parliament. His victory was considered to be a result of big rallies where 
he highlighted major nationalistic issues. By the time he became the president of Serbia he had 
already engineered the fall of the governments of the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, put 
his key followers in media, and was considered to be the “boss of Serbia” (Cox, 2002; Sotirović, 
2009). In literature, he has been described as a nationalistic leader who ruled the country as an 
authoritarian and, while allowing some opposition, brutally interfered with the elements of 
democracy (Cox, 2002).  
During Milošević’s rule news media were either under strict control of the state or were 
severely persecuted by the regime. Although the new laws allowed the formation of private 
media and formally guaranteed “freedom of the press and other forms of public dissemination of 
information” (Pešić, 1994, p. 16), the main media were state media: Radio-Television of Serbia, 
news agency TANJUG, and daily Politika. Milošević took full control of all of them. For 
example, at Radio-Television of Serbia (RTS) the government appointed all members of the 
managing board and the general manager after the 1991 law enabled the centralization of three 
state broadcasting centers into one (Veljanovski, 2005).  The regime put its followers in key 
positions and selected the journalists according to criteria related to patriotism (Pešić, 1994, 
p.17). Those who did not obey those criteria were sent off to so-called “compulsory vacation” for 
an indefinite period of time. More than 1,000 staff members were forced to leave because the 
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regime considered them politically unsuited (Open Society Institute, 2005). Simultaneously, state 
media were the main source of information for impoverished people hit by the severe economic 
crisis. For example, RTS was the only broadcaster to cover the majority of the country (96%) 
with average viewership of 3.5 million for its main news program (Pešić, 1994, p.15).  
Unlike in the Communist era, independent reporting in Serbia did exist during the 1990s 
and was reserved for private media, but they were severely persecuted by the regime. 
Independent journalists were arrested for supposed treason or libel and often called the “stooges” 
of Western powers (Cox, 2002). The 1998 Information Law banned, among other things, the 
“breach of reputation and honor of individuals” (Article 11) and broadcasting of foreign 
programs (Article 27) while Article 69 envisaged draconian punishments for breaches of the act 
(Information Law of Serbia, 1998). Just in the first year after its adoption, more than 20 media 
were punished for breaching the law – many of them were completely closed while others had to 
pay millions of dinars in fines (Kaljević, 1999). Besides enduring harassment from Milošević’s 
regime, independent journalists faced low payments. During hyperinflation in 1993, a 
journalist’s monthly salary could buy a jar of pickles or beets from the mostly empty shelves of 
Serbian stores. On the other hand, journalists working for news programmers of the state-
controlled media were very well paid, some of them even rewarded with apartments. Their 
loyalty during the 1990s was to be proven by defending the nation during bloody ethnic wars, 
which usually consisted of glorifying tradition and Serbian historical greatness, while claiming 
an international conspiracy against the Serbs. The control over the news media was supported by 
the powerful, former Communist State Security Service (SDB), with its paid professionals or 
patriotic volunteers infiltrating the media as journalists or other media workers (Milic, 2006). 
This mix of existence of private and public media, in which the criticism of political machinery 
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and officials in power is severely punished, corresponds most closely to Siebert, Peterson, and 
Schramm’s (1956) authoritarian model of the press. Originated out of the philosophy of the 
absolute power of the leader and his government, in which the society (i.e., the leader) keeps the 
right to prohibit the propagation of dangerous opinions under the pretext of preserving public 
peace and order, this press model assumes that the chief purpose of mass media is to support and 
advance the policies of the government. Thus, social control is imposed from one institution (the 
government) to another (the press), and censorship and licensing are considered as justifiable 
means for media control. In authoritarian press systems, existence of privately operated media 
are allowed, but various methods of establishing the restraints over them are employed: from 
granting special permits to selected individuals to engage in mass information dissemination and 
introducing a licensing system for individual printed works, through employing prosecution 
before the courts for violation of accepted and established rules of behavior, with treason and 
sedition as the basis for prosecutions of persons suspected of disseminating information inimical 
to authorities, to special taxation designed to limit the profit of private media (Siebert, Peterson, 
& Schramm, 1956).  
On October 5, 2000, Milošević’s regime was toppled in a massive demonstration in the 
capital, Belgrade. Milošević was forced to step down and recognize the results of the September 
24, 2000 federal elections in which the candidate of a coalition of democratic parties won. 
Western countries supported the results of the elections and welcomed the country into the 
international community by restoring diplomatic relations, sending millions of dollars in aid and 
accepting the country into different international organizations (Cox, 2002). The toppling of 
Milošević finally opened the way for the news media to function in a non-repressive 
environment. However, the inherited problems, as well as the connections of new authorities 
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with organized crime and secret services made the job more difficult (Milic, 2006). Serbia’s state 
television had to be transformed to a public service broadcaster and the Broadcasting Agency of 
the Republic of Serbia was formed, representing the first time in Serbia’s history that an 
independent regulatory body was entrusted to act as a controller of the broadcasting sector 
(Veljanovski, 2005).  However, the lack of media law implementation postponed the 
transformation of state television, while other state media, such as the major dailies Politika and 
Večernje Novosti, along with Belgrade’s Studio B Television remained partially or fully owned 
and controlled by the state. News agency TANJUG was still receiving government help, making 
it more competitive than the two private national news agencies, Beta and Fonet (IREX, 2012; 
Open Society Institute, March 28, 2006).   
Today, Serbia is characterized as a democratic country by several organizations that 
measure the level of freedom in the world, but their assessments of the level of country’s 
democratization range from almost full institutionalized democracy to flawed democracy. On 
Polity IV index5, which ranks the level of state democratization from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 
(full institutionalized democracy), the country scored 8 for the period 2005-2010. This means 
that Serbia obtained high scores on two elements: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; 
and 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive 
(TheMacroDataGuide, 2010). Freedom House (2013)6 ranked Serbia as a free country. On a 
scale for political rights and civil liberties ranging from 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free), 
                                                     
5
 The latest version of the Polity Project, the Polity IV, is a continuation of a research program established by Ted 
Robert Gurr in the 1970s. Originally, the aim of the project was to measure political system durability. In subsequent 
years, the analytical scope was broadened to encompass the issue of regime type more generally, and today the 
project’s main index is a measure of the degree of democracy and autocracy. 
6
 Freedom House is an American organization that measures the levels of freedom around the world considering that 
freedom is possible only in democratic political environments where governments are accountable to their own 
people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, and belief, as well as respect for the rights 
of minorities and women, are guaranteed. 
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Serbia obtained a freedom ranking of 2, civil liberties ranking of 2, and political rights ranking of 
2.  The report described the country as an electoral democracy with largely free and fair 
elections, present political pluralism, generally free press, constitutionally guaranteed freedom of 
religion, where citizens enjoy freedoms of assembly and association. However, the report noted 
that corruption and human trafficking remained serious problems in Serbia, that judicial 
independence, independence of media from political parties, and the representation of ethnic 
minorities in the government had to be improved, while religiously motivated incidents 
diminished. The Democracy Index 2012 (Economist, 2012)7 considered Serbia as a flawed 
democracy with the overall score of 6.33 (on a scale from 1 to 10). The report included almost all 
Eastern Europe countries in this category (except the Czech Republic) noting that the countries 
of the region lag behind the countries in Western Europe in political participation, political 
culture, and, in case of Serbia, the functioning of the government. Taking into account the 
findings of these reports, which indicated that Serbia reached satisfactory levels of electoral 
process, political pluralism, and the presence of democratic institutions, but noted the problems 
with the functioning of the government, political culture, and some civil liberties, this 
dissertation will consider Serbia as a formal but not yet a fully developed democracy.   
In terms of news media, today, Serbia has 134 registered television stations, 39 cable 
televisions, 377 radio stations, and 517 print media outlets. In total, the country has 1,000 media 
outlets for 7.1 million people, making most of the outlets unsustainable. Although the news 
media in the country are no longer experiencing extreme government pressures, as they had 
during the Communist and Milošević’s eras, violations of freedom of speech are still present. 
Political removals of editors and journalists, prohibitions to individual journalists to enter public 
                                                     
7
 The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit that measures the state 
of democracy in 167 countries around the world.  
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press conferences, attacks on journalists, trumped-up court cases against journalists, as well as 
cases of state officials verbally attacking journalists remain common occurrences (IREX, 2012).   
At the same time, professional standards in Serbian journalism have suffered due to the 
impact of the economic crisis on the media market, low salaries, worsening ethical standards, 
and heightening self-censorship. IREX’s8 panelists described situations in which the news media 
have often missed coverage of serious political, economic, and social problems. Journalists often 
base a story on a single source, and fail to do background research. Some are prone to 
sensationalized reporting using vulgar and other inappropriate language. According to IREX’s 
panelists, Serbian journalists do not possess qualified knowledge to cover specialized topics such 
as economics, justice, or ecology, and are often prone to biased reporting (IREX, 2012; IREX, 
2011). In addition, Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia (2011)9 described 
corruption as one of the main problems of Serbian news media. Being closely aligned with 
specific political parties or other centers of power, Serbian editors and journalists are often 
inclined to publish rumors, insinuations, and half-truths (Miller, 2006-2007).  
In sum, the literature on news media in post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, 
although lacking a common theoretical framework, has pointed out some shared characteristics 
of media systems in the region. After the fall of Communism in 1989, most of the counties, albeit 
in different ways, went through the process of transition, during which the old systems of control 
became ineffective. However, the processes of news media transformation in these countries, 
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 International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) is an international nonprofit organization, based in the United 
States, which works in transitional, conflict, and post-conflict environments, and uses specialized training and 
consulting in supporting the sustainability of news media.  
9
 Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia is an expert, advisory body to the Serbian government, 
founded with the mission of discovering corruption activities, proposing measures to fighting the corruption 
effectively, and monitoring their implementation. The body was established by the Serbian Government on October 
11, 2001, with the members appointed by the government. Its former president, Ms Verica Barać, was known as one 
of the biggest fighters against the corruption in Serbia, who openly defied political and economic centers of power in 
the country. 
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which by definition should include the evolution from one stable system to another, from one in 
which news media serve the state to one in which they serve citizens, have still not been 
completed (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013; Hallin & Mancini, 2013). In Serbia, the media system 
transitioned in 1989 from a Communist one, in which all media were under state control, to an 
authoritarian one, in which one part of the news media were under the control of the ruling 
regime, and the other were independent but severely persecuted. Functioning in a not yet fully 
developed democratic society, news media in Serbia today try to imitate the Western journalistic 
style, but face problems with economic and political pressures, journalistic unprofessionalism, 
and violations of press freedoms (Anticorruption Council of the Government of Serbia, 2011; 
IREX, 2012). 
In this complex situation, in which historical, political, and social developments tie with 
the transformation of media systems, it becomes hard to discern what leads people to trust news 
they see, hear or read. Is it the quality of contemporary news reporting or the general distrustful 
predisposition that has spilled over from the Communist past that determines the present 
relationship of Serbians towards their transitional media systems? Scholars have found that in 
terms of political institutions both explanations are possible in Eastern Europe (e.g., Luhiste, 
2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). What’s astonishing is that the news 
media have attracted less scholarly attention, despite their central role in democratic systems. 
The goal of this dissertation study is to determine the origins of trust in news media in Serbia and 
thus explain deeper the relationship of Serbians with their news media.  
The next Chapter will delve into the scholarly literature on trust and news media, will 
introduce this study’s theoretical framework by providing an overview of cultural and 
performance theories of institutional trust, and will present its research questions and hypotheses.   
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CHAPTER III: 
CORE CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The Concept of Trust  
Trust is omnipresent in social relationships and as such has been attributed with multiple 
meanings. The oldest connotation of trust equates this notion with faith in supranatural power on 
which man feels dependent. As such trust is present in all religious beliefs and represents more 
of a commitment to something than a cognitive understanding. The second concept closely 
connects trust to confidence. It assumes the confidence in or reliance on some quality or 
attributes of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement (Misztal, 1988). Sociological theories 
of trust in modern societies, however, have differentiated trust from confidence and hope.  
Modern human societies are complex entities that have shifted from communities based 
on fate to those moved by human agency. In this more dynamic context, humans, who need to 
face the future more actively and constructively, deploy trust as an active anticipation of the 
unknown future (Sztompka, 2000). For example, politicians have to trust the viability of 
proposed policies, inventors have to trust the reliabilities and usefulness of new products, and 
common people have to trust representatives who act on their behalf in the domain of 
government, economy, judiciary, or science (Dahrendorf, 1990). In this regard, trust is always 
oriented towards future actions, towards situations in which people have to deal with uncertainty 
and risk. As Sztompka (2000) states, when we are almost certain about the future and have a 
high degree of control over it, there is practically no need for trust. Thus trust requires believing, 
even more, believing despite uncertainty. It involves an element of risk resulting from our 
inability to monitor other’s behavior (Misztal, 1988). As Luhamann (1994) explains, one can 
choose to buy or not buy a used car risking that the car turns out to be “a lemon,” or hire a 
babysitter leaving her unsupervised in the apartment; unless one is ready to waive the associated 
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advantages, one cannot avoid taking risks in building trustworthy relationships. For Sztompka 
(2000) this belief represents a bet that we place on the future contingent actions of others.  
This meaning of trust included in modern sociological theory, incorporates two main 
components: beliefs and commitments. When we believe, we hold specific expectations about 
how things will happen in the future or how another person will behave in the future. Barber 
(1983) has distinguished between the three kinds of expectations that people hold when they 
allocate trust. The most general is the expectation of the persistence and fulfillment of the natural 
and moral social orders. Under the first one, trust accounts for the expectations, which all 
humans in a society internalize, that the natural physical and biological orders, as well as the 
moral social order will persist and be realized. It is what people mean when they say, “I trust that 
heavens will not fall,” or “I trust human life to survive.” Second is the expectation of the 
technically competent role of performance, such as trusting the doctor to perform the operation 
well (Barber, 1983). As Fukuyama (1995) writes, “we trust a doctor not to do us deliberate injury 
because we expect him or her to live by the Hippocratic oath and the standards of medical 
profession” (p. 26). And the third expectation assumes that partners in interaction will carry out 
their fiduciary obligations and responsibilities. This expectation includes the belief that people 
will in certain situations place others’ interests before their own (Barber, 1983). 
Besides the contemplative consideration of future possibilities, trust involves 
commitment through action, a bet on someone, an expectation about the action of others which 
has a bearing on our own actions.  According to Sztompka (2000), trusting involves three 
different types of commitments: anticipatory, responsive, and evocative. Anticipatory 
commitment assumes that people act toward others because they believe that the actions which 
they carry out will be favorable to their interests, needs and expectations. For example, a man 
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marries a particular woman because he believes that a woman will be a good mother. Responsive 
trust involves the act of entrusting some valuable object to somebody else and expecting 
responsible care. For example, this kind of commitment occurs when a person leaves a child with 
a baby-sitter, place parents in a nursing home, or deposit savings in the bank. The third type of 
commitment happens when people act on the belief that the other person will reciprocate with 
trust - we trust intentionally to evoke trust. This is particularly characteristic for the close, 
intimate relationships, among family members or friends. For example, a mother allowing her 
daughter to return late in the evening from a date (Sztompka, 2000). 
In modern societies, trust is directed at various objects, the targets of trust. The most 
fundamental target of trust is another person. We can allocate our trust either to people in general 
or to a particular person. In the former case, the trustors experience generalized trust while in the 
latter case they experience particularized trust. Generalized trust assumes trust towards people 
we do not know, towards complete strangers (Uslaner, 2002), whereas particularized trust arises 
in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation (Bjornskov, 2007).10 The next, 
more abstract target of trust is a social role. Independent of the concrete incumbents, some roles 
evoke more trust than others. Mother, friend, doctor of medicine, priest, judge, notary public are 
considered trusted social roles. Other roles, such as the bazaar merchant, used-car dealer, 
prostitute, secret agent, spy, imply apriori distrust. Of course, the definition of some roles as 
trustworthy may differ between societies, depending for example, on the social practices of 
cheating and corruption (Sztompka, 2000).  
The final target of trust is trust in institutions. Institutional trust refers to “confidence in 
institutions under conditions of risk” and means that when one does not have full information 
                                                     
10
 Further discussion about generalized and particularized trust will be presented later in this chapter as they are 
especially important for Cultural and Performance Theories of Trust. 
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about the intention and outcomes of governance, one will still be confident that governing 
institutions will not misuse their power (Luhiste, 2006, p. 478). In this context, individuals place 
trust in institutions such as the school, the university, the army, the church, the courts, the police, 
the banks, the stock exchange, the government, the parliament, or the industrial enterprise 
(Sztompka, 2000). The amount of trust that people vest in various institutions differ among 
societies. It also undergoes changes in time, although these changes are relatively slow and 
require not only modifications in the functioning of institutions but also physiological changes in 
people who vest trust (Luhiste, 2006). Sztompka (2000) describes one of these changes in Polish 
institutions. Due to its long history of foreign domination and oppression, the army and the 
Catholic Church in Poland were considered as the embodiments of national struggle and 
continuing identity and have always stood at the top of trusted institutions. But after the fall of 
Communism in 1989, the author observed the advancement of new democratic institutions, such 
as the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman to high positions in the trust hierarchy, as well as 
the relative demise of the Catholic Church, which was no longer so important in its unifying role.  
 In sum, the review of the concept of trust shows that its meaning has changed from 
passive connotations of faith and confidence to a more active anticipation of the unknown future, 
whose meaning implies insufficient knowledge about the outcomes of future actions, and the 
awareness of risk. In such capacity, trust can be targeted towards individuals, social roles, or 
institutions. Conceptualizing trust in its modern sociological meaning, this dissertation research 
studies trust in news media as an institution. News media have been studied both as a social and 
a political institution. In terms of as a social institution, defined as an organization that provides a 
“support system for individuals as they struggle to become members of a larger social network” 
(Silverblatt, 2004, p.35), news media have been looked to as guidebooks for social behavior that 
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convey societal norms and values (Silverblatt, 2004). The political angle has mainly related news 
process to the structure of the state and the economy, as well as to the economic foundation of 
the news organization.  In this regard, news media as an institution have been studied as state-
controlled organs of propaganda but also as autonomous forces in politics that, independent of 
political parties, affect political processes. At its best, the latter conceptualization of news media 
is one in which journalism is capable of standing as spokesperson of civil society and monitoring 
the work of the government  (Schudson, 2002). This dissertation measures the institution of news 
media against this ideal and uses sociological theories as well as theories of modern journalism 
to conceptualize individual trust in news media.  
Conceptualizing Trust in News Media  
In consolidated democracies of Western Europe and Northern America, news media have 
been considered one of the key institutions necessary for the surveillance of decision makers, 
scrutinizing government performance, and reporting and interpreting ongoing events (Graber, 
2010). Thus the study of trust in them has had a long tradition (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus 
& McCann, 2003). In over eight decades of research, Western academic literature has generated 
three separate, although not always clearly distinguished, lines of research about trust in news 
media: 1) believability of news media organizations, 2) credibility of news media, 3) and trust in 
news media as an institution.  
1) The studies in the field of believability in news media organizations started in the 
1930s, when the newspaper industry became concerned that an increasing number of 
people were turning to radio. It gained momentum again with the arrival of television 
in the 1950s, when Roper started asking about the believability of different media 
(Roper, 1985). Namely, the Roper organization began regularly asking people which 
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medium they would believe if they got conflicting reports of the same news from 
radio, television, magazines, and newspapers. At first, newspapers were judged to be 
more believable than television, but in 1961, television became the most-believed 
medium (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus & McCann, 2003). Having widely 
criticized Roper’s question for bias against newspapers, scholars have moved from 
defining trust in news media as believability of news organizations to looking at the 
multidimensionality of the construct (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus & McCann, 
2003). 
2) Studies on media credibility have dealt with three types of media credibility: source, 
article, and organizational credibility. Defined as “the amount of believability” 
attributed to a source of information by the receivers (Bracken, 2006, p. 724), source 
credibility can affect attitude change. Receivers were found to be persuaded more by 
sources they find more credible then by those they view less positively (McCroskey, 
Hamilton, & Weiner, 1974; Pornpitakpan, 2004). The research in this domain mainly 
relied on Yale Communication Research Program and Carl I. Hovland’s findings that 
credibility of the source is comprised of two components: expertise, “the extent to 
which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions,” and 
trustworthiness, “the degree of confidence in the communicator’s intent to 
communicate the assertions he considers most valid” (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 
1953). Later, scholars proposed other dimensions of source credibility such as 
dynamism, composure, and sociability (e.g., Berlo, Lemert & Mertz, 1970; Markham, 
1968; Whitehead, 1968). In television studies, Markham (1968) found that besides 
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trustworthiness, the entertainment factor, consisting of showmanship and dynamism 
is important for TV anchors to be perceived as credible.  
Article credibility focuses on the message itself. Research has shown that in some 
cases message factors may be more important than source factors when assessing 
credibility (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, & Mccann, 2003). For example, 
recipients turn to message cues when issue involvement, knowledge, and personal 
relevance are high (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) or in situations in which little 
information is available about the source of a message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1988). In 
media research, characteristics of news stories are found to influence the level of 
credibility that the audience attributes to them. For instance, Fico, Richardson, and 
Edwards (2004) found that balanced or imbalanced story structure influenced the 
perceived bias, which further influenced perceptions of newspapers credibility. The 
authors explained that these results indicated that news audiences can distinguish 
between balanced and imbalanced stories and give the balanced one greater trust.  
The credibility of news media organization refers to the extent to which a media 
organization has been perceived by the audience as (a) factual and accurate 
(believability dimension) and (b) concerned mainly about the community’s interest 
(community affiliation dimension) (Meyer, Marchionni, & Thorson, 2010). This 
definition stems from Gaziano & McGrath’s (1986) study, which created a 12-item 
scale that represented a credibility dimension. It included the perceived fairness, 
accuracy, bias, trustworthiness, respect for people’s privacy and their interest, 
factuality, separation of facts from opinion, and journalistic training. Their scale was 
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refined by Meyer (1988), who indicated that two factors, believability and community 
concern, best reflected dimensions of credibility of a medium as organization.  
3) The third line of research in the area of trust in news media dealt with the concept of 
trust in news media as institutions. Studies that have examined trust in news media in 
this context were mainly big international public opinions polls (e.g., General Social 
Survey, 1972-2006; Eurobarometer 2001-2006; World Values Survey, 2010-2012) or 
academic studies based on the secondary data analysis of these polls (e.g., Mishler & 
Rose, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Luhiste, 2006). In them, news media were 
considered as one of the social, political, or non-profit institutions of a particular 
country, and the trust in them was conceptualized as the amount of confidence people 
put in press, television or/and radio.  
This dissertation research treats news media as an institution of a democratic society but 
moves away from conceptualizing trust in it as the amount of believability, confidence, or 
credibility. The decision to do so partly stems from the fact that others have not been able to 
validate past measurements of the concept. For example, West (1994) found that Meyer’s (1988) 
model did not fit the data well (GFI=.87 and .85); Gaziano and McGrath (1986) used only 
exploratory techniques; whereas the studies that relied on the data from polling organizations 
(Eurobarometer 2001-2006; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Luhiste, 2006; 
World Values Survey, 2010-2012), have used a single item in measuring trust in news media as 
institutions. More importantly, the conceptualization of trust in news media was not theoretically 
derived in these studies, which led to the confusion of notions of credibility and trust in the 
literature (e.g., in Kiousis, 2001; Tsfalti & Capella, 2003, 2005). Drawing from the research of 
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Kohring and Matthes (2007), this dissertation research relies on sociological theories of trust and 
the theories of modern journalism and society to define trust in news media.  
As discussed in the section above, the concept of trust in modern societies allows people 
to deal with the risk of the open future, allowing them to compensate for giving up control to 
someone else. In this situation, the complexity of modern societies demands from social actors to 
become selective of other social actors (Barber, 1983; Luhmann, 1979; Sztompka, 2000). In the 
act of trusting, the trusting actor does not know whether his or her trust is warranted, but has to 
selectively connect his or her action with a certain action of other social factors under the 
condition of perceived risk (Kohring, 2004, cited in Kohring and Matthes, 2007). As Kohring 
and Matthes (2007) note, news media are expert systems in modern societies that have their own 
organizational structure, specialist language, and logic of action. Not being able to control the 
effectiveness of these systems by themselves, individuals have to invest a certain amount of trust 
in news media, risking that news media will not betray their expectations. The societal function 
of news media consists of selecting and conveying information about the events in modern 
societies, thus enabling the public to fulfill their need for orientation in their social environments. 
In this process, journalists cannot provide all information about any possible issue, but have to 
inform the public selectively, which makes relying on news reporting itself a risky action 
(Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Following this line of reasoning, trust in news media is 
conceptualized as trust in news media selectivity, rather than in absolute truth. When reporting 
about issues, personalities, and events, news media selectively choose some information over 
other information, and people take the risk when trusting these specific selections (Kohring & 
Matthes, 2007). Thus the audience does not invest their trust in an ultimate truth of news media, 
but rather in their selectivity.  
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From this theory, Kohring and Matthes (2007) derived four dimensions of journalistic 
selectivity: “trust in selectivity of topics,” “trust in selectivity of facts,” “trust in accuracy of 
depictions,” and “trust in journalistic assessment.” Trust in selectivity of topics assumes that trust 
is associated with the selection of reported topics and that the recipients trust that the news media 
will focus on those topics and events that are relevant to them. Trust in selectivity of facts 
concerns the selections of facts or background information assuming that the way in which an 
event is contextualized is relevant to trust in news media. Trust in accuracy of depictions 
presupposes that recipients trust the verifiable and approvable accuracy of depicted facts. Finally, 
trust in journalistic assessment takes into consideration the trust that recipients put in the 
journalistic evaluation of an event (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). 
When conceptualizing trust in news media, this dissertation research uses Kohring and 
Matthes’s (2007) trust in journalistic selectivity. Although this conceptualization of trust in news 
media has been used previously in research (e.g., Holbert, 2011; Holbert, Hmielowski, & Weeks, 
2011), it has not been expanded to the region of Eastern Europe, where the relationship of 
individuals towards trust has been somehow different.  
Trust in post-Communist Countries  
Even though there were obvious national varieties in the rigidity and style in which 
Communists ruled in different countries of Eastern Europe (e.g., Romania was not the same as 
Yugoslavia; Poland was not the same as Czechoslovakia), the Communist regime succeeded in 
creating a common cultural framework, over and above distinct national cultures. It was a unique 
syndrome of values, rules, norms, codes, and standards typical for the Soviet bloc as a whole, 
called the “bloc culture.” Citizens of Communist countries of Eastern Europe shared the life 
under so-called “real-socialism” that has produced the unique legacy of a peculiar cultural-
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civilizational syndrome (Sztompka, 1996; 2000). Besides a common institutional framework of 
autocratic polity and command economy, the Communists imposed a “philosophy of 
dependence” instead of self-reliance, collectivism and conformity instead of individualism, 
equality of not only opportunities but outcomes, extremism in beliefs and intolerance (Seweryn 
Bialer, quoted in Reisinger , Miller, Hesli, & Maher, 1994, p. 195).    
One of the consequences of bloc culture was the widespread erosion of trust. Grandiose 
false promises of Communist regimes, the failure to deliver those promises, and oppressive rule 
which included the strong activities of secret services in controlling the citizenry, have produced 
a generalized distrust in everything that was linked to the state and its institutions (Traps, 2009). 
Authorities both central and local were perceived as alien and hostile; the government was seen 
as the arena of conspiracy, deceit, cynicism, or at least stupidity and inefficiency. Trusting the 
state or the ruling party was considered as naiveness or stupidity, and actively supporting the 
regime was seen as treason. On the other hand, citizens developed particular skills in outwitting 
the state. They recognized that the ability to beat the system, using all the means necessary, even 
evasion of laws, was a widely accepted virtue. Sociologists later coined the term “parasitic 
innovativeness” to describe this characteristic (Sztompka, 2000).  
The erosion of trust in post-Communist countries is explained by Paldam and Svedsen’s 
(2001) dictatorship theory. It argues that trust levels in Central and Eastern Europe deteriorated 
due to the oppressive behavior of the communist dictatorships. For example, Romania’s dictator 
Nicolae Ceausescu created an internal intelligence agency known as Securitate that may have 
used as many as 700,000 citizens as informers. Other communist regimes had similar agencies: 
the Soviet KGB or East Germany’s Stasi, both known worldwide for their brutal treatment of 
citizens merely accused of being political dissidents. In this atmosphere, it may have been 
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entirely rational not to trust people other than the closest family and friends (Bjornskov, 2007). 
The theory posits that dictatorships destroy trust by devastating social capital, which is achieved 
by the atomization of human relations. Communism made a fundamental division between the 
two spheres of life, private and public, and encouraged social atomization. Unable to trust 
anybody but close friends and family, individuals withdrew to the private sphere or to their inner 
selves (Wheaton & Kavan, 1992). Atomized individuals were distrustful, uninterested in public 
matters, and unwilling to spend energy on shared goals (Petrova, 2007). Paradoxically, 
communist dictators themselves became distrustful. As Milovan Djilas witnessed, to Stalin, the 
world of politics as well as the world in general was a world of enemies. “If you wanted to 
survive as your own master,” Djilas (1998, p. 14) described his impression of the Soviet 
dictator’s thoughts during one of their encounters in 1944, “you dared not trust a soul. Everyone 
but yourself was either a crook or a knave. You had to battle it out, you dared not rely on 
anyone’s strength but your own” (p. 14). Atomization of individuals was achieved by controlling 
the citizens through secret services, creating fear and distrust, and abolishing all voluntary 
organizations. In order to attain its main goal of the creation of a new socialist person and the 
elimination of a capitalist person, Communist regimes brought all voluntary organizations under 
the leadership control of the Communist party: even the boy scouts were replaced by official 
party scouts (pioneers). By doing this, the party, in every realm of life, told people effectively 
what to do and made almost all decisions on their behalf. There was no room left for 
entrepreneurship, experiments and voluntary organization into social groups (Paldam & Svedsen, 
2001).  
The erosion of trust in Communist societies represented the opposite of what the rulers 
intended to produce by conducting severe control of the citizenry. Despotic, dictatorial, and 
42 
 
totalitarian systems attempt to directly institutionalize trust and turn it into a strongly sanctioned 
formal demand. In such a system, citizens are expected to trust unquestionably the monarch, 
dictator, or the leader. They are expected to ignore any relevant evidence about the deeds or 
misdeeds of the ruler and to avoid making evaluations or critiques of the ruler. One should “trust 
the leader unconditionally, not because of what he does, but because of who he is, just as one 
trusts one's father, a priori and without any proofs of trustworthiness really being needed” 
(Sztompka, 2000, p. 148). Citizens are expected to allocate the same levels of trust to the whole 
system of authority: feudal monarchy, or national socialism, or dictatorship of the proletariat. 
The principles of the regime should not be questioned and are to be treated as truths. In 
democratic regimes, in contrast, trustworthiness is primarily based on two criteria: accountability 
and pre-commitment. Accountability assumes that rulers are best trusted when the rule of law 
can be relied upon to force them to abide by their trust. Pre-commitment treats the Constitution 
as the guarantee of continuity. Thus, democracies institutionalize distrust by using principles of 
democracy, whereas autocracies institutionalize trust by demanding total and unconditional 
support for the rulers and the system of rule (Sztompka, 2000).  
Although Communism fell in 1989, skepticism towards strangers, as well as towards 
institutions prevailed in Eastern Europe. Analyzing World Values Survey (WVS) data from 
1995, Miheljak (2006) found that level of generalized trust, or trust in strangers, was relatively 
low in all the central and eastern European countries under examination. For example, only 
15.3% of participants in Slovenia thought that most people could be trusted, 16.9% in Poland, 
17.9% in Romania, 22.5% in Hungary, and 22.8% in Croatia. The fourth wave of the WVS, 
which included 21 countries from the region, showed average generalized trust at 22%, whereas 
the fifth WVS wave, which covered 9 countries from the region, showed average generalized 
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trust at 21%. For comparison, the respective value in the fourth wave was 38% for the EU 15 
countries and 36% for the USA (Aasland, Grodeland & Pleines, 2012). In terms of trust in 
institutions, Mishler and Rose (1997) analyzed the comparative data from New Democracy 
Barometer surveys that were conducted in November 1993 and March 1994 in seven central and 
eastern European Countries (Bulgaria, the Check Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovenia) and in two republics of the former Soviet Union (Belarus and Ukraine). 
The main findings indicated that skepticism predominated in the region in terms of trust towards 
15 institutions. In Rose’s (1994) study, citizens of Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland were asked whether they trusted or distrusted key institutions of civil 
society. The respondents in all countries expressed distrust of seven out of ten institutions. The 
author noted that in all these countries, levels of public trust in institutions were significantly 
lower than the levels that researchers typically found in both Western Europe and the United 
States.    
Trust in News Media in post-Communist Countries  
During the Communist period, media, as state institutions, did not enjoy the confidence of 
citizens. General suspicion of everything that came from the public domain, was supported by 
the discrepancy between official statistics and everyday observation, between the messages of 
the media and everyday knowledge. Common wisdom, “TV lies,” was shared among citizens. In 
contrast to general distrust in state media, there was a naïve faith in the information coming 
either from private sources or foreign media (e.g., Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, 
Deutsche Welle) (Sztompka, 2000). Citizens of Tito’s Yugoslavia were aware that the state 
media served the interests of the state. Although they usually accepted the message, they did not 
always trust the source (Glenny, 1996). Scholars note that such an ambivalent position is not 
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uncommon in authoritarian media systems. Halpern (1994), who explored media dependency in 
Chile, found that state-controlled media suffered from low credibility, but that, in an 
authoritarian political system, media dependency might have a significant impact on political 
perceptions. The author explained that the media environment in an authoritarian political system 
is characterized by a lack of functional alternatives for political information; state-controlled 
mass media represent the main source of news. As Taylor and Kent (2000)  explained, “even 
though citizens mistrusted the source of the state-controlled messages, the state ideology behind 
the messages was a part of their everyday existence” (p. 357).    
After the fall of Communism, mass media, although more independent, had trouble 
regaining trust due to their instrumental role during real-socialism. Although citizens did 
distinguish between state and independent media when attributing trust11, in general, attitudes 
towards news media remained negative. In Poland, for example, in 1993, 48% of people still did 
not believe television, and 40% distrusted newspapers (Sztompka, 2000). In other Eastern 
European countries, skepticism towards media prevailed too. Mishler and Rose’s (1997) study 
showed that people in seven eastern and central European countries and two republics of the 
former Soviet Union, were generally skeptical towards their media. On a 7-point scale, the scores 
                                                     
11
 During the 1990s, in Slovakia, the first private television station Markiza,  formed by the American 
media group, Central European Media Enterprises, was highly critical of the government of Vladimir Mečiar and its 
main newscast was quickly rated by the viewers as the most objective and trustworthy. It was especially trusted by 
respondents aged 18 to 24, those with university education, residents of cities with population of more than 100,000, 
and by the Hungarian minority. In contrast, the viewers saw public TV as the least trustworthy  (Johnson, 2013). In 
Serbia, radio station B92, financed mainly by foreign donations, played a major role in informing and mobilizing the 
citizenry during 1996-1997 student demonstrations against Slobodan Milošević’s regime’s attempt to fake the 
outcome of municipal elections (Cheterian, 2009), while at the same time dissatisfied citizens protested against the 
propagandistic reporting of the state television (Open Society Institute, 2005).  In Georgia, even today, any 
association of the media with the state raises suspicion. Thus, state financial support for television company Rustavi 
2 decreased public trust in the medium (Berekashvili, 2009). Ukrainian journalist Andrii Shevchenko described in 
2006 that “the society had no trust, absolutely no trust, in the national state television”  (Cheterian, 2009). Even in 
Belarus, where from 1997 to 2008 the level of trust in state media was higher than the level of trust in independent 
media, the state media seem to have lost people’s support. In 2008, 2009, and 2011, an independent public opinion 
agency measured higher levels of trust in independent media than in state media, concluding that distrust for state 
media has grown rapidly (Manaev et al., 2013).      
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for trust in media institutions ranged from 3.2 in Romania to 4.0 in Slovakia (Mishler & Rose, 
1997).  Similar trend was detected in Croatia. For example, Baloban and Rimac’s (1999) survey 
showed that only between 2% and 3 % of Croatians completely trusted the media; Čuvalo’s 
(2010) analysis of the 2009 data indicated that, on average, Croatians’ level of trust in media, 
when compared to trust in other institutions, was among the lower ones; whereas a study from 
2011 conducted by an audience research agency GfK showed that only 21% of participants said 
they trusted news media (GfK Croatia, 2012). 
In Serbia, general distrust prevails today among the general population. Gallup Balkan 
Monitor (2010) found that the Serbs together with Macedonians are the most pessimistic people 
in the Balkans, with a particular trend in diminishing trust in national institutions. Mass media 
together with national government and judiciary are the least trusted institutions. Only between 
35% to 41% of respondents said they trusted these institutions, which represented a significant 
drop from their 2008 survey. The same year, another polling agency, Strategic Marketing from 
Belgrade, conducted a national survey of the Serbian population. The results showed that 
Serbians had quite low levels of trust in media in general. Almost every third respondent thought 
that information coming from the media was too scarce to enable the proper understanding of 
problems. In the survey, 73% of respondents thought that there was some form of censorship in 
the media, with 26% describing content control as prevalent. According to surveyed Serbians, 
political parties, the government, oligarchs, people involved in organized crime, as well as the 
international community controlled the information in Serbian media. Although the majority of 
them (57%) said they trusted television the most, this medium was simultaneously perceived as 
the one under the biggest control. Respondents rated private television B92 (44%) as the most 
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trusted medium, followed by the private television Pink (35%) and the public broadcaster RTS 
(35%) (Strategic Marketing, 2008).   
Scholars have derived two major explanations about the origins of distrust in news media 
in post-Communist countries. Under the first explanation, distrust in news media has been 
understood as a spill-over from generalized distrust in other people and distrust in all other 
institutions. Studies that have subscribed to this explanation, found that origins of distrust in all 
institutions in Eastern European countries can be found in their Communist and socialist legacy 
that destroyed trustworthy social relationships (e.g., Aasland, Grodeland, & Pleines, 2012; 
Bjornskov, 2007). Other group of explanations saw distrust in news media among Eastern 
Europeans as a consequence of bad journalistic practice. This line of reasoning described that 
news reporting in post-Communist countries has been generally on a very low level, lacking 
proper training, objectivity, neutrality, and being under severe economic and political pressures 
(Gross, 2002; IREX, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Spasovska, 2010). The mixture of low journalistic 
standards, political activism, and representation of self-interest rather than public interests can 
contribute to a society’s diminished trust in journalism as an independent agent (Johnson, 2013). 
These two major explanations about distrust in news media, coincide with two groups of theories 
that explain the origins of institutional trust: cultural and performance theories. This dissertation 
research uses these two groups of theories to examine the factors that influence trust in news 
media in Serbia. 
Cultural and Performance Theories of Trust    
Cultural theories differ from performance theories in the extent to which trust is 
conceived as exogenous or endogenous to social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 
2001). According to cultural theories, the origins of trust lie outside of the institutions. They 
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originate from the character of the people, are deeply rooted in cultural norms and beliefs and are 
learned early in life (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 
1990). In contrast, performance theories view trust as endogenous to institutions and consider it a 
consequence of institutional functioning. They treat trust as consequence not a cause of 
institutional performance (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1988; Hetherington, 1998).  
Cultural theories assume that cultural heritage plays a significant role in determining the 
value systems of societies. Thus, as Inglehart (2006) notes, large differences exist between value 
systems of the historically Catholic or Protestant societies and the historically Orthodox societies 
in Europe. According to these theories, trust is a fundamental property engrained in the base of 
every society and as such is shaped by culture. Defined as “a system of attitudes, values, and 
knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation” 
(Inglehart, 1990, p. 18), culture determines the trust norms that individuals carry within them. 
Virtually from birth, individuals learn first from their parents and immediate family and then 
from school friends, coworkers and neighbors, to trust or distrust people. They obtain this 
particular trusting or distrusting characteristic by experiencing how others in their culture treat 
them and how, in return, others react to their behavior (Mishler & Rose, 2001). This creates a 
particular “collective programming,” which influences the processes the trustors use to decide 
whether and whom to trust (Triandis, 1972). Indeed, research shows that some countries are 
inherently more trusting than the others: people in the United States and France, and China and 
Japan differ on the basis of trust (Olson & Olson, 2000). In Norway, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands, about 60% of people believe most other people can be trusted, whereas in Brazil, 
the Philippines, and Turkey about 10% trust others (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Fukuyama 
(1995) writes that the French have a tendency not to trust their superiors to make honest 
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evaluations of their work; Almond and Verba (1963) found that Germans and Italians rank 
relatively low on interpersonal trust; Huff and Kelley (2002) found that American managers 
show higher levels of trust than Asian managers, while Doney, Cannon and Mullen (1998) 
propose that various cultural dimensions, such as power distance or individualism and 
collectivism, may influence general trusting mechanisms of a particular population.  
According to cultural theories, generalized sense of (dis)trust is learned early in life, is 
largely stable through the lifetime, and is not shaped by immediate experiences. Using 
longitudinal General Social Survey data (1972-1996) about immigrants in the United States of 
different ethnic backgrounds, Uslaner (2008) has shown that roots of generalized trust go back 
far in time. He found that people whose grandparents came to the United States from countries 
that have high levels of trust (Nordic and the British) tend to have higher levels of generalized 
trust than Italians, Latinos and African Americans. Generalized trust does not refer to faith in 
specific persons but reflects a more general notion that people, especially those who may be 
different from oneself, have a shared faith (Uslaner, 2008). Also referred to as social trust, 
generalized trust assumes trust towards people that we do not know, towards complete strangers. 
It is a belief that most people can be trusted and is largely based on moralistic values as it does 
not have foundations in experience (Uslaner, 2002). This kind of trust arises when “a community 
shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest 
behavior” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 153). As Rothstein and Stolle (2002) describe, trusting strangers 
indicates the “potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and the abstract 
preparedness to engage in civic endeavors with each other” (p. 2). Generalized trust, as trust 
towards people that we do not have information about, should be distinguished from 
particularized trust, which arises in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation 
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(Bjornskov, 2007). It represents the notion that we should have faith only in the people like 
ourselves. Whereas generalized trust embraces the idea that most people are part of our moral 
community, particularized trust restricts that moral community to our own kind. Generalized 
trusters get the optimistic trust trait from their parents, while particularized trusters rely heavily 
on their experiences and stereotypes in deciding whom to trust (Uslaner, 2002). The difference 
between the two is clearly made in Banfield’s (1958) famous study of a village in Southern Italy, 
in which individuals were connected by exceedingly strong bonds within families but not at all 
between families. The author coined the term “amoral familialism” to describe the phenomenon 
where no trust exists between people who do not know each other through families or kin 
groups.  
Studies on Eastern European countries have found that explanations for generalized sense 
of distrust in the region can be found in their Communist and socialist legacy (Aasland, 
Grodeland, & Pleines, 2012). Using survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, 
Bjornskov (2007) discovered that the Communist past had a clear effect on perceptions of trust, 
as these countries were about eight percentage points less trusting than otherwise comparable 
countries. In-depth interviews with elite representatives of East Central Europe, South East 
Europe, and the Western Balkans, revealed that people in this region distinguished between “us” 
and “them” between “our people” and “others.” Whereas the former usually enjoy their full trust, 
the latter are generally viewed with skepticism, a clear relic of communist past’s atomization of 
human relations (for discussion see e.g., Petrova, 2007; Wheaton & Kavan, 1992). Besides these 
studies that directly assessed the influence of Communist past on the perceptions of trust in 
Eastern Europe, other studies indirectly supported these claims. Measuring the levels of 
generalized trust in the region, these studies found that people in post-Communist countries 
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traditionally have lower levels of generalized trust than those in established democracies (e.g, 
Hankiss, 1990; Macek & Markova, 2004; Musil, 1992).  
The spill-over effect: Cultural theories further assume that a generalized sense of trust 
influences the success of group actions. People who trust each other are more likely to cooperate 
with each other in forming and maintaining both formal and informal institutions such as choirs, 
bowling leagues, community association, even big companies. In these instances interpersonal 
trust spills over into other forms of cooperation (Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Putnam, 1993). For Almond and Verba (1963) interpersonal trust is a prerequisite for the 
formation of secondary associations, which in turn is essential for effective political participation 
in any large democracy. In this regard, a generalized sense of trust allows citizen to join their 
forces in social and political groups, and it enables them to come together in citizens’ initiatives 
more easily. This is in the heart of Robert Putnam’s (1993) idea of social capital. In his study on 
regional governing in Italy he defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as 
trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (p. 167). He posited that a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place 
extensive trust in each other will be able to accomplish more than a group lacking these qualities. 
In the presence of trust in others, people have stronger social capital, they are able to form social 
networks, participate in voluntary organizations, which leads to higher participation in politics 
and ultimately greater political stability (Putnam, 2000). As Putnam (1993) put it, without norms 
of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, “amoral familialism, clientelism, lawlessness, 
ineffective government, and economic stagnation, seems likelier than successful democratization 
and economic development” (p. 183).  
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Fukuyama (1995) explained how generalized trust spills over to create a large and 
measurable economic value. Describing how trust influences successful functioning of firms, the 
author claimed that the greatest economic efficiency is not achieved by rational self-interested 
individuals but by a group of individuals, who, because of trustworthy relationships based in a 
preexisting moral community, are able to work together effectively. He found that in high-trust 
societies, where people trust one another, the functioning in enterprises is more productive as 
everybody is operating according to a common set of ethical norms. High-trust societies, as 
Fukuyama (1995) described, can organize their workplaces on a more flexible and more group-
oriented basis, with more responsibility delegated to lower levels of organizations. On the other 
hand, low-trust societies must impose a series of bureaucratic rules on their workers, who in turn, 
find their workplace less satisfying if they are not treated like adults who can be trusted to 
contribute to their community. Rothstein and Stolle (2002) pointed out that high level of 
generalized trust lubricates harmonious functioning of organizations by eliminating friction and 
minimizing the need for bureaucratic structures that dictate the behavior of people who do not 
trust each other. Fukuyama’s (1995) analysis showed that high-trust societies, such as Germany, 
Japan and the United States, with plentiful social capital, were able to develop large, private, 
hierarchically managed business organization. In contrast, economies of relatively low-trust 
societies, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, France and Italy, have been traditionally populated by 
family businesses as the reluctance to trust non-kin has delayed or prevented the emergence of 
modern, professionally managed organizations. Although, one might conclude, from these 
studies’ findings,  that higher levels of trust have usually been noted in rich countries, it has to be 
pointed out that, in terms of general sense of trust, “what matters is not how rich a country is, but 
how equitable is the dispersion of income” (Uslaner, 2002, p. 181). Analyzing cross-national 
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survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, Bjornskov (2007), found that GDP per capita 
did not have a significant effect on generalized trust, and that poorer countries, such as India or 
Indonesia, had above-average trust levels. The author found, however, that at a country level, 
income inequalities, religion, form of government, and a presence of Communist past affected 
trust in people that one doesn’t know. 
General trust can also spill over to trust in institutions. Cole (1973) analyzed national 
survey data from 1964, 1968, and 1970 and found that trust in people had a statistically 
significant effect on trust in political institutions, when age, race, gender, social class, education, 
efficacy, and employment status were controlled for. Analyzing the General Social Survey data 
from 1972 to 1994, Brehm and Rahn (1997) found that the direct effect of generalized trust on 
confidence in government institutions was positive, and the fourth largest in the model with 14 
independent variables. The authors concluded that the confidence in government requires the 
trust in other people too. In Newton’s (2001) analysis of the relationship between social trust and 
confidence in parliament, 30 out of 42 nations analyzed using World Values Survey data 1991-
1995, had positive correlations between the two variables. The author did find that some of the 
newly democratized nations (e.g., Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Chile, and South Africa) 
were the exception to this trend. He explained that higher confidence in the parliament in these 
countries might be the expression of faith in the principles of democracy as a form of 
government, rather than a satisfaction with the parliament as an institution. Some other studies 
have also found that in new democracies and non-liberal regimes, social and institutional trust 
were not significantly correlated. Rohrscheider and Schmitt-Beck (2002) discovered that 
generalized trust had different effects on institutional trust in East and West Germany ten years 
after the unification. In West Germany, generalized trust was a significant predictor of 
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institutional trust, whereas in East Germany the coefficient had the right sign but was too small 
to attain statistical significance. This finding resembles the pattern found by Almond and Verba 
(1963) in their comparison of old and new democracies in the 1950s. The authors found that in 
established democracies, like Britain and the United States, generalized trust transferred to the 
political realm, but not in new democracies, as West Germany was back then. Kim (2005) even 
found that in South Korea, generalized trust and institutional trust were negatively correlated. In 
the analysis of data from a national survey, the author found that social trust was the most 
influential predictor of trust in parliament and political parties, solely explaining eight percent of 
the variance in political trust12. A newer study, however, showed a remarkably strong association 
between social trust and institutional trust regardless of the level of country’s democratization. 
Analyzing data from 2010 European Social Survey, Boda and Medve-Balint (2012) found a 
correlation of .96 between the two variables across both Eastern and Western European 
countries.  
Some newer studies seem to point out that generalized sense of trust has spilled over to 
the area of trust in news media in some countries. Analyzing the association between generalized 
trust and individuals’ perceptions of trust in news media on a sample of Croatian youth, Pjesivac 
and Imre (2013) found that generalized trust had a positive and statistically significant effect on 
trust in news media, when the effects of age, gender, media use, religion, and political party 
affiliation were controlled in the regression model. Cook and Gronke (2001) analyzed General 
Social Survey’s longitudinal data from 1973 – 1998. The authors found that the confidence in the 
media among American audiences was strongly predicted by a measure of generalized 
                                                     
12
 It has to be noted, however, that Kim (2005) used a different measure of generalized trust than previously 
mentioned studies.  
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confidence in other institutions, but that education, age, income, partisanship, ideology, and 
strength of partisanship had independent effects upon confidence in the press.  
Performance-based theories appeared as a reaction to society-centered and historically-
determined approaches. They posit that trust in institutions depends on perceived successful 
functioning of institutions. In other words, the better the citizens believe the institutions function, 
the higher their trust in them (Luhiste, 2006). In this regard, trust and distrust are conceived as 
rational responses of individuals to the performance of institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). For 
Coleman (1990), for example, a potential trustor decides to place trust or revise his estimate of 
the trustee’s trustworthiness based on information from trustee’s actions. In Dasgupta’s (1998) 
words, a person’s trustworthiness is derived from their behavior which, with time, constitutes 
their reputation. Trust and confidence are, under these theories, not regarded as the direct 
products of social conditions that are associated with well-developed social capital. Instead, 
because all citizens are exposed to institutional actions, trust in institutions is considered to be 
randomly distributed among various different cultural and social types.  Institutions that perform 
well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate 
feelings of distrust and low confidence. The general public, the theories assume, recognizes 
whether government or institutions are performing well or poorly and reacts accordingly 
(Newton & Norris, 2000). 
In the literature, the performance approach is also studied under the notion of institution-
center approach (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002) or institutional theories (Mishler & Rose, 2001). The 
core of the new institutionalism lies in the claim that institutions matter in regards to the 
influence on human behavior through rules and norms and that their structure is a function of 
rational choice (Orren & Skowronek, 1995). According to this group of theories, social capital 
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does not exist independently of institutions, but institutions create, channel and influence the 
amount and type of social capital. The capacity of citizens to develop cooperative ties and 
establish social trust is, in this account, influenced by the government institutions and policies 
(Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). As the contributors to Lijphart and Waisman (1996)’s book showed, 
institutional design has real consequences for government performance and therefore for public 
trust in institutions.  
Institutional theories emphasize two main aspects of performance that are important for a 
trustworthy relationship: policy and economic performance. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and 
Limongi (1996) analyzed the survival and the death of political regimes in 135 countries between 
1950 and 1990, and found that in poorer countries, economic performance is crucial for the 
survival of democracy. The authors showed that poorer democracies had a larger probability of 
dying in a year after their per capita income fell than if their income raised. In contrast, economic 
growth was shown to be conducive to the survival of democracy – the faster the economy grew, 
the more likely it was that the democracy would survive (Przeworski et al., 1996). Political 
outputs of institutions matter equally, especially in new democracies. Thus, in countries where 
individual liberties and the rule of law have been systematically repressed, citizens are likely to 
value institutions that succeed in reducing corruption, removing restrictions on individual liberty, 
and providing increased freedoms. For example, despite nearly two dozen major corruption 
scandals that have hit Argentina in the first part of the 1990s, no investigation has ended in trial. 
Polls showed that more than 80% of Argentinians did not trust their country’s judicial system, 
and that corruption ranked second, behind low salaries, among issues that most concerned them 
(Diamond, 1999). Mishler and Rose (2001) write that in post-Communist countries both 
economic and political factors matter in institutional performance. Socialization into a state-
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controlled economy has taught citizens to hold government accountable for economic conditions. 
In addition, neither freedom nor the rule of law can be taken for granted in these countries, 
taking into account that after the collapse of Communism new forms of corruption have appeared 
including the massive transfer of wealth through the privatization of state enterprises.    
Performance of institutions has been found to influence trust in them. Bouckaert et al. 
(2002) identify two lines of research addressing the link: macro-performance theory and micro-
performance theory. The former refers to comparative studies that explain trust variations across 
countries and over time as the result of variations in factors such as unemployment, economic 
growth, inflation, and the stability of government. Thus, Anderson (1995) explained that the 
German government lost public support between 1980 and 1982, as the unemployment rate rose 
after the 1980 elections. The author found support for his claims in empirical findings from other 
countries, as his longitudinal comparative analysis (1960-1992) demonstrated a negative 
correlation between unemployment rate and trust in public institutions in five European 
democracies: Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, and Netherlands. Newton and Norris 
(2000) conducted a cross-national analysis of 1980-84 and 1990-93 World Values Survey data of 
17 trilateral democracies. Having found a large proportion of respondents that replied they had 
“a great deal” or “quite a lot” confidence in public institutions, such as police, legal system, 
armed forces, parliament, and civil service, as well as in non-profit and private institutions, the 
authors concluded that these responses were likely to be a good gauge of how well the political 
system is actually performing. The micro-performance group of studies denotes the ones that link 
trust to changes in the quality or the perception of institutional service delivery. Thus, DeHoog, 
Lowery and Lyons’s (1990) research conducted in Kentucky showed an important role for local 
government efficacy and attachment to local community for citizens’ satisfaction levels.  Glaser 
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and Hildreth (1999) demonstrated, on a survey of a Midwestern American city with a population 
more than 300,000, that citizens classified as rating government performance high and 
registering a high willingness to pay increased taxes were the most positive about local 
government responsiveness to honor citizen values. Some scholars claim that it is precisely in the 
performance of institutions that we should look for the reasons for traditionally low institutional 
trust in Eastern Europe. Boda and Medve-Balint (2012) found that the levels of social trust, 
personal happiness, and religiousness demonstrated a statistically significant, positive association 
with institutional trust across the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, whereas other 
variables (such as income, age, gender, media consumption, education, type of domicile, 
membership in a minority group) did not have a significant effect on institutional trust in both 
regions. The authors concluded that the examinations for lower trust in institutions in Eastern 
Europe should be looked for elsewhere. The authors suggested looking at the perceived low 
performance of institutions, as they might be highly politicized and thus less trusted in Eastern 
than in Western Europe.   
In the domain of news media, trust has been associated with the levels of journalistic 
performance. In order to be considered trustworthy, news media have to practice news reporting 
in accordance with set standards and ethical norms, which define journalistic professionalism 
(Deuze, 2008). Most of Western journalism studies equate journalism with professionalism if it 
meets the following criteria: its reporting is fair, objective, and well-sourced; journalists follow 
recognized and accepted ethical standards; journalists and editors do not practice self-censorship; 
journalists cover key events and issues; pay levels for journalists and other media professionals 
are sufficiently high to discourage corruption and retain qualified personnel within the media 
organization; entertainment programming does not eclipse news and information programming; 
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technical facilities and equipment for gathering, producing, and  distributing news are modern 
and efficient; and quality niche reporting and programming exist (investigative, economic, 
business, local, political) (Deuze, 2008; IREX, 2013). In Eastern Europe however, although 
journalists are aware of the standards of professionalism (e.g., fairness, objectivity, balance, 
impartiality and independence) their daily routines prove to be different. In many countries of the 
region, there have been no standards for writing news stories, using sources, and respecting the 
rules for the separation of facts from opinions (Gross, 2002; Spasovska, 2010). Gross (2002) 
observed that Polish journalists in 1990-1992 lacked the basic skills in objective news reporting; 
Romanian journalists throughout the 1990s were more devoted to ideological and political rather 
than to professional values, whereas Albanian journalists remained inclined to writing 
propaganda. Johnson (2013) quoted Martin Šimčeka, a former newspaper editor, who described 
that “Slovak newspapers present a highly superficial and blurred picture of the world and the 
country … based on scraps of information without any attempt at analysis” (p. 159).  
A great majority of new journalists who entered the profession in the 1990s in Eastern 
Europe did not have any formal training. This is in contrast to Western practices where 
journalistic education has been considered a keystone in the professionalization process 
(Lippman, 2008) and where the majority of journalists working in the newsrooms hold 
journalism qualifications (Weaver, 1998, 2007). In Eastern Europe, the Communist era merged 
journalism education with political education in order to prepare journalists for their positions as 
socio-political workers (Spasovska, 2010), or teachers and spiritual leaders of society (Gross, 
2002). Journalism programs were often part of political science colleges as was the case with 
former Yugoslavia (Spasovska, 2010). After the fall of Communism, official university programs 
continued to exist and were to a certain extent modified but kept the same philosophy according 
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to which politics, journalism, and literature were mixed in order to create journalists as analysts, 
critics, and commentators rather than reporters or explainers. This conception has led journalists 
to consistently mix facts and opinion (Gross, 2002). At the same time, Western governments, 
non-governmental organizations, and private foundations have attempted to further media 
development in Eastern Europe by sending an influx of venture capital (Sparks, 2005) and 
conducting workshops and hands-on training for journalists. Media workers have learned about 
Western-style media operations and management, especially with regard to the news media 
(Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010). Despite these efforts, the journalistic practice has stayed in poor 
shape. IREX’s Media Sustainability scores indicated that from 2001 to 2012, average scores for 
these countries, on a scale from 1 to 5, ranged from 1.52 to 1.86. These scores put all the 
countries in the region under the category of unsustainable mixed systems, which, under IREX’s 
categorizations, indicates that these countries minimally meet objectives of professional 
reporting (IREX, 2012a).  
In addition, journalists in the region are often under strong political and business 
pressures that damage professional standards. Influenced by a particular party or ideology, 
journalistic reporting became biased and incomplete (Gross, 2002). Political partisanship 
infiltrated publicly owned media, while politically favored media would get preferential status in 
access to information (IREX, 2012a). IREX (2012a) panelists from Albania, Bosnia, Moldova 
and Georgia said that siding with a particular party or government severely hurt news media’s 
objective reporting. Thus one panelist from Georgia stated, “The largest television stations 
uncritically convey the government’s ideas and projects, while opposition-leaning stations do not 
do enough to balance their criticism of the government” (pp. 10, 11). In Macedonia, due to heavy 
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political pressures, journalists have had difficulties following professional standards and often 
have opted for censoring themselves to protect their jobs (Spasovska, 2010).  
Studies that have tested the cultural and performance theories of trust in institutions 
together have generated ambiguous results. Analyzing survey data from Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, Luhiste (2006) found that both cultural and performance variables influenced citizens’ 
trust in political institutions. In other words, institutional trust depends on how much the 
individual trusts other people as well as on how well they believe economic and political systems 
function. On the other hand, in Mishler and Rose’s (2001) study, performance reasoning was 
found to be a better explanation of the origins of political trust than cultural theories. The authors 
tested the data from ten post-Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union and found that institutional trust is substantially affected by both political and 
economic performance while being almost wholly unaffected by interpersonal trust or by 
socialization influences. Analyzing two waves of the World Value Surveys conducted in the 
early 1980s (1981-84) and the early 1990s (1990-93) that included 47,000 respondents in 17 
trilateral democracies, Newton and Norris (2000) found that social trust is not strongly associated 
with measures of confidence in institutions at the individual level.  Socially trusting people were 
not necessarily politically trusting, and vice versa. In addition, confidence in public institutions 
was not at all well explained by the social and economic variables usually associated with 
attitudes and behavior. Life satisfaction, education, income, gender, age, and membership in 
voluntary associations explained little of the variance in confidence in parliament, the civil 
service, or the police. Instead, their research provided substantial support for theories that focus 
on the performance of governments and political institutions to explain citizens’ declining 
confidence in them.  
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation study starts by asking about the levels of three main variables used to 
test cultural and performance theories.  Previous studies that have measured trust in news media 
and generalized trust in Eastern Europe have done so either using different measures or different 
populations (e.g., GfK Croatia, 2012; Luhiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Strategic Marketing, 
2008; World Values Survey 2010-2012). Moreover, perceptions of news media performance 
have not been measured on a developed scale in the region. This dissertation study, therefore, 
begins by describing the levels of trust in news media in Serbia, as well as the levels of two other 
main variables in this study: generalized trust and perceptions of news media performance.   
RQ1: What are the levels of trust in news media, generalized trust, and perceptions of 
news media performance in Serbia? 
Following the assumptions of cultural and performance theoretical perspectives, this 
dissertation hypothesizes that both generalized trust and assessments of news media performance 
play a role in determining trust in news media in Serbia. The cultural perspective, which posits 
that cultural heritage plays a significant role in determining the value systems of societies, claims 
that a nation can have a trusting or distrusting disposition depending on its dominant culture. 
This (dis)trusting disposition is reflected in the nation’s generalized sense of trust towards other 
people. Generalized trust or social trust, according to the cultural view, represents a 
characteristic, engrained in the culture of certain people that is long-lasting and inheritable (e.g., 
Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990, 2006; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2008). The 
macro-cultural theories hold, that most post-Communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe 
have a predisposition to distrust, which is inherent in authoritarian political cultures (e.g., 
Bjornskov, 2007; Keenan, 1986). Previous literature found evidence that generalized trust is 
positively associated with trust in political and social institutions in liberal democracies (Cole, 
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1973; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Newton, 2001), as well as in post-communist countries (Mishler & 
Rose, 2001; Dowley & Silver, 2002), although some studies found that this correlation might not 
be significant or can even have a negative association in new democracies (e.g., Almond & 
Verba, 1963; Kim, 2005; Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). On the other hand, the 
performance perspective posits that potential trustor decides to place trust based on the 
information from other social actor’s actions (Coleman, 1990). Conceiving trust or distrust as 
rational responses of individuals to successful performance of other individuals or institutions, 
these theories assume that trust in institutions depends on perceived successful functioning of 
institutions. Institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens, whereas those 
that perform badly will elicit the feelings of distrust (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & 
Norris, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). The empirical tests of the performance theoretical 
perspective have indicated that economic and political performance, as well as service delivery, 
influence trust in institutions (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Diamond, 1999; Glaser & Hidreth, 1999; 
Newton & Norris, 2000). Taking into account that these separate tests of cultural and 
performance factors have found support for both theories, this dissertation research applies these 
theoretical perspectives to news media, as one of the important institutions of any democratic 
society. In the area of news media, cultural and performance theories have not been tested 
directly, but studies have shown that sensationalism in news stories, serving the interests of 
political regimes and businesses rather than the public (e.g., Liu & Bates; Open Society Institute, 
2005), can hurt the believability of news media. This finding could indicate that performance 
aspects matter in the assessment of trust in news media. Also, the cultural setting of post-
Communism, as well as the positive correlation between generalized trust and trust in institutions 
in general and news media in particular found in post-Communist countries (e.g., Luhiste, 2006; 
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Pjesivac & Imre, 2013), could indicate that the cultural factor could play a significant role in 
determining trust in news media in Serbia. Thus this dissertation hypothesizes that both factors, 
cultural and performance, will have significant influences on trust in news media in Serbia. 
H1a: Generalized trust will significantly influence trust in news media in Serbia.  
H1b: News media performance will significantly influence trust in news media in Serbia.  
In addition to separate tests of cultural and performance factors, several studies have 
empirically tested together the two competing explanations. These tests generated ambiguous 
results: while some researchers found that the cultural factor prevailed in people’s evaluation of 
trust in institutions (e.g., Luhiste, 2006), others have noted the bigger influence of the 
performance factor (e.g., Misher & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). Since it remains 
unclear which factor, cultural or performance, might play a stronger role in determining the 
levels of trust in institutions, and taking into account the fact that the two frameworks have not 
been used together to examine trust in news media separately from trust in other institutions, this 
dissertation research asks the following question:   
RQ2: Which of the two factors, cultural or performance, plays a greater role in 
determining trust in news media in Serbia? 
Literature has identified several additional variables that might potentially moderate the 
relationship between our independent variables (generalized trust and news media performance) 
and the criterion variable (trust in news media). In two of Cole’s (1973) studies, age appeared 
significant in the model that tested the relationship between generalized and institutional trust.  
In Cook and Gronke’s (2011) study age had an independent effect on trust in news media. Other 
studies (e.g., Alesina & la Ferrara, 2000; Gleaser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; 
Putnam, 2000) have found the so-called cohort effect, where older generations appeared to be 
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more trusting than their younger fellow citizens. On the other hand, studies on trust in Eastern 
Europe suggested that older generations in a post-Communist country, raised under the influence 
of Soviet block culture, could be particularly distrustful (e.g., Sztompka, 2000). In sum, previous 
literature has pointed out that age might moderate the relationship between generalized trust and 
trust in news media, but is not unanimous about the directionality of this effect. Thus, this 
dissertation hypothesizes:  
H2: The relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media will be moderated 
by age of Serbian participants.  
Literature has also found that the level of education can amplify or dampen the effects of 
generalized trust on trust in institutions. Thus, Cole (1973) found, in his studies from 1964 and 
1970, that more educated people were more likely to trust institutions; and in Cook and Gronke’s 
(2011) study, education had an independent effect on trust in news media. Knack and Keefer 
(1997) and Knack and Zach (2002) argued that trust is created in the educational system by 
making individuals better informed and better at interpreting perceived information. Moreover, 
as Bjornskov (2007) argues, schooling might have an important socialization effect that may give 
young people a more positive attitude toward strangers. Although these studies did not exclude 
the alternative causal effect, as trust might lead to better educational outcome, their results 
suggest that there might be an interaction effect of generalized trust and level of education in 
predicting trust in news media. Thus this dissertation hypothesizes that:  
H3: The level of education will moderate the relationship between generalized trust and 
trust in news media.  
 Luhiste (2006) noted that people’s trust in institutions could be affected by their political 
affiliations. The author explained that, for example, a Social Democrat living under the rule of a 
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right-wing coalition might display less support for institutions because he or she simply does not 
support the parties in power. This party preference explanation, as Luhiste (2006) observed, has 
been empirically confirmed by analyses that suggested that ‘‘winners” displayed higher trust in 
political institutions than ‘‘losers’’(e.g., Price & Romantan, 2004). Thus, it can be inferred that 
political affiliation might be another moderator of the relationship between generalized trust and 
trust in news media.  
H4: The relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media will moderated 
by political party affiliation.13  
When testing the hypotheses, this dissertation study statistically controlled for several 
variables in order to limit the possibility of Type I error caused by a spurious association 
between the dependent and independent variables (Hayes, 2005). The control variables used in 
this study - trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, media 
use, gender, and income – were all found in the literature to be related to news media or 
institutional trust (e.g., Bennet, Rhine, Flickinger & Benner, 1999; Chafee, 1982; Golan & Day, 
2010; Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010; McLeod, Rush & Friedrcih, 1968; Kiousis, 2001; Tsfalti & 
Cappella, 2003; Westley & Severin, 1964).14     
  
                                                     
13
 Originally, Ethnicity was also to be tested as a possible moderator. However, as the great majority (86.9%) of the 
participants of this study declared themselves as Serbians, enough variability could not be reached. Thus the 
hypothesis predicting that ethnicity could moderate the relationship between generalized trust and trust in news 
media was dropped.     
14
 A more detailed description of control variables used in this dissertation study can be found in chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER IV: 
METHODLOGY 
 
In order to answer the above research question and test the hypotheses, this dissertation 
undertook two steps. The first step had the goal of providing a better understanding of the notion 
of trust in Serbia and of ensuring the proper operationalization of three main concepts used in 
this study: trust in news media, generalized trust, and news media performance. This was done 
by in-depth interviews with representatives of the Serbian population. Based on the findings of 
these interviews, as well as on the review of the relevant literature, a survey questionnaire was 
then constructed to test the impact of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media. I 
will first present the method for in-depth interviews, which will be followed by the survey 
method.    
In-depth Interviews 
The three main concepts used in this study are: trust in news media, generalized trust, and 
news media performance. The first two have been defined and operationalized in the Western 
literature (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Kohring & Matthes, 2007), whereas news media performance 
has not been clearly delineated in the literature. In-depth interviews were meant to establish the 
conceptual equivalences of trust in news media and generalized trust provided in the Western 
literature with their meanings among the Serbian population, as well as to discover the dominant 
aspect/s of news media performance among Serbians. Conceptual equivalence would allow the 
constructs of trust in news media and generalized trust to be applied on a new population, 
whereas the conceptualization of news media performance would allow for its proper 
operationalization.  
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Conceptual equivalence focuses on the presence (or absence) of meanings that 
individuals attach to specific concepts: the meaning of the concepts under study should be the 
same across cultures if the constructs and/or measures are imported from one culture to another 
(in this case from Western cultures to an Eastern European culture) (Gudykunst, 2002). In other 
words, the conceptual definitions of the constructs under study need to be constant across 
cultures (Levine, Park, & Kim, 2007). The constructs in question: trust in news media and 
generalized trust were reviewed carefully in the literature review section. It was established that 
generalized trust, or trust in people that we do not know, conceptualized as the belief that most 
other people try tried to be fair, helpful, and can be trusted, has been used on Eastern European 
populations (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; European Social Survey 2002-2012/13; Luhiste, 2006; 
Mishler & Rose, 2001). However, the notion has been taken from previous, mainly Western 
research15 without proper qualitative assessments of its meaning for Eastern Europeans. The 
peoples in this region, as the literature showed, due to complex historical and socio-political 
circumstances, might have a different relationship with trust than their Western counterparts 
(e.g., Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000)16. The construct of trust in news media, defined as 
trust in journalistic selectivity (Kohring & Matthes, 2007), has not been used so far on Eastern 
European populations. Trust in news media in these countries has not been theoretically derived 
but just assessed in big public opinion polls17 (e.g., Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010; GfK Croatia, 
2012; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Sztompka, 2000).  Although these studies have recorded basic 
attitudes regarding trust in the fourth estate in the region, they have not addressed questions 
                                                     
15
 The term dates back to Rosenberg’s (1957) faith in people construct. 
16
 During the oppressive and controlling rule of Communist regimes, when news media’s role was to serve the state 
rather than the people, trusting other people or government institutions has been considered as a “naïve” and 
“stupid” character flaw, rather than a precondition for social cohesion. News media, being part of the authoritarian 
state apparatus, represented another source of government lies and manipulations (e.g., Sztompka, 2000).  
17
 In these polls trust in news media has been assessed by one question that asked the respondents to indicate their 
level of trust in news media as one of the institutions.  
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regarding the relationship of Eastern Europeans towards their media systems or the 
conceptualization of trust in news media systems.  
Finally, the review of the literature showed the lack of adequate conceptualization of 
news media performance. Studies that have tested the influence of performance on institutional 
trust have used both macro outputs (political and economic), and micro outputs (service 
delivery), as indicators of performance for political, social, and non-profit institutions. For 
example, the country’s GDP (Przeworski et al., 1996), unemployment rate (Anderson, 1995), 
levels of corruption and individual liberties (Diamond, 1999), have been used as macro measures 
for the success of political institutions, whereas satisfaction with institutional attachment to local 
communities (DeHoog, Lowery & Lyons, 1990), and honor of citizens’ values (Glaser & 
Hildreth, 1999) have been used as micro outputs for successful institutional performance. 
However, these outputs could not be considered as adequate indicators of news media 
performance, as their levels are not dependent on the work of news media. In order to clarify 
which performance outputs would be more suitable for conceptualizing news media performance 
in contemporary Serbia, this dissertation explored prevalent aspect/s of news media performance 
in the discourse of the Serbian population.  
In order to discover whether Eastern and Western conceptualizations of trust in news 
media and trust in other people overlap as well as what the proper conceptualization for news 
media performance is, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Serbian 
population were conducted. The method enabled the researcher to access the mental world of 
individuals and reach for their understandings of trust in other people and in news media, as well 
as news media performance (McCracken, 1988). These understandings might be numerous, and 
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the researcher was able to unlock them only by intruding into the authors’ world (Lacity & 
Janson, 1994).  
Participants 
Twenty individuals were interviewed. Qualitative research allows for small samples, even 
single cases, as its purpose is to reach for the depth rather than the breath of phenomena (Patton, 
2002). The participants were selected using a purposeful, snowball method. The first participants 
were the individuals known to the researcher and the rest were selected based on their 
recommendation. Following Patton’s (2002) recommendations, snowball sampling was used 
because it allowed for location of information-rich cases from which we could learn a lot about 
the issue in question. The exact number of participants was determined when the point of 
redundancy was reached in data collection. In other words, when the saturation was attained and 
no new information was emerging from interviews, the researchers stopped the recruiting of new 
participants (Patton, 2002).  
The purpose of the sampling was to identify the individuals that experienced the main 
phenomena in question. In other words, the researchers tried to identify individuals who, in 
various degrees, followed news media and thus were assumed to attribute levels of trust in them, 
and were able to assess their performance18. Serbians interviewed in this study ranged from weak 
news media followers, who only “watched news when their parents turned on the TV” (P11)19, to 
veracious ones, who turned on the TV even “before they got up” from bed (P14). Television was 
the most popular medium among Serbian participants, with all of them watching daily news at 
least once a day. The most popular TV station among our interviewees was RTS, the public 
broadcaster, followed by B92, a private TV station with national coverage, Studio B, Belgrade’s 
                                                     
18
 It was assumed that, with regards to trust in other people, there was no need to look for information rich cases. 
19
 In parenthetical form, as well as before citing  a direct quote, a participant will be referred to as P, and will carry 
the corresponding number. For example, here P11
 
represents “Participant 11.” 
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TV station, and TV Prva, another commercial TV station with national coverage20. In terms of 
newspapers, Serbians interviewed in this study read mostly tabloid-like Blic, a daily newspaper 
owned by the Swiss company Ringier, as well as Politika and Večernje Novosti, both with 
unclear state ownership in them and a history of serving as state propaganda tools. Serbians 
interviewed in this study rarely bought newspapers, but rather read “whatever was available at 
work” (P4; P13) or what other family members (usually older ones) bought (P5). Interviewed 
Serbians also read online news on their home and work computers, or smartphones. The minority 
of participants listened to the radio (P16) or followed foreign news media (P5; P7; P10; P12; 
P15).  
The purpose of the sampling in this study was also to represent different age groups, 
different levels of education, and different gender of participants. The number of participants per 
age groups was the following: 19-24 (3), 25-35 (8), 36-45 (2), and 46-63 (7). There were 13 
women and 7 men in the sample. All of the participants live, work or study in Belgrade, the 
capital of the country, although some of them were not born in the city. The educational level 
ranged from high school diploma to various college degrees (Associate, Bachelor’s, and 
Master’s).   
Instrument 
 The researcher, a native Serbian speaker, conducted interviews with all participants. The 
researcher worked from an interview guide that was composed of open-ended questions. The 
interview guide was meant to be a conversation starter, while the course of the interview was 
designed largely by the respondents. The interviewer was trained to probe the stream of thought 
of the respondents in order to capture important constructions necessary for reaching the 
                                                     
20
 RTS (15 regular followers), B92 (9 regular followers), Studio B (5 regular followers), and Prva TV (1 regular 
follower) 
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meanings the participants assigned to the phenomena (Haley, 1996). The questionnaire served as 
a guarantee that all of the important research terrain was covered (McCracken, 1988).  
All questions asked the participants to position themselves with regards to trust in news 
media, trust in other people, and news media performance. They were meant to explore 
interviewees’ expectations of news media reporting, the relevance and assessment of the four 
trust in news media factors defined in Kohring & Matthes (2007) (trust in selectivity of topics, 
selectivity of facts, accuracy of depictions, and journalistic assessment), participants’ 
expectations for trustworthy strangers, and the dominant aspect/s of news media performance. 
Using open-ended and situational questions, the interview guide did not contain direct inquiries 
but was designed to indirectly access participants’ constructions. The open-ended nature of 
qualitative interviews allowed for exploratory, unstructured responses which were essential for 
reaching deep understandings of the phenomena in question (McCracken, 1988). Please see 
Appendix A for the complete interview guide.  
Data Analysis 
All interviews were conducted in person, in May 2013, in Belgrade, Serbia, in locations 
convenient for participants, and lasted from 35 minutes to one hour. The shorter interviews were 
with younger participants, who had less opinion about the topics. Interviews were taped on a 
digital audio recorder and transcribed in their entirety by outside, professional transcribers.  
The data were analyzed using thematic analysis, a method for identifying, analyzing, and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In conducting the thematic 
analysis the researcher followed six steps suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). First, the 
researcher familiarized herself with the data (interview transcriptions) through immersion into 
the depth and the breath of the content. In order to do that, the researcher engaged in repeated 
readings of the data, actively searching for meanings and patterns. Then the researcher generated 
72 
 
initial codes, a list of ideas of what is in the data and what is interesting about them. This was 
done by writing notes on interview transcriptions and using highlights and pens to indicate 
potential patterns. In phase three, the researcher sorted different codes into potential themes, and 
collated all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes. In this regard, a theme 
was considered as one if it captured something important about the data in relation to the 
research questions, and represented some level of patterned response or meaning within the 
dataset. The prevalence of the theme was considered both on the level of the entire dataset (all 
the transcribed interviews) and individual data item (individual transcribed interview) (i.e., How 
many times did the theme appear across the different interviews? Did it appear anywhere in each 
individual interview? Did the theme capture something important about the research questions 
within the individual data item and across the dataset?). In step four, the researcher refined the 
themes, determining whether there was enough data to support a particular theme, as well as 
whether themes had internal homogeneity (whether data within a particular theme cohered 
together meaningfully) and external heterogeneity (whether there were clear and identifiable 
distinctions between themes). Finally, the researcher defined and named the themes (step 5) and 
wrote the analysis (step 6).  
Results of in-depth interviews 
 Trust in news media. The thematic analysis of the interviews showed that the 
interviewees distinguished between four factors of trust in news media. The first factor – trust in 
selectivity of topics - was reflected in the theme that suggested that Serbians trusted the news 
that were addressing all the people, not only privileged ones. Serbians expected news media to 
select topics that are relevant for the larger community and not only for smaller, elitist, societal 
groups, such as politicians or media owners (e.g., P17). In this regard, they expected journalists 
not only to concentrate on “official visits of politicians” (e.g., P15; P19) in their reporting, but to 
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investigate the consequences of public officials’ actions. In the view of interviewed Serbians, 
news media objectivity is reflected in the coverage of topics that have wide societal implications. 
Thus, they thought that newscasts and news pages should cover a “broad range of information” 
(P8), such as social issues (P6; P9), educational issues (P6; P9; P10), international stories (P14), 
human interest issues (P15), as well as cultural issues (P8; P9; P11) and avoid celebrity news and 
exclusive coverage of crime stories (P1). 
The second factor – trust in selectivity of facts- was reflected in the theme that suggested 
that Serbians trusted news reporting that included diverse points of views that are important for 
the news story. In order to be considered as “fair” (P1), “unbiased,” and “neutral” (P19) 
journalists should, according to interviewed Serbians, represent different opinions in their 
reports, should find the balance between governmental and independent sources in their reports 
(P1), and should be able to find “good” sources that are knowledgeable about the topic (P14; 
P17; P19)
.
 The facts reported in the story should be essential for the topic and not trivial, 
presented only to increase the ratings or circulation (e.g, P1; P6; P12).  
The third factor – trust in accuracy of depictions – was reflected in the theme that 
suggested that in order for Serbians to trust the information presented in news stories, they have 
to be accurate and precise. The accuracy and precision are, according to interviewed Serbians, 
achieved by reporting the facts of an event in a short, clear, and concise form (P2; P3; P7; P9; 
P13; P14)
. 
Thus news media should not “twist” or “embellish” news stories or take a particular 
angle when reporting, but “just report truthfully what happened” (P2). This should be achieved 
by answering who, what, where and when, as four basic journalistic questions, while avoiding 
answering why something had happened (P4).  
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The expectation for refraining from a more elaborate expression of journalistic opinion in 
news stories led to the fourth factor – trust in journalistic assessment. It was reflected in the 
theme that suggested that, in Serbians’ opinion, journalistic criticism in news stories is welcomed 
only when it’s well- founded. In that context, interviewed Serbians thought that journalists 
should openly talk about the problems in the society and not “beat around the bushes” (P15), but, 
at the same time, avoid journalistic commentary when it makes the story longer (P2) and leads 
the readers/viewers astray from making their own conclusions (P13).   
Generalized trust. The thematic analysis of the interviews showed that when talking 
about trusting other people, Serbians, indeed, mainly talked about others’ perceived helpfulness, 
trustworthiness, and fairness. In this regard, the interviewees did not make a distinction between 
people they did not know personally and those that they did. Interviewees almost unanimously 
stated that to trust other people meant to be able to “rely” on them. This was reflected in the 
expectation that other people would be willing to provide help when needed (P4), or “during 
hard times” (P12). The expected help ranged from small everyday favors to moral help in dealing 
with serious life problems and was not to be asked but was expected. For interviewed Serbians, 
providing aid symbolized the expression of “respect” toward individuals in need and their 
families. Allocation of trust depended then on “a personal feeling” that others were sincere in 
their wishes to assist (P4). In contrast, people who did not choose to offer help would be 
considered as “selfish,” the ones that “look only after their own interests” (P5); or the ones “who 
would sell their own mother for a personal benefit” (P12).  
The second theme - trustworthiness of others - was mainly reflected in others’ perceived 
sincerity and openness. These characteristics assumed that trustworthy persons should be very 
direct in conversations, that they would tell the truth “no matter what” (P6). Serbians interviewed 
75 
 
in this study considered revealing the complete truth in any situation as a quality, and the proof 
that such a person is acting in accordance with her beliefs, no matter the consequences. In their 
view, people are not expected to embellish the truth even in everyday exchange of pleasantries 
and daily rituals. Telling the truth was viewed as “revealing” and “liberating” (P6), as it helps 
fight “the false morals” (P6). For interviewed Serbians things could only be “black and white,  
not grey” (P9) making ambiguity in relationships not welcomed (P9). If a person is not 
completely open, he/she risks being characterized as “sly” (P3), “insidious”, and “treacherous” 
(P2). Being “smooth-spoken” (P2; P14) or flattery is not seen by a Serbian eye as a value but as a 
vice, a “mask” that people put on when they want to hide something (P14).  
This seemingly blatant openness did have some limitations. The third theme reflected that  
interviewed Serbians expected trustworthy people to be “fair” (P1; P3), to respect others by, for 
example, not invading their privacy, not insulting them, or talking behind their backs (P1; P8; 
P9; P20). Although recognizing the values of these characteristics, interviewed Serbians thought 
that it was almost impossible to find strangers who would be open, trustworthy, fair, and helpful. 
Asked to evaluate a hypothetical person who goes openly into relationships with others, who 
thinks that people are, in general, ready to help rather than to use others, and who thinks that 
people, generally, tend to be fair rather than look only after their own interests, participants of 
this study described such a person as “naïve” (P8; P13), “foolish” (P4; P6; P9), “gullible” (P10), 
“stupid” (P4), “unrealistic” (P6), somebody who “lives in a fairy tale” (P19), “does not have 
enough life experience,” and “does not understand the environment she lives in” (P13). 
Participants also indicated that this person would, most probably, be taken advantage of in the 
Serbian society (P12; P15). They acknowledged, however, that this hypothetical person would be 
considered as “normal,” “nice,” “right” (P2; P9) in another country but would not be able to 
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survive in Serbia where “conditions of living are different” (P4) and where everybody tries to 
“cheat on you” (P4). Almost all of the participants of this study completely trusted only family 
members and closest friends. Most thought that other “people would try to cheat you on every 
corner” (P2; P4), and that they would do so “intentionally” without “choosing means to achieve 
their goals” (P4). Some interviewees thought that even people who spontaneously start 
conversations in public places usually have other intentions, such as stealing from your purse 
(P10) or  committing some sort of fraud (P13; P17), illustrating the prevalent thought of most 
participants that, “it is in the human nature to use good people” (P6).  
News media performance. Serbians interviewed in this study saw the performance of 
news media in the context of the performance of institutions in general. Interviewees complained 
that institutions of public interest and their employees were inefficient and  incompetent (e.g., 
P1; P6; P7; P13; P19). They accused employees in city and federal administration of sending 
people back “five times to bring a different paper” (P13), of making them pay for unnecessary 
paperwork (P19) and wait unreasonably long (P13), of dragging  the work (P7), and of making 
mistakes without taking responsibility for them (P6). Participant 8 had problems with the 
judiciary system. Her two ongoing civil litigations have been dragging for 15 and 20 years in 
courts. Participant 13 complained about public schools. “Every time a judgment is about to be 
made in my cases,” she said, “they change the judge!” “Educational system is falling apart,” 
participant 13 stated. “Students are beating professors and professors only think of how to keep 
their positions so they can get their salaries. Grades are allocated randomly, A, B, C, D, F, it 
doesn’t matter!”  
The inefficiency and incompetency of institutions were attributed to one dominant reason 
that emerged as the overarching theme in interviews – corruption. Processes of hiring personnel, 
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managing and leading projects in all institutions, were perceived as corrupted. Participant 12 
claimed that “five to six thousand euros” would get one a teaching job in a high school in Serbia; 
participant 18, that “300 to 3000 euros” would get one a passing grade in state medical school; 
participant 6, that she paid 200 euros to get the needed documentation from the City Planning 
Agency; participant 3, that his former employer, one of Belgrade’s municipalities, was rigging 
the tenders for construction works;  whereas participant 10 refused to be expert witness in a court 
case because she realized that the judge was “dragging the case for seven years so the lawyers 
could get paid more.” Participants 9 and 10 described that in health care in Serbia, personal 
connections are key for getting adequate help and that most of the doctors in public hospitals 
would refer patients to their private health practices “in order to make more money” (P10). They 
considered that all the institutions are corrupted “from the bottom to the top” (P4), to the point 
that, as participant 4 explained, “in order to get anything done, one has to bribe literally 
everybody from doormen, through cleaning ladies, clerks to people on the top.” 
In this general atmosphere of perceived institutional dysfunction due to corruption, news 
media were perceived as being under the influence of economic and political centers of power 
and thus unable to professionally fulfill their job. Interviewees believed that media owners, news 
editors but also political parties censor the news content. Participant 17 thought that journalists 
publish only official information that politicians give them during press conferences and are not 
allowed to release any unofficial information from other sources. Other participants believed that 
journalists take money to publish certain stories, and that, pressured by political and economic 
centers of power, circulate information that they have to (P9). For example, some participants 
stated that political parties pay news media to create scandals before elections (P3; P7). 
Participant 7 gave the example of the tabloid  Kurir, which he considered as a newspaper paid to 
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defame whoever it intends to (P7). Most interviewees considered corruption in journalism in 
Serbia so prevalent that it led them to perceive “journalism as a very bad profession” in which 
“very few journalists write objectively, but are ready to write whatever, if you pay them” (P13). 
Some of them even thought that all news media are inherently set to lie, that they have been set 
up as tools of falsification, a “very well designed “system of lies”, fraud and manipulation that 
“Hitler called the most powerful weapon” (P6). Controlled by different sources of power, news 
media, private or state, domestic or foreign, were seen as pure instruments for the realization of 
their controllers’ interests (e.g., P13; P6; P4).   
 This perception of widespread corruption in all intuitions led people not to trust the 
system at all. For example, participant 6 described a couple of cases of unreported domestic 
abuse, which, according to her, stayed undocumented mainly because the beaten women were 
afraid that the authorities would not be able to protect them from violent husbands. Others 
thought that there was a great disparity between the institutions and the citizenry and that 
omnipresent corruption has made it practically impossible for them to abide by the law on an 
everyday basis (e.g., P13).  
Summary of in-depth interviews: The thematic analysis of 20 in-depth interviews with 
representatives of the Serbian population showed that the meanings of trust in news media and 
generalized trust among the Serbians are equivalent with their Western conceptualizations. It was 
found that interviewed Serbians perceived trust in news media as trust in journalistic selection 
and that they distinguished between four factors of trust in news media provided in Kohring and 
Matthes (2007): trust in selectivity of topics, trust in selectivity of facts, trust in accuracy of 
depictions and trust in journalistic assessment. In other words, interviewed Serbians expected 
trustworthy news reporting to select topics that are relevant for citizenry, to focus on important 
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facts, to be unbiased and include different points of view, to be accurate and precise in its 
depictions of events, and to have well-founded assessments. As far as the concept of generalized 
trust is concerned, in order for Serbians interviewed in this study to trust strangers, they have to 
be sincerely helpful, fair, open, and direct. This conceptualization overlaps with the Western 
notion of generalized trust or trust in people that we don’t know that dates back to Rosenberg’s 
(1957) faith in people concept and is widely used in public opinion surveying (e.g., European 
Social Survey, 2002-2012/13; World Values Survey 1990-2010/12). Finally, in-depth interviews 
discovered that the most problematic aspect of news media performance among the interviewees 
was perceived corruption. They thought that widespread corruption in Serbian news media, as 
well as in other institutions, prevent them from professionally fulfilling their jobs. This finding 
corresponds with the literature showing that corruption, an area of vulnerability for transitional 
countries, is one of the most serious problems in Serbia. A United Nation’s report (UNODC, 
2011) showed that Serbian citizens ranked it as one of the most serious problems facing their 
country and that 13.7% of Serbian citizens, age  18 to 64 had either direct of indirect exposure to 
a bribery experience with a public official. As the in-depth interviews found conceptual 
equivalences between Western and Serbian notions of trust in news media and generalized trust, 
and discovered that the most troubling aspect of news media performance is perceived 
corruption, this dissertation research proceeded with using these three constructs in a survey of 
the general population of Serbians in order to test the impact of cultural and performance factors 
on trust in news media in Serbia.  
Survey 
In order to test the impact of cultural and performance factors on trust in news media in 
Serbia and the effects of moderator variables, a survey on a stratified random sample of the 
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Serbian population was conducted. Survey research is ideal for asking about opinions and 
attitudes (Nardi, 2006); it enables us to answer how people perceive and evaluate the issues in 
questions, and allows us to assess not only what they think about them, but also how they differ 
in their perceptions (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003). Also, providing an “efficient and 
accurate” means of assessing information about a targeted population (Zikmund & Babin, 2007, 
p. 128), surveys allow us to construct a sample of people that represent those within the 
population we seek to describe (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003).  
Participants and Sampling  
 Only men and women (N=544), who were at least 18 years of age and were living in 
Serbia, were recruited for participation in the survey using a stratified random sampling 
technique. This method allowed representativeness of the sample, as the number and type of 
sampling was sufficient, with an acceptable 5 percent error, to generalize the findings to the 
entire population (Hocking, Stacks, & McDermott, 2003). Also 544 participants were enough to 
satisfy the minimum of 5 observations for each independent variable in order for results to be 
generalizable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). The participants were recruited by IPSOS 
Strategic Marketing agency, an international company with over 15 years of experience, assisting 
approximately 1,000 researchers a year from the academic, governmental, and private sectors 
around the world with their research studies.  
The participants for this study were recruited from the general population in Serbia, 
excluding the Kosovo region, using the stratified random sampling method. Initial strata were 
created by using Census 2011 population data for Serbia and considering two variables: six geo-
economical regions (Vojvodina – Northern Serbia, Belgrade-the capital, West Serbia, Central 
Serbia, East Serbia, and South Serbia) and two types of settlements (urban and rural). The 
distribution of respondents to initial strata was based on proportional criterion – percentage of 
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respondents per stratum was proportional to its size. Thus, in this research, Vojvodina was 
represented by 27.4% of total participants; Belgrade by 25.2%; West Serbia by 11%; Central 
Serbia by 14.2%; East Serbia by 8.8%; and South Serbia by 13.4% of total participants. 
Participants in urban areas represented 60.7% of total participants and in rural areas the 
remaining 39.3%. Population strata proportions from Census 2011 were matched in order to get 
the sample structure similar to population structure. The sampling frame for the study was the 
total number of polling station territories in Serbia (N=8,246), where one sampling point 
represented one polling station territory. Households from where the participants were surveyed 
were sampled using a random route technique, starting from the given addresses and using 
“every fourth house principle.”21 Within each household, the person to be surveyed was chosen 
using the Kish Grid, the method that uses a pre-assigned table of random numbers.  
The final sample was composed of slightly more women (53.9%) than men (46.1%). The 
majority of participants (53.5%) had a high school education. Others had a Bachelor’s degree 
(12.1%), Associate Degree (9%), up to 8-grade education (12.8%), a vocational degree (6.6%), 
Master’s degree (1.1%), or Doctorate (0.6%), whereas 23 participants (4.2%) did not finish their 
elementary school education. The biggest percentage of those who wanted to state their income 
made 353 U.S. dollars or less per month per household (24.2%); 21.5% made between $353 and  
                                                     
21
 Survey Interviews at the starting point address were not performed. First the data collector had to choose the so-
called START. From the starting point, data collectors moved in the direction of increasing house numbers and took 
the right side of the street. They skipped three entrances (house numbers) and in the FOURTH house in a row from 
the starting point, they looked for the first household where they could interview one person – that was the Start. 
From the Start, moving on the right side of the street and in the direction of increasing ordinal numbers, they chose 
every FOURTH house number – that is, they entered the FOURTH ADDRESS IN A ROW, then the EIGHT 
ADDRESS IN a ROW etc. At every cross-road, they turned right and kept choosing every FOURTH house number. 
If it was an apartment building with up to four floors, the interviewers chose up to two apartments in which they 
tried to do interviews. If it was an apartment building with five or more floors, they were allowed to choose three 
apartments. In case of villages the Step was reduced to two.  
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$660; 13.2% between $660 and $1179; 3.7% made more than $1179 per month per household, 
whereas 0.7% did not have any income in the last month. The average age of the sample was 
47.98 years (SD = 17.39), with a range from 18 to 89.  The distribution of the sample per age 
group was the following: 18-29 (16.5%); 30-39 (20.8%); 40-49 (16.5%); 50-64 (25.9%); 65+ 
(20.2%).  
Most of the participants (47.4%) didn’t identify with any political party; 40.5% identified 
themselves with center-right and nationalistic parties22; and 10% identified with center-left 
parties23. The remaining 2.1% of participants either sided with other parties or did not want to 
answer the question. The great majority of participants were of Eastern Orthodox religion 
(84.9%). The rest were Catholics (6.1%) and Muslims (1.5%), belonged to other religions 
(1.3%), were not religiously committed (4.4%), or did not want to indicate their religious 
affiliation (1.8%). In terms of ethnicity, the great majority of participants in this study declared 
themselves as Serbians (86.9%). The others were Hungarians (4.2%), Bosnians (1.1%), Croats 
(0.9%), and Bulgarians (0.7%); 3.9% sided themselves with other ethnics groups and 2.2% 
refused to state their ethnicity. Finally, most Serbians interviewed in this study used television as 
their main source of information (67.1%). Television was followed by the Internet (16.7%), 
newspapers (11.2%), and radio (3.7%), whereas 1.3% of participants did not answer this 
question.   
Procedure 
Data were collected by face-to-face surveying of participants. Ninety-three professional 
and well-trained IPSOS Strategic Marketing data collectors were deployed to survey the sampled 
                                                     
22
 30% identified themselves with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party; 7.4% with the ruling Socialist Party of 
Serbia, party of the ousted ruler Slobodan Milošević; 1.8% with the Democratic Party of Serbia; 0.7% with the 
Serbian Radical Party; and 0.6% with Dveri. 
23
 7.7% identified themselves with the Democratic Party; 0.9% with the Liberal Democratic Party; 0.4% with the 
League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina; 0.6% with the United Regions of Serbia; 0.4% with the Social-
Democratic Party of Serbia; and 0.2% with the Hungarian minority party 
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population in the six geo-economic regions of Serbia. The participants were reached at their 
homes and asked to take the survey. The survey was administered in an electronic form, on 
tablets, portable computer devices. After the participants acknowledged their consent to 
participate in the study, they were asked to answer the survey questionnaire. Data collectors read 
each question to participants and entered their answers. That way, it was made possible for the 
illiterate and semi-literate to answer the questionnaire. The participants first answered questions 
about trust in news media, then about generalized trust, and then questions about news media 
performance. Blocks that measured two independent variables (generalized trust and news media 
performance) were separated by a block of questions about participants’ socialization activities.24 
Participants then completed measures that assessed potential moderator and control variables 
(age, education level, political party affiliation, and ethnicity, gender, income, trust in 
government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, and media use). The 
complete list of survey questions is provided in Appendix B. 
The questionnaire was developed first in English and then translated into Serbian. In 
order to establish the linguistic equivalence, the questionnaire was back-translated following the 
suggestions of Gudykunst (2002). Two bilinguals fluent in both Serbian and English, and 
holding degrees in philology and translation, assisted. One of them translated the English 
questionnaire to Serbian and the other back-translated it. The variations in original wording were 
reconciled. The questionnaire was then sent to IPSOS Strategic Marketing Agency, where two 
researchers, with extensive background in opinion polling in Serbia, looked at all the questions. 
                                                     
24
 News media performance was measured again at the end of the survey by a separate measure. This will 
be explained in more detail in the “Measures” section. Also note that socialization activities as well as some 
additional variables measured on this questionnaire (trust in other institutions, life satisfaction, personal happiness, 
satisfaction with democracy, cosmopolitanism, main source of information, place of birth of participants and their 
parents, citizenship, and religious affiliation) were not used in this study. 
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After IPSOS’s researchers made smaller wording changes, the questions were then entered into 
IPSOS’s software for electronic data collection and were ready for administration. The data were 
collected between October 12 and October 23, 2013.  
Measures  
Dependent variable: Trust in News Media was measured by Kohring and Matthes 
(2007) scale. The scale consisted of 16 items that measured four latent factors: trust in 
“selectivity of topics,” “selectivity of facts,” “accuracy of depictions,” and “journalistic 
assessment.” Responses were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) 
to 7 (Strongly Agree). Participants were asked to think about news media in Serbia in general 
when rating their level of agreement with statements about news media presentation of the topic 
of economic crisis.25 The scale was successfully validated in Germany (Kohring & Matthes, 
2007), United States, and China (Radovic & Rui, 2012). Before using it on a Serbian sample for 
the purposes of this dissertation, the scale was pretested on a sample from another Eastern 
European nation - Croatia. The fit was satisfactory: CFA: χ2/df = 4.378; CFI=0.928; GFI= 0.905; 
RMSEA=0.083, pclose=.000. Testing the scale on a Serbian sample for this dissertation, the fit 
of the trust in news media scale was found to be satisfactory: CFA: χ2/df = 4.665; CFI=0.954; 
GFI= 0.905; RMSEA=0.082, pclose=.000. In addition, factor loadings, the explained variance of 
first and second order factors, were high in both cases (for first order factors, factor loadings 
ranged from λ=.749 to λ=.906; for second order factors, factor loadings ranged from λ=.905 to 
λ=.948). Finally, the Cronbach’s Alpha was highly satisfactory for the individual factors: 
selectivity of topics: .901; selectivity of facts: .901; accuracy of depictions: .916; and journalistic 
assessment: .903.  
                                                     
25
 In Kohring and Matthes (2007) the topic used was “unemployment.” The researcher decided to avoid 
unemployment in this dissertation as it is considered to be the most serious problem affecting Serbia today 
(UNODC, 2011) and as such could bias participants’ answers.  
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Independent variables: Generalized Trust was measured by three items from the 
European Social Survey (2002-2012/13). The items asked the respondents to indicate whether, 
generally, other people can be trusted or one can’t be too careful in dealing with people; whether 
most people would take advantage of you or would try to be fair, whether most of the time 
people would try to be helpful or are mostly looking out for themselves. The responses were 
offered on an 7-point scale ranging from 1 to 7. The items used in this scale date back to 
Rosenberg’s (1957) faith in people scale that originally consisted of five items assessing the 
degree of confidence in trustworthiness, honesty, goodness, generosity, and brotherliness of 
people in general. These items were slightly reworded and summed into three items by the 
Survey Research Center (1969) – the items used in this research. Since then, the scale has been 
widely used to tap into the concept of generalized trust, either in its one-item format (e.g., World 
Values Survey, 1990-1995/6; 2005/6-2010/12), two-item format (General Social Survey, 1972-; 
World Values Survey, 1999-2002) or three-item format (European Social Survey, 2002-
2012/13). Rosenberg’s (1957) original scale used a Guttman-type scale and the Survey Research 
Center’s (1969) scale also used a forced-choice response format. In this dissertation, the 
European Social Survey’s (2002-2012/13) format was used as it allowed for the variable to be 
tested as continuous rather than dichotomous. Research has shown that the three items in the 
European Social Survey (ESS) are reliable and cross-culturally valid. Testing the scale in two 
waves of ESS, 2002 and 2004, Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) showed that the items demonstrate 
metric equivalence in 24 countries, indicating that the factor loadings of the generalized trust 
concept were equal across European countries (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). Sturigs and Smith 
(2010), however, found some problems with the two-item format of the scale. The authors found 
that, counter to the widespread assumption that these questions measure trust towards people in 
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general, a substantial number of respondents reported having thought about people who are 
known to them personally (Sturigs & Smith, 2010). To ensure more coherent interpretation and 
following the suggestions of Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) who suggested applying adequate 
control methods when using the generalized trust scale, for this dissertation, an additional 
explanation was added in the question instructions. Specifically, the instructions asked the 
participants to think about the people they DO NOT know when answering generalized trust 
questions. The 3 items of the Generalized Trust scale were subjected to principal components 
analysis (PCA) using SPSS 20. Prior to performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor 
analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed that all the coefficients were 
of .547 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was .710, exceeding the recommended value 
of .6 (Kaiser 1970, 1974); Bartelett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical 
significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Principal components analysis 
with Varimax rotation revealed the presence of one component with eigenvalues exceeding 1, 
explaining 73.039 % of the variance. The inspection of the component matrices showed that 
three items loaded quite strongly on one factor (from λ=.851, λ=.877; λ=.835). Finally, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha was highly satisfactory for the generalized trust scale: α= .815. 
 News Media Performance: Based on the results of in-depth interviews, which suggested 
that corruption might be in the core of the news media performance concept, this dissertation 
research measured the news media performance by two proxy corruption variables. 
The first variable was Trust in Corrupt Journalists, for which a scale was developed. The 
goal was to separate the performance trust factor from a trait-oriented cultural trust factor 
(generalized trust). Thus the researcher concentrated on measuring the assessment of corruptive 
behavior of journalists. In order to do that, vignette-based questions were developed. Vignettes 
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have been defined as the “use of stories which represent hypothetical situations to elicit 
preferences, judgments, or anticipated behavior” (Wason, Polonsky, & Hyman, 2002).  
Vignette-based surveys have been used for more than 30 years in behavioral sciences in 
such fields as marketing, environmental economics, transportation, ethics, and professional 
decision making to determine the forces that influence multidimensional judgments, especially 
when assessing the quality of professional practices (McFadden et al., 2005; Veloski, Tai, Evans 
& Bash, 2005).  The premise in the use of this method is that individuals often make choices 
through the consideration of the characteristics of specific situations as they occur rather than 
through a systematic application of principles. They then make judgments about vignettes as a 
basis for inferring the principles that drive individual choices (McFadden et al., 2005).  This 
might particularly be the case with the assessment of corruptive behavior, as the term carries 
negative connotation and a direct question might elicit respondents’ exaggerated negative 
reaction. Describing hypothetical situations while humanizing their actors, might, to some extent, 
correct for the socially desirable answers. The analysis of in-depth interviews with Serbians 
showed that the apriori negative perception of institutional corruption (e.g., P10 – “They are all a 
bunch of liars and cheaters!”) fades to some extent when they are presented with real-life 
situational events of corruptive processes. For example, for participant 5 it was acceptable to 
give presents to medical doctors, because “they have very low salaries and very responsible 
jobs.” Participant 6 didn’t mind giving or receiving gifts under the condition “that the job gets 
done”, whereas participant 7 even found corruption in politics justifiable if it was used for 
greater good (e.g., improving the lives of citizenry). These justifications spilled over to 
corruptive news media behaviors, with participants acknowledging that the work of journalists 
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“is not easy” or is “very hard” (P6; P8; P10), that journalists are subject to various pressures and 
have even been killed if they reported objectively (P10).      
Corruption was defined as the “behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding interest” 
(Nye, 2009, p. 284).  As Nye (2009) describes, corruption includes such behaviors as bribery 
(use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit), and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).  
Based on these definitions, the researcher developed a scale that tapped into the 
dimensions of nepotism and bribery (it was assessed that misappropriation was more applicable 
to officials who have access to public funds than to journalists). Six vignette-based situations 
were developed: two of them described nepotism situations and the rest described bribery 
situations. All the vignettes described hypothetical Serbian journalists who were involved in 
corruptive practices. The nepotism dimension was represented in two vignettes that described 
situations in which a journalist helped a cousin, a construction worker, get a job as a journalist, 
and another one in which a journalist focused a positive news story on his nephew rather than on 
somebody else who was more deserving of that news spot. The bribery dimension was 
represented in four vignettes that described situations in which journalists took bribes to not 
publish incriminating stories about politicians. Each bribery question represented a different 
level of story seriousness (starting from the most benign one – covering a love affair, to the most 
serious one – concealing politician’s involvement in covering the real unemployment rates), and 
was matched with a different amount of bribe given to a hypothetical journalist (starting from the 
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lowest one  for covering the love affair - return of a favor to a monetary one of 1,000 Euros – for 
covering the real unemployment numbers). The bribery stories were additionally based on a 
United Nations’ report about the corruption in contemporary Serbia that indicated the most 
serious problems that country has been facing and the average amounts citizens pay in bribes 
(UNODC, 2011).26  
After the face validity of vignettes was assessed by two other senior researchers, 
vignettes were pretested on a sample of the Serbian population (N=32). The pretest vignettes 
were entered into Qualtrics, an online survey software, and the URL was distributed to a 
voluntary sample of Serbian citizens (age range 27-55, M=36.33, SD=8.11; 67% female, 33% 
male). The respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very 
likely) how likely they thought that a particular hypothetical journalist would work in their best 
interest when fulfilling his journalistic duty. The results showed that surveyed Serbians made a 
difference between different levels of corruption: nepotism (M=2.94, SD=1.50)27, bribery 1 
(M=2.26, SD=1.44), bribery 2 (M=2.03, SD=1.59), bribery 3 (M=1.53, SD=1.07), and bribery 4 
(M=1.50, SD=1.07). After the pretest, the vignettes were used in the survey of the general 
population of Serbia. In the analysis, the six vignettes were combined to form a scale of trust in 
                                                     
26
 A United Nations’ report (UNODC, 2011) found that Serbians considered Serbia’s large unemployment rate to be 
the most serious problem in the country, while crime and security were in the middle of the scale. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, the researcher used the example of covering up the real unemployment rate to illustrate the 
highest level of problem seriousness, and the example of covering up a crime to illustrate the second most serious 
problem. The remaining two bribery vignettes illustrated the covering up of less serious problems, such as 
politician’s involvement in political scuffles and his involvement in a love affair. These issues were taken from 
everyday news in Serbia and were assessed by the researcher to be of a lesser importance than unemployment and 
crime. The amounts of bribery cited in vignettes were also based on the UNODC (2011) report. As this report stated 
that the average cash bribe paid in Serbia was 165 Euros, the researcher took the round figure of 150 Euros  to 
represent the bribe for covering up the mid-level serious problem of involvement in criminal enterprise, and the 
amount of 1,000 Euros to represent the covering up of the more serious issue - the unemployment rate. The report 
also indicated that giving drinks and food prizes and exchanging services were also present in the Serbian bribing 
culture, but were usually of a comparatively smaller value that the average cash bribe. Thus the example of bribes in 
the forms of “a bottle of Scotch and a packet of cigarettes” and “returning of the favor” were used in two vignettes 
to match the covering up of less serious  problems such as politician’s involvement in political scuffles and his 
involvement in a love affair.  
27
 Only one nepotism question was included in the pretest. 
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corrupt journalists. The scale was reliable with satisfactory Cronbach’s Alpha: α= .873. 
Confirmatory factor analysis of the two-factor news media performance concept (nepotism and 
bribery) showed that the model fit the data well: CFA: χ2/df = 3.470; CFI=0.992; GFI= 0.985; 
RMSEA=0.067, pclose=.140. In addition, the fit of the measurement model was assessed by 
conducting a confirmatory factor analysis on the model that included scales for trust in news 
media, generalized trust, and trust in corrupted journalists. The confirmatory factor analysis 
showed that the fit of the measurement model was satisfactory: CFA: χ2/df = 3.087; CFI=0.949; 
GFI= 0.890; RMSEA=0.062, pclose=.000.    
Besides trust in corrupt journalists, this dissertation also included the measure of 
Perceived News Media Corruption. This single item asked respondents to state how widespread 
they thought corruption in news media was in Serbia. The responses were given on a scale from 
1(not widespread at all) to 7(extremely widespread). The Perceived News Media Corruption 
question was put at the end of the survey (before the demographics), separated from the items 
assessing journalistic corruption. This item was successfully used in research that assessed 
perceived corruption in the public sector in 33 countries around the world – including Eastern 
European countries (e.g., Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). This measure is different than trust in 
corrupted journalists as it taps into the perception of institutional (news media) corruption rather 
than situational journalistic corruption.  As news media performance has not been measured 
before using corruption proxies, and in-depth interviews suggested there might be a difference in 
assessment of corruption depending on how you ask the question, this dissertation wanted to 
measure the concept by using two measures and explore whether there would be a difference in 
the prediction of trust in news media.  
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Moderating variables: Age was measured by asking the participants to state their exact 
age; Education by asking the participants to state their highest level of education attained; and 
Political Party Affiliation by asking the participants to state with which political party they 
identify with or supported.  
 Control variables: Trust in Government was measured by a 7-point scale, which 
indicated the different extent (not at all 1 to very much 7) of trust in the government in Belgrade 
(Jones, 2004). This variable was chosen following several studies, which found that attitudes 
towards the media are strongly related to political trust (Bennet, Rhine, Flickinger, & Bennet, 
1999; Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010). Personal Religiosity was measured by 4 items asking participants 
how much guidance religion provided in their day-to-day lives, how often they attended religious 
services, how important of a role religion played in their lives, and how often they prayed (Golan 
& Day, 2010). Frequency was measured on a scale from 0 (never) to 7 (every week) and the 
personal importance questions was measured on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Discussing the problematic interaction between religious audiences and the mainstream media, 
Golan and Day (2010), found that religiosity was not directly related to media credibility when it 
came to newspapers and magazines, but a significant relationship existed between personal 
religiosity and perceived credibility of online news. Interpersonal Discussion of News was 
measured on the 8-point scale, which indicated how many days per week a participant discussed 
news with friends/family. Studies have shown that interpersonal communication patterns may be 
relevant for differences in perceptions of media credibility (e.g., Chafee, 1982; McLeod, Rush & 
Friedercih, 1968), while others have found the negative correlation between interpersonal 
discussion of news and the credibility of some media (e.g., Kiousis, 2001). Media Use was 
measured by asking respondents to indicate how many days per week they read newspapers, 
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listen to the radio, watch television, or use the Internet. These variables were included following 
Tsfalti and Cappella’s (2003) findings that media skepticism is negatively associated with 
mainstream news exposure but positively associated with nonmainstream news exposure. 
Gender and Income were measured by standard questions asking the respondents to specify their 
biological sex and monthly income per household. Westley and Severin (1964) found that gender 
played a significant role in influencing people’s perceptions of news credibility. 
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CHAPTER V: 
RESULTS 
 
The first research question asked about the levels of trust in news media, generalized 
trust, and perceptions of news media performance in Serbia. The results obtained on Kohring and 
Matthes’s (2007) 7-point scale indicate that the average level of trust in news media among 
Serbians is a little bit above the middle of the scale (M=3.73; SD=1.26). To facilitate the 
analysis, this dissertation study followed Mishler and Rose’s (1997) collapse of trust scale into 
three categories. Respondents were said to trust other people or news media if they gave them a 
positive score of 6 or 7 on the scale; they actively distrusted other people or news media if they 
scored it 1 or 2; and they were described as skeptical if they gave other people and news media a 
score of 3, 4, or 5. The cutting points for these categories were based on analyses indicating that 
individuals scoring 3 or 5 on trust are more similar on a variety of political and social attributes 
to those scoring 4 on the scale than to those with scores at either extreme (Mishler & Rose, 
1997). Following this categorization, the results of this study show that, on average, Serbians did 
not express either very low or very high trust in news media but were rather skeptical about them 
(M=3.73; SD=1.26). This indicates that, the average answer was between “slightly disagree” or 
“neither agree nor disagree” when it came to the questions about journalistic selection of topics, 
selection of facts, accuracy of depiction, and fairness of assessment. When analyzing the latent 
factors of the second-order multidimensional construct of trust in news media separately, it was 
found that the skepticism category was dominant in all four factors: selectivity of topics 
(M=3.85, SD=1.38), selectivity of facts (M=3.75, SD=1.35), accuracy of depiction (M=3.64, 
SD=1.37), and journalistic assessment (M=3.71, SD=1.36).  
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In terms of generalized trust, the results show that Serbians’ average score was below the 
middle of the 7-point scale (M=2.90; SD=1.38). This indicates that, on average, Serbians are 
somewhere between active distrust and skepticism when it comes to trusting people that they 
don’t know personally. Analysis of separate items showed that the lowest score (M=2.57; 
SD=1.59) was for  the item that asked the participants to indicate whether they thought that most 
people look out for themselves or would rather try to be helpful (1 = most people look out for 
themselves; 7 = most people try to be helpful). The results show that, on average, Serbians 
thought that people generally try to look out for themselves rather than to be helpful. The 
analysis of another item showed that Serbians, on average, thought that one cannot be too careful 
when dealing with people that he or she doesn’t know. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represented 
that one cannot be too careful when dealing with people and 7 that most people can be trusted, 
Serbians’ average score was 3.05 (SD=1.58). The analysis of the final item showed that Serbians, 
on average, thought that most strangers would take advantage of them. On a scale of 1 to 7, 
where 1 represented that most people would try to take advantage of others if they had a chance 
and 7 that most people would try to be fair, Serbians scored 3.08 (SD=1.67). 
Finally, in terms of perceptions of news media performance, overall results showed that 
Serbians assess corruption in news media negatively. The first measure of news media 
performance, labeled as “trust in corrupt journalists” and based on six vignettes which described 
hypothetical corrupted practices of individual Serbian journalists, measured how respondents 
thought that journalists who engaged in corrupt practices were likely to work in the people’s best 
interest. The average score on this measure was 1.65 (SD=0.90). This indicates that Serbians 
generally do not have confidence in corrupt journalists, thinking that they are not likely to 
represent the interests of the average person. The second measure of news media performance 
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was the single-item perceived news media corruption measure. The results showed that Serbians 
believe that corruption in news media is highly widespread in their country (M=5.26; SD=1.41). 
The average levels of trust in news media, generalized trust, and news media performance are 
shown in Table 128.  
In the analysis of the following hypotheses and research question, the regression models 
were first tested using the news media performance measure of trust in corrupt journalists and 
then all the models were retested using the measure of perceived news media corruption. This 
was done to explore how the two measures compare since the measure of corrupt journalists is 
not an established one.  
The first hypothesis argued that both generalized trust (H1a) and news media 
performance (H1b) would significantly relate to individuals’ trust in news media. In order to test 
this hypothesis a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted using trust in corrupt 
journalists as a proxy for news media performance. This technique allowed for prediction of the 
effects of the independent variables while controlling for possible effects of age, gender, 
education, political party affiliation, income, trust in government, personal religiosity, 
interpersonal discussion of news, and media use. Prior to conducting a hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis, the relevant assumptions of this statistical analysis were tested. An 
examination of correlations revealed that the independent variables, generalized trust and trust in 
corrupted journalists, were not highly correlated (r=.18) (correlation matrix of independent and 
dependent variables is presented in Table 10). In addition, collinearity statistics (Tolerance and 
VIF) were all within the accepted limits (tolerance values for independent variables were .859 
and .942, which is well above the threshold of .10 and VIF values of 1.164 and 1.062, which is 
well below the cut-off of 10) . Thus it can be concluded that assumptions of multicollinearlity 
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have been met (Hair et al., 2010). Residual and scatter plots indicated assumptions of normality, 
linearity and homoscedasticity were all satisfied.  
A two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was then conducted with trust in news media 
as the dependent variable. At stage one, control variables (age, gender, education, political party 
affiliation, income, trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, 
and media use) were entered. Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those 
supporting two main political parties in power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of 
Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was coded as 1: Male 0: Female. Other 
variables were treated as continuous. Control variabes explained 14.8% of the variance in trust in 
news media (Table 2). After the entry of generalized trust and trust in corrupt journalists scales, 
the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 19.2%, F (11, 355)=7.68, p<.001. The 
two independent variables explained an additional 4.5% of the variance in trust in news media, R 
squared change=.045, F change (2,355)=9.84, p<.001. In the final model, both generalized trust 
(b=.12, p=.021) and trust in corrupted journalists (b=.16, p=.001) were statistically significant. 
This indicates that both independent variables have a significant positive influence on trust in 
news media. The more trusting an individual is towards strangers, the more he or she is likely to 
trust news media in Serbia; the more an individual is likely to believe that journalists in Serbia 
act in people’s best interest, even if they are corrupt, the more he or she is likely to trust news 
media. Thus the first hypothesis was supported. One additional control variable was statistically 
significant in the model: trust in government (b=.32, p<.001). This indicates that despite the fact 
that trust in government made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model, two 
independent variables (generalized trust and trust in corrupted journalists) still were significant 
predictors of trust in news media. However, the effect sizes were small. Analysis of part 
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correlations, indicate that, controlling for all other variables, generalized trust explained 1.23% 
of unique variance in predicting trust in news media, whereas trust in corrupt journalists 
explained 2.50% of unique variance in predicting Trust in News Media.     
The second research question asked which of the two independent variables, generalized 
trust or news media performance, played a greater role in determining trust in news media. The 
results of the hierarchical regression showed that news media performance, when measured as 
trust in corrupt journalists, had a higher beta value (b=.16, p=.001) than generalized trust (b=.12, 
p=.021). In addition, the effect size for trust in corrupt journalists (squared part correlation 
=0.025) was larger than the effect size for Generalized Trust (squared part correlation =0.012), 
indicating that trust in corrupt journalists plays a slightly bigger role in predicting trust in news 
media than generalized trust.   
The second hypothesis argued that the relationship between generalized trust and trust in 
news media would be moderated by the age of participants of this study. In order to test this 
hypothesis, an interaction between age and generalized trust was entered in the third block of the 
hierarchical multiple regression. This hypothesis was not supported. The results show that adding 
the interaction between age and generalized trust did not bring any change in the model (R 
squared change=.000, F change (1,354)=0.006, p=.937). In the final model, interaction between 
age and generalized trust was not significant (b=.014, p=.937). The summary of the third step of 
the hierarchical regression with age as moderating variable is presented in Table 3.  
The third hypothesis argued that education would moderate the relationship between 
generalized trust and trust in news media. In order to test this hypothesis, an interaction between 
level of education and generalized trust was entered in the third block of the hierarchical multiple 
regression. This hypothesis was not supported either. The results show that the interaction 
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between education and generalized trust did not bring significant change in the model (R squared 
change=.002, F change (1,354)=1.068, p=.302). In the final model, interaction between age and 
generalized trust was not significant (b=-.181, p=.302). The summary of the third step of the 
hierarchical regression with education as moderating variable is presented in Table 4. 
The fourth hypothesis argued that political party affiliation would moderate the 
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media. In order to test this hypothesis, an 
interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust was entered in the third block 
of the hierarchical multiple regression. This hypothesis was also not supported. The results show 
that the interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust did not bring 
significant change in the model (R squared change=.001, F change (1,354)=.279, p=.598). In the 
final model, interaction between political party affiliation and generalized trust was not 
significant (b=.061, p=.598). The summary of the third step of the hierarchical regression with 
political party affiliation as moderating variable is presented in Table 5. 
After testing the hypotheses using trust in corrupt journalists as a proxy for news media 
performance, the regression models were then rerun using perceived news media corruption as a 
proxy variable for news media performance. An examination of correlations revealed that the 
independent variables, generalized trust and perceived news media corruption, were not highly 
correlated (r=-.090). In addition, collinearity statistics (Tolerance and VIF) were all within the 
accepted limits (tolerance values for independent variables were .880 and .928, which is well 
above the threshold of .10 and VIF values of 1.136 and 1.078 were well below the cut-off of 10). 
Thus it can be concluded that assumptions of multicollinearlity have been met. Residual and 
scatter plots, in this case too, indicated the assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity were all satisfied.  
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A two-stage hierarchical multiple regression was then conducted with trust in news media 
as the dependent variable and with perceived news media corruption as a proxy for news media 
performance. The control variables (age, gender, education, political party affiliation, income, 
trust in government, personal religiosity, interpersonal discussion of news, and media use), 
entered at stage one, explained 14.8% of the variance in trust in news media (Table 6). After the 
entry of generalized trust and perceived news media corruption, the total variance explained by 
the model as a whole was 23.7%, F (11, 355)=12.513, p<.001. The two independent variables 
explained an additional 8.9% of the variance in trust in news media, R squared change=.089, F 
change (2,355)=20.806, p<.001. In the final model, both generalized trust (b=.12, p=.013) and 
perceived news media corruption (b=-.27, p<.001) were statistically significant. This indicates 
that both independent variables significantly influenced perceptions of trust in news media. The 
more trusting an individual is towards strangers, the more he or she is likely to trust news media 
in Serbia, and the more an individual believes news media in Serbia are corrupt the less likely he 
or she is to trust news media. Trust in government was again the only control variable significant 
in the model (b=.30, p<.001), indicating that that despite the fact that it made a unique 
statistically significant contribution to the model, the two independent variables (generalized 
trust and perceived news media corruption) still were significant predictors of trust in news 
media. However, analysis of part correlations, indicate that effect sizes were small. Controlling 
for all other variables, generalized trust explained 1.35% of variance in predicting trust in news 
media, whereas perceived news media corruption explained 6.97% of variance in predicting trust 
in news media.  
The first research question asked which of the two independent variables, generalized 
trust or news media performance, played a greater role in determining trust in news media. The 
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results of the hierarchical regression showed that when measured as perceived news media 
corruption, news media performance had a higher beta value (b=.30, p<.001) than generalized 
trust (b=.12, p=.013). In addition, the effect size for perceived news media corruption (squared 
part correlation =0.069) was larger than the effect size for generalized trust (squared part 
correlation =0.013), indicating that perceived news media corruption plays a bigger role in 
predicting trust in news media than generalized trust.  
Although these effect sizes can be considered small (effect size for perceived news media 
corruption: squared part correlation =0.069, and for generalized trust: squared part correlation 
=0.013), comparison with the regression model in which news media performance was measured 
with a proxy of trust in corrupt journalists (effect size for trust in corrupt journalists: squared part 
correlation =0.025, and for generalized trust: squared part correlation =0.012) shows that the 
effect size for news media performance in the second model was larger than in the first model. 
When news media performance was measured by a proxy of perceived news media corruption, it 
explained 6.97% of unique variance in predicting trust in news media. When it was measured by 
a proxy of trust in corrupt journalists, it explained 2.50% of unique variance in predicting trust in 
news media. This represents a difference of 4.47%. Thus it can be concluded that the measure of 
perceived news media corruption has a bigger predictive power in explaining trust in news media 
than a measure of trust in corrupt journalists.  
The hypotheses that predicted moderation effects of age, education, and political party 
affiliation were retested using perceived news media corruption as a proxy for news media 
performance. Three hierarchical multiple regression models were run. In each model, the 
interaction between generalized trust and one of the predicted moderators was entered in Step 3. 
The results show that none of the three variables moderated the relationship between generalized 
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trust and trust in news media: Age (R squared change=.000, F change (1,354)=.120, p=.729; b=-
.059, p=.729) (Table 7); education (R squared change=.002, F change (1,354)=.725, p=.395; b=-
.145, p=.395) (Table 8); or political party affiliation (R squared change=.000, F change 
(1,354)=.053, p=.818; b=.026, p=.818) (Table 9).  
Post-hoc tests 
As the effects of age and education were not found in the moderation analysis, post-hoc 
tests were conducted to probe whether different age and educational groups could moderate the 
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media29. For this purpose, Age was split 
in two categories: people who are younger than 42 and people 42 and older. The goal was to 
separate people who were fully socialized in Communism from those that were not. It was 
assumed that those who were 18 when the Communism in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989 
could have been fully socialized during the Communist period, whereas the younger ones were 
assumed to have had socializing experiences in other regimes too.  Based on the literature 
review, it was assumed that socialization during Communism could have negative effects on 
trust. In terms of the level of education, participants were also split in two groups: those who had 
up to a high school degree and those who had more education. Based on the literature review, it 
was assumed that those who had at least some college experience, would have been more 
incorporated into the educational system and thus more trustful of institutions systems (including 
news media) than those who completed only high school, elementary school or did not have any 
formal education. The interactions of age group and education group were entered separately in 
Steps 3 of the hierarchical regression analyses. All other variables remained the same. An 
analysis was first done using trust in corrupt journalists as a proxy for news media performance. 
Results show that neither age group nor education group moderated the relationship between 
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generalized trust and trust in news media. The interaction between age group and generalized 
trust did not bring significant change in the model (R squared change=.000, F change 
(1,354)=.153, p=.696). In the final model, interaction between age group and generalized trust 
was not significant (b=.049, p=.696). The interaction between education group and generalized 
trust did not bring significant change in the model either (R squared change=.000, F change 
(1,354)=.138, p=.710). In the final model, interaction between age group and generalized trust 
was not significant (b=-.048, p=.710). A similar analysis was then conducted using perceived 
corruption as a proxy for news media performance. Neither variable was shown to moderate the 
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media: age group (R squared 
change=.000, F change (1,354)=.049, p=.825; b=-.027, p=.825) and education group (R squared 
change=.000, F change (1,354)=.000, p=.989; b=.002, p=.989).  
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CHAPTER VI: 
DISCUSSION 
 
Popular trust in institutions is vital for democracy, but in post-Communist countries 
skepticism and distrust in all institutions, including news media, have been pervasive (e.g., 
Bjornskov, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001). So too has been the case with 
interpersonal trust. Citizens of post-Communist countries either fundamentally distrust both 
intuitions and their fellow citizens or at least are deeply skeptical of them. Only smaller groups 
of individuals across post-Communist countries have been found in previous research to trust 
institutions and people, yet only superficially (Mishler & Rose, 1997). In the preface of their 
edited volume on social trust in post-socialist countries, Kornai and Rose-Ackerman describe 
dishonesty and distrust as “ubiquitous” in Eastern Europe (Kornai & Rose-Ackerman, 2004, p. 
xiv). The authors note that the topics of deception, lying, corruption, and abuse of trust have been 
concealed and forbidden to talk about for decades in the region. They warn that it is precisely 
during periods of transition, when Eastern European societies come to open up more, that those 
topics became visible during everyday conversations among friends, at home, at work, or in daily 
press and television. 
The main purpose of this dissertation research was to examine the origins of trust in news 
media in Serbia, one of the countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe. It was done by testing 
cultural and performance factors as possible determinants of trust in news media, through a 
survey of the general population in Serbia (N=544). In order to give a more complete picture of 
trust in a post-Communist society, this dissertation study also explored the meanings of trust in 
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news media and trust in other people in Serbia, through 20 in-depth interviews with 
representatives of the Serbian population.  
The results of this dissertation study show that more than 20 years after the fall of 
Communism and 13 years after the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s authoritative regime, the 
pervasiveness of distrust remains present. Serbians who participated in this study expressed 
skepticism about their news media and distrust of people they don’t know personally. 
Conceptualizing trust in news media as well as trust in other people in the same way as their 
Western counterparts, Serbians thought that Western standards, necessary for trust in news media 
and other people to occur, such as fair selectivity of news, objectivity, neutrality, accuracy in 
reporting or sincerity in helping other people, were not met or applicable in their country. 
Looking further at the origins of this distrust, this dissertation tested the influences of two 
contrasting explanations, cultural and performance, on trust in news media in Serbia. The results 
supported the explanation that both factors play a role in determining trust in news media. 
However, the performance explanation, measured as assessments of news media corruption, was 
found to be slightly more powerful than the cultural explanation, measured as generalized trust, 
or trust in people that we don’t know personally.  
The results of this study point out that the relationship of Serbians towards their news 
media is a distrustful one, based both on cultural beliefs and more rational assessments of 
performance of media institutions. As such, this relationship appears to involve a dense 
permeation of social, economic, and historical contexts and demands a holistic interpretation. In 
order to do this, this chapter will discuss the combined results of the in-depth interviews and 
survey, conducted in May 2013 and October 2013 for this dissertation study. It will interpret the 
qualitative and quantitative results in light of existing literature on trust and trust in news media 
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in post-Communist countries. This approach should provide a more complete picture of trust in 
general and trust in news media in particular in this transitional country, and allow interpretation 
in a larger context. The discussion points will be presented as three overall inferences based on 
the holistic consideration of the results of this study.  
 The first overall inference suggests that Serbians conceptualize trust in news media 
according to Western normative standards, but believe that these standards cannot be applicable 
to their local conditions. The thematic analysis of 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of 
the Serbian population showed that the meaning of trust in news media among the Serbians is 
equivalent with its Western conceptualization. The interviewed Serbians perceived trust in news 
media as trust in journalistic selection of topics, facts, depictions, and assessments. In other 
words, interviewed Serbians expected trustworthy news reporting to select topics that are 
relevant for citizenry, to focus on important facts, to be unbiased, fair and include different 
points of view, to be accurate and precise in its depictions of events, and to have well-founded 
assessments. These factors are also reflected in Kohring and Matthes’s (2007) construct of trust 
in news media. The findings of this dissertation study show that Serbians, as Westerners, 
recognize that news media selectively choose some information over other, and that audiences 
are taking a risk when allocating trust to these specific selections. From the participants’ long 
descriptions of the need to have a bigger variety of topics covered in Serbian media, as well as 
different points of views included in news reports, it was clear that the Serbians interviewed for 
this study recognized the process of journalistic selection of information. In addition, the 
expectations by which Serbians judged the trustworthiness of this selection overlapped with the 
items used to measure the trust in news media construct in Kohring and Matthes’s (2007) scale: 
fairness, neutrality, objectivity, independence, inclusion of different points of view in a news 
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reports, use of reliable and knowledgeable sources in news reports, or selection of topics relevant 
for all citizens.  
These expectations represent the same normative standards used by audiences in 
countries with long democratic traditions when judging their press and they overlap largely with 
the perceptions of news media social roles in democratic societies.  Although several books have 
been written about press systems and models across the world (e.g., Christians, 2009; Hallin & 
Manicini, 2004; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramn, 1963), a social responsibility type of model has 
been widely accepted as an unwritten contract in Western countries. In this type of model, the 
state waives most of its control over the media, while media accept social commitments toward 
society and restrain themselves accordingly (Himelboim & Limor, 2010). Journalists pursue 
objectivity in two different ways: they either try to stay unbiased in their work as gatekeepers or 
they try to advance a social cause as advocates (Janowitcz, 1975); they either try to disseminate 
information in a neutral way or they try to have a more adversary role towards loci of power 
(Johnstone, Slawski & Bowman, 1972; Weaver et al., 2007). In the pursuit of either of these 
paths, Western journalistic practices demand dedication to a common set of values, such as 
accuracy, balance, relevance (Elliott, 1988), fairness, justice, responsibility, or civic-mindness 
(Plaisance & Skewes, 2003). These values are also in the core of the measurement of the trust in 
media construct provided by Kohring and Matthes (2007).  
Serbians interviewed in this study showed the ability to perceive the democratic ideals of 
journalistic values exercised in the scope of the socially responsible model of the press. In fact, 
these principles have been circulating in discourse pertaining to Serbian journalism for a long 
time. Even during Communism, when the media were fully under state control, the fourth estate 
was nevertheless seen as a “public forum” that was supposed to be a “mirror of events” but also 
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an “interpreter” of social realities. In fulfilling their “socially responsible reporting” role, 
journalists in the Communist Yugoslavia were supposed, at least declaratively, to “provide 
independent and nonpartisan sources of comment and criticism” (Robinson, 1977, pp. 119, 120). 
The Constitution itself stated that the press, radio, and television were expected to “truthfully ” 
and “objectively” inform the public (Paulu, 1974, p. 467), as well as include a broad range of 
topics “of public interest” and integrate diverse opinions (Paulu, 1974, p. 469). Although the 
question of what information was considered “truthful” and “objective” might have been left 
open, and the definitions of “socially responsible reporting” and other related terms were left 
afloat, it has to be noted that these principles were present in the discourse about Yugoslav 
journalistic practices. Even during years of Milošević’s authoritarian regime in the 1990s, these 
principles kept their place. Independent journalists, who had left state media and formed private 
newspapers, had made their decisions to leave based on a desire to protect the values of 
journalistic objectivity and fairness against state propagandistic media system. At the same time, 
scholars were warning about the bias of state media and their use of one-sided news reporting, 
contra posing these practices with Western standards of neutrality and fairness (e.g., Thompson, 
1994). Since the fall of the Milošević’s regime in 2000, the principles of Western journalism 
have become even more prominent in Serbia. Numerous reporters, producers and news directors 
have gone through Western media training, during which they have learned about Western-style 
media operations and management as well as about the values of Western-style news reporting 
(e.g., Hoffman, 2002; Peters, 2010). The big projects, such as the transformation of state 
television into a public service broadcaster, have been set up with the goal of establishing 
politically, economically, culturally and ethnically unbiased radio-television entities 
(Veljanovski, 2005). The principle of objectivity, neutrality, or independence from political and 
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economic interests, have been also clearly cited in the Code of Ethics of Serbian Journalists, a 
common document adopted by two competing associations of Serbian journalists in 2006. 
In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that participants of this dissertation study well 
recognized as their own, the values that had been known as Western values or standard norms for 
good journalistic practices and identified them as necessary components of trust in news media. 
In fact, there are indications that these standards are now recognized as normative in most 
countries around the world as journalistic codes of ethics have become strikingly similar. A 
recent study of 242 codes of ethics in 94 countries indicated a rather consensual perception of a 
neutral journalistic role across the world with the duties of “distributing information” and 
“commitment to social interest” as prevalent. The study also showed that Eastern Europeans 
expected even more from their journalists: to be more involved and stand up for the protection of 
values recognizable in Western democratic practices, such as protection of peace, democracy, 
and human rights (Himelboim & Limor, 2010).  
The results of in-depth interviews thus point out that Serbians conceptualize trust in news 
media using Western standards of journalistic practices as guidelines. Whether they think that 
these norms can be achieved in real life, is a different question. The results of the survey 
conducted in the scope of this dissertation (N=544) show that Serbians are skeptical about this. 
Scoring the average of 3.73 (SD=1.26) on a 7-point trust in news media scale, the participants of 
this study showed that they were not confident that their news media select topics and facts that 
are relevant for society, report facts and describe events accurately and neutrally, and express 
criticism adequately.  The average score was just a hair above the midpoint of the scale. On 
Mishler and Rose’s (1997) collapse of the trust scale, this score qualifies as skepticism.  
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In mass communication literature, media skepticism has been studied largely by Tsfati 
and his colleagues (e.g., Tsfati, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2005). In their 
work, media skepticism has been defined as a “subjective feeling of alienation and mistrust 
toward the mainstream news media” (Tsfati, 2003, p. 160). In this context, journalists are not 
viewed as fair or objective in their reports about society and not always telling the whole story. It 
also means individuals believe mainstream media would sacrifice accuracy and precision for 
personal and commercial gains, and audiences cannot believe what they read in newspapers or 
watch on television. In other words, Tsfati’s definition of media skepticism applies the notion of 
mistrust not only to how mass media report but how they function in the society too. In this 
dissertation, skepticism towards news media represents a medium stage (scores of 3,4, and 5) on 
a trust scale, falling between active distrust (scores 1 and 2)  and trust (scores 5 and 6). As the 
trust scale used in this study taps into the notion of trust in journalistic selectivity, it can be 
inferred that skepticism in this context assumes skepticism towards journalistic selectivity. 
Serbians who participated in the survey portion of this dissertation study were skeptical about 
journalistic selectivity and didn’t have confidence that their news media select topics, facts and 
express their criticism fairly, accurately, and neutrally.  
For comparison purposes, it has to be noted that skepticism towards news media does not 
exclusively pertain to Serbians. In her previous surveys in America and China, the author of this 
dissertation found, using the same scale for trust in news media, that young people in these 
countries also didn’t score very high on their trust in news media assessments. Although, young 
Americans had higher levels of trust in news media than Serbians surveyed in this study 
(M=4.42; SD=0.85; N=322), as well as young Chinese (M=4.28; SD=0.82; N=298), their scores 
were still in the domain of skepticism (Radovic & Rui, 2012). Using different scales or single 
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items to assess trust in news media, other studies also noted lower levels of trust in news media 
in Western societies. Pew Research Center reported in 2011 that 66% of Americans thought that 
news stories produced by traditional media outlets were inaccurate (Pew Research Center, 2011), 
whereas a world-wide survey conducted in 2006 showed that, in the United Kingdom, 64% of 
viewers did not consider that broadcast news media report all sides of the story (BBC, Reuters & 
Media Center Poll, 2006).  
Skepticism towards mass media does not have to be inherently bad. Some level of 
skepticism can be healthy for the development of democratic institutions. Some evidence suggest 
that media skeptics are more likely to be knowledgeable about politics or participate in the 
political process and thus, as Tsfati (2003) argues, less likely to slide into apathy. Mishler and 
Rose (1997) claimed that “healthy skepticism” can facilitate democratic process more than blind 
trust. However, the problem with Eastern European countries is not one of healthy skepticism but 
of severe skepticism that borders on outright distrust in institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997). This 
dissertation showed that in Serbia too, skepticism towards news media can be interpreted as 
rather strong than healthy. The score (M=3.73; SD=1.26) is closer to the upper bordering value 
for active distrust (2) than to the lower bordering value for trust (6). Falling between the scale 
points of “slightly disagree” and “neither agree nor disagree” with the questions about trust in 
news media, this average score might indicate that the skepticism among Serbians corresponds 
more to a certain degree of mistrust toward mainstream news media than to a positive suspicion 
in news media reporting.  
The results of in-depth interviews additionally inform this inference. For most of 
interviewed Serbians, the values of fairness, neutrality, objectivity, and independence are 
impossible to attain. They thought that the influences of political and economic sources of power 
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are so strong in Serbia that they prevent journalists from performing their jobs professionally. 
Serbians interviewed in this study thought that politicians and media owners, not the journalists, 
are the ones who select news topics to cover, or angles to take. In this regard, the participants 
were not sure how much journalists in Serbia can report objectively, cover all sides of the story, 
or work in the interest of citizens of Serbia. They rather thought that news media became 
instruments for the realization of their controllers’ interests, tools of falsification, “systems of 
lies,” fraud and manipulation. Willing to take bribes in exchange for covering up important 
stories or creating scandals, journalists were seen more as professional deceivers than as 
disseminators of relevant information (e.g., P2; P3; P7; P9; P13; P17).  
The second inference suggests that skepticism towards news media comes more from the 
negative assessment of news media performance than from a cultural predisposition to distrust. 
After finding the low levels of trust of Serbians in their news media, as well as discovering their 
conceptualization of trust in news media, this dissertation study shifted focus to examining the 
sources of news media skepticism in this country. The regression analysis of survey data 
collected for this study showed that regardless whether it was measured as trust in corrupt 
journalism or perceptions of news media corruption, news media performance played a larger 
role in determining trust in news media than the cultural factor of generalized trust. The beta 
weight of news media performance factor, either measured as trust in corrupt journalists (b=.16, 
p=.001) or as perceived corruption of news media (b=-.27, p<.001), was larger and more 
significant than the beta weight for generalized trust (b=.12, p=.021). Consequentially, news 
media performance had a larger amount of unique variance in explaining trust in news media 
than generalized trust did. Measured as trust in corrupt journalists, news media performance 
explained 2.5% of variance in trust in news media, and measured as perceived news media 
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corruption, it explained 6.97% of unique variance in trust in news media. On the other hand, 
generalized trust explained 1.23% of unique variance in trust in news media.   
This suggests that the performance explanation is superior to the cultural explanation 
when it comes to explaining trust in news media among the participants of this study. Serbians 
viewed trust as endogenous to news media functioning rather than as an exogenous trait rooted in 
the character of the people. Performance theories conceive trust or distrust as rational responses 
of individuals to the performance of institutions. The potential trustor decides to place trust based 
on the information from trustee’s actions: if the trustee performs well, the trustor will trust him 
or her (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1998; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Thus institutions that 
perform well are likely to elicit the trust of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively 
generate feelings of distrust and low confidence. In the case of this dissertation research, the 
more Serbians thought news media were corrupt, the more they distrusted them. Trust in news 
media, insulated from the effects of generalized trust, was substantially determined by news 
media performance. As citizens negatively evaluated news media for corruption practices, they 
were skeptical of their news media.  
In the view of Serbians interviewed in this study, corruption is a very serious problem of 
Serbian media. The survey results showed that Serbian media are perceived as highly corrupt. On 
a 7-point scale, Serbians gave them a very high average score of 5.26 (SD=1.41). During the in-
depth interviews, participants of this study stated that they thought that news media, under the 
influence of politicians or media owners publish information that are in the interests of these 
centers of power, not in the interests of people (e.g., P9; P17). They thought that Serbian 
journalists intentionally cover up some stories, while promoting others and that they take money 
for doing it (P3; P7). For the Serbians interviewed in this study, corruption in journalism is so 
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prevalent that those who write objectively are considered as endangered species (P4; P13). But it 
is not only in journalism that Serbians recognized the omnipresent corruption. They viewed that 
ravaging corruption infiltrated into all institutions of the Serbian society, from state and local 
administrations, through educational system to health care, police, and judiciary (P6; P9; P10; 
P13). Due to perceived presence of corruption in all institutions, Serbians would go to state 
institutions with already prepared bribes. During the in-depth interviews they described how they 
would bring money, foods and drinks to representatives of different institutions, but feared that 
their interests would still not be fully protected (e.g., P6; P13).  
More importantly, Serbians not only considered news media as highly corrupt but also 
distrusted corrupt journalists. The survey results of this dissertation showed that, when 
evaluating the corrupt journalistic practices in the form of hypothetical situations presented to 
them, Serbians clearly sent a message that they did not believe that corrupt journalists would 
work in people’s interest. The average score for this question was extremely low: 1.65 (SD=0.90) 
on a 7-point scale.  
This perception of corruption could have more devastating effects than corruption itself. 
As Melgar, Rosi and Smith (2009) point out, it generates a “culture of distrust” towards 
institutions and can create a cultural tradition of gift giving, which, in a vicious circle, raises 
corruption. Čábelková and Hanousek (2004) found that corruption perception is one of the key 
factors in giving a bribe.  The higher the perceived corruption in an organization, the more 
probable it is that a person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe, therefore supporting 
corruption. As Melgar, Rosi and Smith (2009) state, high levels of corruption perception are 
enough to cause institutional instability and the deterioration of relationships among individuals, 
institutions and states. Serbia’s scores in perceived corruption are worrisome not only judging by 
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the data from this dissertation, but also from other sources. Transparency International is a non-
governmental organization that monitors and publicizes corporate and political corruption in 
international development. Its 2013 Corruption Perception Index, based on expert opinions, 
measured the perceived levels of public sector corruption in countries worldwide, scoring them 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Serbia scored 42, indicating that it is perceived as a 
corrupt country in which institutions and leaders are not bribe-free and rather answer to their 
powerful friends than to the public. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, an incredible 95% of 
countries had a score below 50 (Transparency International, 2013). In terms of news media, high 
corruption perception can not only prevent citizens from being properly informed but can further 
reinforce the practice of gift giving to news media practitioners and undermine even more their 
fragile credibility.  
The results of this study supported the findings of other studies that have found 
performance explanations superior to cultural explanations in predicting trust in institutions (e.g., 
Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). For example, Mishler and Rose (2001) did not 
find evidence that general trust in humankind spills over to trust in institutions.  By contrast, their 
study showed that institutional trust was substantially affected by both political and economic 
performance, while being almost completely unaffected by interpersonal trust or by socialization 
influences. Their findings suggested that institutional performance holds the key to developing 
trust in political institutions, and that trust can be built more surely and swiftly than the decades 
or generations suggested by cultural theories. The superiority of performance explanation in the 
Serbian case might have important implications for news media development. If trust in news 
media is largely dependent on the performance of news media, then it can be nurtured by 
improving the conduct and performance of news media. Journalists can generate trust the old-
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fashioned way: they can earn it by responding to public needs and rooting out corruption 
practices. They can also earn it by sticking to the doctrines of fair, independent and independent 
reporting. The character and performance of trustworthy news media can generate trust just as 
the performance of untrustworthy news media generated skepticism and distrust.    
The importance of performance of news media in predicting trust in news media in 
Serbia, can be also looked at from the perspective of the relatively smaller contribution of 
generalized trust. As pointed out earlier, generalized trust had smaller predictive value of trust in 
news media, as its beta weight was smaller than the beta weights of the news media performance 
measures, as was the amount of variance it explained in trust in news media. The smaller 
contribution of generalized trust in explaining trust in news media might suggest a changing 
relationship of Eastern Europeans towards their institutions, especially taking into account the 
history of distrust in Eastern Europe noted by numerous researchers (e.g., Aasland, Grodeland & 
Pleines, 2012; Bjornskov, 2007; Macek & Markova, 2004; Miheljak, 2006; Paldam & Svedsen, 
2001; Petrova, 2007; Rose, 1994; Sztompka, 2000). All these scholars pointed out that during the 
rule of oppressive Communist regimes in the region, erosion of distrust was widespread. Due to 
the controlling nature of the Communist rules, peoples from Eastern Europe started distrusting 
everybody and everything that did not belong to immediate circles of family and friends. 
According to some researchers, this general predisposition to distrust spilled into the post-
Communist period, as the levels of trust in other people and institutions remained small (e.g., 
Miheljak, 2006; Rose, 1994). Using survey data from 1997, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003, 
Bjornskov (2007) discovered that the Communist past had a clear effect on perceptions of trust, 
as these countries were about eight percentage points less trusting than otherwise comparable 
countries. In-depth interviews with elite representatives of East Central Europe, South East 
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Europe, and the Western Balkans, revealed that people in this region distinguished between “us” 
and “them” between “our people” and “others.” Whereas the former usually enjoy their full trust, 
the latter are generally viewed with skepticism, a clear relic of communist past’s atomization of 
human relations.  
The results of this dissertation study, which showed that the impact of generalized trust in 
predicting trust in news media was statistically significant but small, might indicate that the 
predisposition to distrust as predictor of trust in institutions in Eastern Europe might be 
changing. For Serbian citizens, performance of news media appears to play a more significant 
role in determining trust in news media than generalized distrust. This might indicate that 
rational assessments of performance might be starting to prevail over cultural explanations, and 
that some Eastern European nations might be moving towards evaluations based on past actions 
rather than relying on cultural beliefs and norms that belong more to the domain of faith than 
reason.  
The third inference suggests that performance should be coupled with culture in 
understanding trust in news media in Serbia. Despite the fact that perception of news media 
corruption was shown to be a better predictor of trust in news media in Serbia than generalized 
trust, as a cultural factor generalized trust was still a significant predictor of trust in news media. 
In the model with controls, generalized trust’s beta weight was smaller than the beta weight of 
news media performance but still statistically significant. This indicates that together with news 
media performance generalized trust had a significant predictive value of trust in news media, 
even when controlling for other variables. In addition, the moderation tests showed that the 
relationship between generalized trust and trust in news media did not change when the 
interaction effects of age, education and political party affiliation were tested. This shows that 
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generalized trust positively affects trust in news media regardless of people’s age, educational 
level or political party affiliation. Finally, the predictive power of the whole model increased 
when generalized trust and news media performance were also entered in the equation, indicating 
that these two variables together bring significant variance in explaining trust in news media. 
This suggests that trust in strangers cannot be ignored when assessing trust in news media in 
Serbia.  
Even more so, the results of the survey further showed that levels of trust in people we 
don’t know are pretty low in Serbia. In terms of generalized trust, Serbians moved very close to 
the active distrust category. Their average score of M=2.90 (SD=1.38) indicates that they thought 
that other people would be more likely to look out for themselves and to take advantage of 
others, than to help others or be fair. Thus, Serbians thought that one has to be rather careful 
when dealing with other people. The results of in-depth interviews provided a deeper look at the 
sources of generalized distrust in Serbia. During in-depth interviews participants pointed out that 
one can completely trust only family members and closest friends. Most thought that other 
“people would try to cheat you on every corner” (P2; P4), and that they would do so 
“intentionally” without “choosing means to achieve their goals” (P4). Some interviewees thought 
that even people who spontaneously start conversations in public places usually have other 
intentions, such as stealing from your purse (P10) or  committing some sort of fraud (P13; P17), 
illustrating the prevalent thought of most participants that, “it is in the human nature to use good 
people” (P6).  
These findings suggest that generalized distrust is not only a significant predictor of trust 
in news media in Serbia, but a very strong feeling among citizens of Serbia, too. Thus, although 
news media performance plays a greater role in explaining trust in news media, trust in strangers 
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has to remain an active variable in models predicting trust in news media. Trust in news media in 
Serbia significantly does not only depend on how well Serbians evaluate the functioning of news 
media, but also on how much people in that country trust others. The results of this dissertation 
study showed that the more Serbians trusted strangers and the less they thought news media were 
corrupt, the more they trusted news media. In this context, cultural and performance theories that 
provide contrasting explanations of the origins of trust, have to be considered not as mutually 
exclusive, but as complementary. Cultural predisposition to trust or distrust other people does not 
necessarily have to exclude the possibility that people also take into account performance of 
particular institutions when attributing trust to them. Although one variable might be stronger 
than the other in predictions of trust, taken together they provide a more powerful explanation of 
trust in news media. It can also be argued that although on a country level, cultural 
predispositions can be stronger than performance assessments in predicting trust (or vice versa), 
each individual does carry in oneself both cultural predispositions towards trust and distrust and 
possibilities to assess institutional performace. Thus, instead of looking at cultural and 
performace theoretical perspectives as competing explanations, a more holistic assessment would 
be to integrate them in the same model. They should be used together as long as both variables 
keep their predictive values. 
In terms of journalistic practices, the complimentary influences of performance and 
generalized trust suggest that trust in news media in Serbia can be improved by correcting for 
both. If corrupted practices of news media are improved and interpersonal relations ameliorated, 
it can be expected that the levels of trust in news media would improve. Although the 
improvement of corruption practices is more likely to get bigger increases in absolute numbers of 
trust in news media than improvement of generalized trust alone, its coupling with the 
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improvement of interpersonal relations could bring even more trust in news media. In addition, it 
can bring a more inclusive and productive society overall. Research has already found that 
generalized trust positively influences trust in political institutions (e.g., Brehm & Rahn, 1997; 
Cole, 1973; Newton, 2001) and spills over to create better organizational functioning (e.g., 
Fukuyama, 1995; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Following this logic, the increase of generalized 
trust could spill over to create a more functional environment for journalists in Serbia too and, 
coupled with the decrease in corruptive journalistic practices, could most probably positively 
influence the perceptions of trust in the fourth estate.  
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CHAPTER VII:  
CONCLUSION 
 
In times of the transformation of Serbian news media from an institution that served the 
interests of the state during Communism and authoritarianism, to the one that ought to serve the 
public, in present, not fully developed democratic circumstances, audiences proved to be 
cautious about trusting the newly transformed news media. This dissertation study found that 
Serbians conceptualize trust in news media in the same way as their Western counterparts but 
thought that normative standards of journalistic fairness, objectivity, neutrality or independence 
are not applicable to current conditions in their country. Skeptical towards their news media, 
Serbians believe that news media are under political and economic pressures, corrupt, 
unprofessional, or even inherently organized as instruments of manipulations. This dissertation 
study also showed that low trust in news media in Serbia is determined by low levels of trust in 
other people. Serbians do not trust people that they don’t know personally and are deeply 
distrustful about their intentions. They think that other people mainly want to use them for 
fulfilling their own goals and interests. But even more so trust in news media in Serbia is 
determined by poor news media performance. Serbians who participated in this study saw their 
news media as highly corrupt and this significantly affected their trust in the fourth estate. The 
more they thought the news media were corrupt, the less they were likely to trust them.  
This dissertation study has several limitations. Previous studies that tested cultural and 
performance impact on institutional trust (e.g., Bjornskov, 2007; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton 
& Norris, 2000) based their findings on cross-cultural analyses. Being able to compare the results 
among Eastern European countries and between Eastern European and Western countries, they 
have been able to interpret the results in a larger context and relative to other similar or different 
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societies. This dissertation research examined the determinants of trust in news media in the 
Serbian context and thus is not able to interpret its results relative to the impact these factors 
might be having in other countries. Futures studies should include more countries in their 
analyses in order to see whether the same pattern might be discovered in other Eastern European 
societies. In addition, this dissertation based its findings on cross-sectional data. Thus it is not 
able to compare the levels of trust in news media in Serbia relative to previous levels of trust in 
news media in this post-Communist country. A longitudinal approach would have provided a 
more in-depth view of trust in news media in Serbia and would have allowed for a more 
substantial interpretation of its levels.  
This dissertation study’s finding that news media performance had a higher impact on 
determining trust in news media in Serbia than the cultural factor of generalized trust, might be 
suggesting that the habit of relying on cultural beliefs in at least assessing news media might be 
fading in parts of Eastern Europe. For this claim to be tested, larger comparative studies among 
post-Communist bloc countries are needed. Future studies would also have to look into the 
reasons of why generalized trust might be a weaker predictor of trust in news media, especially 
having in mind that other studies had already pointed out that in new democracies generalized 
trust could be a weaker predictor of trust in institutions than institutional performance, but failed 
to explain why (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Rohrscheider & Schmitt-Beck, 2002).  
In addition, the explanatory power of the model that included generalized trust and news 
media performance and other control variables was not large. The model in which news media 
performance was conceptualized as trust in corrupted journalists explained 19.2% of the total 
variance in trust in news media, whereas the model in which news media performance was 
conceptualized as perceived news media corruption explained 23.7% of the variance in trust in 
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news media. Future studies should include other variables which may be better predictors of trust 
in news media. For example, as trust in government, one of the control variables used in this 
study was significant and explained more unique variance in trust in news media than any other 
variable used in the models, including the two main independent variables, other predictors of 
trust in news media might be maybe found among variables that assess trust in different state 
institutions.   
Finally, the analysis of survey data from this dissertation study showed that the impact of 
news media performance on trust in news media in Serbia was stronger when news media 
performance was conceptualized as perceived news media corruption then when it was 
conceptualized as trust in corrupt journalists. Conceptualized as perception of news media 
corruption, news media performance was able to explain 4.47% of the variance more than when 
it was conceptualized as trust in corrupt journalists. This indicates that a scale that taps into 
general perception of news media corruption might be better than situational vignettes, which tap 
into performance of individual journalists. This could also be interpreted as supporting the 
findings of in-depth interviews which indicate that the impact of corruption perception might 
change depending on how one asks the question. The analysis of in-depth interviews with 
Serbians showed that the apriori negative perception of institutional corruption (e.g., P10 – 
“They are all a bunch of liars and cheaters!”) fades to some extent when they are presented with 
real-life situational events of corrupt processes, in which the individual might benefit. 
Participants did not find such corrupt practices repellant any more, but even found them 
acceptable (e.g., to give presents to different representatives of state institutions if they would 
provide a service in return). In that case, Serbians would justify the acceptance of these practices 
by citing low salaries and hard work in the public sector (e.g., P6; P7). These justifications 
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spilled over to corrupt news media behaviors, with participants acknowledging that the work of 
journalists “is not easy” or is “very hard” (P6; P8; P10), that journalists are subject to various 
pressures and have even been killed if they reported objectively (P10). Future studies could 
further explore this area when conducting studies in other post-Communist bloc countries. Also, 
it has to be noted that the results of this study might have been different if different 
conceptualization of news media performance was used. Corruption perceptions were used in 
this study as they were found to representat the best news media performance in the Serbian 
context. Future studies should test how corruption perceptions would predict trust in news media 
in other countries.  
In sum, I have attempted, in this dissertation study, to assess the current state of trust in 
news media in Serbia, one of the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe. In doing this, I 
have tried not only to explain the origins of trust in news media, but to position it in a larger 
socio-economic and historical context and explain it in relationship to other types of trust, such 
as trust in other people or trust in corrupt journalists. Although at first glance, it might seem that 
the results point out to an optimistic shift of Eastern European thinking that started to allocate 
trust based on others’ actions and not based on previous beliefs rotted in the national culture, it 
has to be noted that Serbians remain deeply skeptical about other people as well as institutions. 
Thus, it might be fair to note that the culture of distrust and skepticism has not disappeared in 
Eastern Europe, but that it might have only changed its form – from fear to disillusionment.  
Past totalitarian regimes in the region persistently stimulated distrust among citizens by 
inducing uncertainly and propagating fear. News media’s, as other official institutions’ role was 
to propagate state ideology and not to independently inform citizens. Both trust and distrust were 
equated with fear. When, in the atmosphere of fear, citizens of authoritarian countries express 
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high trust in institutions in public opinion polls it is implied that they do it out of fear (e.g., 
Markova, 2004; Muller, 2013) of possible regime’s repercussions. Privately though, they distrust 
everything and everybody, and are terrified that trust might make them more open in 
conversations and thus more vulnerable to secret services’ persecutions. In new democracies, 
such as Serbia is today, it doesn’t seem that trust is equated with fear any more. Serbians are not 
afraid of expressing their skepticism towards their news media and are willing to state their 
reasons openly. It seems that in the present context, skepticism towards news media in Serbia 
reflects rather a certain disappointment with the performance of the institution. Serbians are 
bitter that their news media are not up the Western standards of journalistic professionalism. 
They are disappointed that their news media are not reporting fairly, accurately, neutrally, and 
that their journalists are corrupt. As is the case with many other countries in which democracy is 
fairly a new phenomenon, the low levels of trust in news media in Serbia might reflect, what 
Catterberg and Moreno (2005) called, the “post-honeymoon disillusionment” (p. 31). In many 
emerging nations, transition to democracy has been followed by aspirations of civil, political, 
and economic rights. As a result of these new demands, higher standards for evaluating the news 
media emerged after the regime changed. The existence of normative standards of fair and 
balanced reporting became not enough anymore. In the Serbian case, the citizens evidently 
started demanding their implementation as well.   
The results of this study indicate that the basic news needs of vast segments of the 
Serbian population have not yet been met, which might have increased people’s skepticism 
towards their media systems. The mere fact that the political system changed, only implies that 
news media in Serbia have transitioned from Communist and authoritarian to another system of 
operation. It does not imply that they have fully transformed into systems capable of unbiased 
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and independent presentation of information. For that to happen, a longer period of time might 
be needed, a period in which the corrupt practices would be eradicated and mass media systems 
transformed from those that serve the elites to those that serve the people. For that to happen, it 
seems inevitable that disillusionment will be followed by abrupt sobering and decisive action. 
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Appendix A: Interview guide  
 
Date of Interview:___________________ 
 
Place:_____________________________ 
 
Time:______________________________ 
 
Section I – Biographical/Demographic Questions 
1. Pseudonym: 
2. Sex: 
3. Age: 
4. Resides in: 
5. Occupation: 
a. Title: 
b. Place of employment: 
c. Years practicing: 
6. Education: 
a. Highest level: 
b. Areas of specialty: 
7. Family: 
a. Marital status: 
b. Number, ages of children: 
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Section II – Question Categories, Grand Tour Questions, and Planned Prompts 
a. Explore trust in other people:  
i. What does it mean for you to trust other people? 
ii. Who do you trust? Why do you trust them? Imagine a person that you 
trust. Please describe him/her. 
iii. Which characteristics trustworthy people should have? 
iv. How do you decide to trust other people? 
v. Who do you distrust? Why? Which characteristics these people have? 
vi. Imagine the situation: you are at the bus stop in your place of residence. A 
stranger approaches you. What is the first thing that comes to your mind? 
Why? 
b. Explore trust towards family members, friends, co-workers  
i. Imagine the situation in which you would have to give something that is 
very dear to you to another person for a particular period of time. Which 
person would it be? Why?  
c. Explore trust towards strangers 
i. Generally speaking, how much should we trust people that we don’t 
know? Why? 
ii. Generally speaking, how much should one be careful towards other 
people? Why? 
iii. Describe situations in which people that you don’t know personally helped 
you.  
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iv. Please tell me what you think about this hypothetical person: This person 
is open in relationships with other people that he/she doesn’t know 
personally like family or friends. This person thinks that, in general (not 
all people, but on average), people are ready to help her and not take 
advantage of her, that other people, generally speaking, tend to be fair and 
don’t only look for their own interests.   
d. Explore trust in institutions. 
i. Do you trust institutions? Why ? Did you have some negative-positive 
experiences ? Describe them. 
ii. Are there some institutions that you trust? Which ones? Why?  
iii. If they say that instutions are corrupted – describe some cases of 
corruption that you are aware of or that you heard of. What do you 
consider as corruption?  
e. Explore news media habits 
i. Which news media do you follow? Why? On which platforms? 
ii. Are their particular actions, routines with which you connect the 
consumption of news media (e.g. drinking coffee, waiting for the bus, 
watching news with friends, etc.)  
iii. Can you describe your particular day in terms of following news media?  
 
f. Explore trust in news media. 
i. What does it mean for you to trust news media? 
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ii. Which characteristics should media have in order for you to trust them? 
Elaborate on each characteristic having in mind Serbian media/foreign 
media?  
iii. How do media gain your confidence? Describe the process. 
iv. Can you describe your perfect news media channel. What should it have? 
Why? 
v. How would a newscast look like if you were in charge of it? 
vi. Can you describe a perfect journalist? Which characteristics should he/she 
have? 
vii. How would you describe the work of journalists in Serbia? Why? 
viii. How would you describe the work of foreign news media? Why?  
ix. How would you describe the sources that journalists/media use?  
x. How would you describe the work of the news media regarding their 
selection of topics?  
xi. What do you think about the accuracy of news media reports? 
xii. What do you think about the journalistic criticism? 
xiii. Which news media you do not trust? Why?  
xiv. Can you describe some situations in which news media were helpful to 
you? 
xv. Generally speaking, what do you think about the work of news media in 
Serbia? 
xvi. If you had to choose between state and private news media, what would 
you choose and why? 
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xvii. Is corruption present in Serbia news media? If yes – how much; where; 
how do you know.  
  
155 
 
Interview guide - Serbian translation 
 
Datum:___________________ 
 
Mesto:_____________________________ 
 
Vreme:______________________________ 
 
Sekcija I – Biografski podaci 
1. Pseudonim: 
2. Pol: 
3. Godine: 
4. Mesto boravišta: 
5. Zanimanje: 
a. Radno mesto: 
b. Mesto zaposlenja: 
c. Godine zaposlenja: 
6. Obrazovanje: 
a. Najviši nivo: 
b. Oblast specijalizacije: 
7. Porodica: 
a. Bračni status: 
b. Broj i godine dece: 
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Sekcija II – Pitanja  
a. Istražiti poverenje u druge ljude. 
i. Šta za vas znači verovati drugim ljudima? 
ii. Kome verujete? Zašto? Zamislite osobu u koju imate poverenja. Opišite je.  
iii. Koje karakteristike ljudi treba da imaju da biste im verovali?  
iv. Kako se odlučujete da verujete nekoj osobi? 
v. Da li postoje ljudi kojima ne verujete? Koji su to ljudi? Koje osobine 
imaju ljudi kojima ne verujete? 
vi. Zamislite sledeću situaciju. Nalazite se na autobuskoj stanici u Vašem 
gradu i prilazi vam nepoznata osoba. Šta je Vaša prva misao? Zašto? 
b. Istražiti poverenje u članove porodice, prijatelje, kolege. 
i. Zamislite sada situaciju u kojoj treba da poverite nešto što vam je 
dragoceno nekoj drugoj osobi. Koja bi to osoba bila? 
c.  Istražiti poverenje u nepoznate ljude.  
i. Šta mislite, uopšteno govoreći, koliko čovek treba da veruje ljudima koje 
ne poznaje? Zašto? 
ii. Šta mislite, uopšteno govoreći, koliko čovek treba da bude pažljiv/oprezan 
u odnosu sa ljudima koje ne poznaje? 
iii. Da li možete da opišite neke situacije u kojima su vam ljudi koje ne 
poznajete dobro pomogli? 
iv. Sada ću vam opisati jednu osobu a vi mi recite šta mislite o njoj. Ta osoba 
ulazi otvoreno u odnose bilo koje vrste sa drugim ljudima, sa ljudima koje 
ne poznaje intimno, recimo kao prijatelje ili porodicu. Polazi od toga da su 
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drugi ljudi generalno (u proseku/ne svi, nego u proseku) spremni da joj 
pomognu a ne da je iskoriste, da drugi ljudi generalno (u proseku) teže da 
budu fer i da generalno drugi ljudi ne gledaju samo svoju korist.  
d. Istražiti poverenje u institucije. 
i. Da li verujete državnim institucijama? Zašto? Da li ste imali neka 
negativna-pozitivna iskustva? Opišite ih. 
ii. Da li postoje državne institucije kojima verujete? Koje su to? Zašto?  
iii. Ukoliko kažu da ima korupcije u državnim institucijama, neka opišu 
slučajeve korupcije za koje znaju ili za koje su čuli. I da opišu šta smatraju 
da je korupcija. 
e. Istražiti navike što se tiče praćenja informativnih programa. 
i. Koje informativne programe-sadržaje pratite ? Zašto njih ? Na kojim 
platforma (TV, novine, radio, Internet)? 
ii. Da li vezujete odredjene dnevne aktivnosti za praćenje informativnih 
sadržaja (pr. čitanje kafe uz novine) ? 
iii. Da li možete da opišete vaš tipičan dan što se tiče praćenja informativnih 
sadržaja ? 
f. Istražiti poverenje u medije. 
i. Šta za Vas znači verovati medijima (informativnim sadržajima) ? 
ii. Koje karakteristike mediji treba da imaju da biste im verovali? Opišite 
svaku karakteristiku.  
iii. Kako mediji zadobijaju vaše poverenje? Opište taj process. 
iv. Zamislite idealan medij. Možete li ga opisati? Šta treba da ima i zašto ? 
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v. Kako bi izgledao Dnevnik da ga vi uredjujete? 
vi. Možete li da opišete idealnog novinara? Koje karakteristike treba da ima? 
vii. Kako biste opisali rad novinara u Srbiji. Zašto? 
viii. Kako biste opisali rad stranih novinara? Zašto? 
ix. Šta mislite o izvorima koje mediji koriste u informativnoim programima? 
x. Šta mislite o selekciji tema koje informativni programi biraju? 
xi. Šta mislite koliko su tačni izveštaji koji se objavljuju u informativnim 
programima ? 
xii. Šta mislite o novinarskim komentarima koji se objavljuju u medijima ? 
xiii. Kojima medijima ne verujete? Zašto ? 
xiv. Da li možete da opišete situacije u kojima su vam informativni programi 
bili od pomoći (bilo koje vrste) ? 
xv. Uopšteno govoreći, šta misilite o radu informativnih medija u Srbiji ? 
xvi. Kad biste birali izmedju privatnih i državnih medija koje biste izabrali i 
zašto ? 
xvii. Da li ima korupcije u medijima? Ako da - šta mislite kako se ona 
ispoljava?  
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Appendix B: Survey questionnaire 
 
I  Please show on this 7-point scale where 1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great 
trust, how much you personally trust …  
1. … the news provided in newspapers.   
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Great trust 
2. … the news you see on television.  
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Great trust 
3. … the news that you hear on radio.  
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Great trust 
4. … the news from online sources.  
Great distrust 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Great trust 
 
II Keeping in mind the coverage of economic crisis in news media in Serbia, please answer 
whether you 1 = strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=slightly disagree; 4=neither agree nor 
disagree; 5=slightly agree; 6=agree; 7=strongly agree with the following statements.  
1. The topic of economic crisis receives necessary attention.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
2. The topic of economic crisis is assigned an adequate status.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
3. The frequency with which economic crisis is covered is adequate.  
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Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
4. The topic is covered on the necessary regular basis.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
5. The essential points are included.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
6. The focus is on important facts.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
7. All important information regarding the topic of economic crisis is provided. 
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
8. Reporting includes different points of view.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
9. The information in a report would be verifiable if examined.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
10. The reported information is true.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
11. The reports recount the facts truthfully.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
12. The facts that I receive regarding economic crisis are correct.  
                  Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
13. Criticism is expressed in an adequate manner.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
14. The journalists’ opinions are well-founded.  
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Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
15. The commentary regarding economic crisis consists of well-reflected conclusions.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
16. I feel that the journalistic assessments regarding the topic of economic crisis are 
useful.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
III Having in mind people that you DO NOT know personally, please answer the following 
three questions.   
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?  Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means 
you can’t be too careful and 7 means that most people can be trusted.  
You can’t be too careful 1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Most people can be trusted 
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, 
or would they try to be fair? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means most 
people would try to take advantage of me and 7 means that most people would try to be 
fair. 
Most people would              1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Most people would  
try to take advantage of me                                                 try to be fair 
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3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly 
looking out for themselves? Please tell me on a score of 1 to 7, where 1 means most 
people look out for themselves and 7 means that people mostly try to be helpful. 
Most people look out for                                                                  Most people try to be  
themselves                           1—2—3—4—5—6—7       helpful 
 
IV Now, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about yourself.  
1. How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?  
Never -1 
Less than once a month – 2 
Once a month – 3 
Several times a month – 4 
Once a week – 5 
Several times a week – 6 
Every day – 7 
2. Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in 
social activities?  
Much less than most – 1 
Less than most- 2 
About the same – 3 
More than most- 4 
Much more than most - 5 
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V Now I will read to you several short stories and will ask you to answer the questions after 
them:  
1. Milosh is a journalist in Serbia. Last year Milosh helped his cousin, a construction 
worker, to get a job as a journalist.  
How likely do you think Milosh is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic 
duties?  
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely 
2. Lazar is a journalist in Serbia. When writing a story about the success of young talents in 
Serbia, Lazar put the focus of the story on his nephew, although he knew that another 
student from the Mathematical High School in Belgrade had better grades and won more 
prizes in international competitions.  
How likely do you think Lazar is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic 
duties?  
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely 
3. Jovan is a journalist in Serbia. One day a prominent politician asked him not to publish 
an investigative article Jovan was working on about the politician’s involvement in a love 
affair. He promised he would return the favor to Jovan. Jovan accepted and did not 
publish the article.  
How likely do you think Jovan is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic 
duties?  
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely 
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4. Milan is a journalist in Serbia. One day a prominent politician asked him not to publish 
an investigative article Milan was working on about the politician’s involvement in 
political scuffles among the ruling coalition. He gave Milan a bottle of Scotch and a 
packet of cigarettes. Milan accepted and did not publish the article.  
How likely do you think Milan is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic 
duties?  
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely 
5. Zoran is a journalist in Serbia. A prominent politician asked him not to publish an 
investigative article Zoran was working on about the politician’s involvement in a 
criminal enterprise. He gave Zoran 150 Euroes. Zoran accepted and did not publish the 
article.  
How likely do you think Zoran is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic 
duties?  
Not at all likely 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely 
6. Petar is a journalist in Serbia. A prominent politician asked him not to publish the 
investigative article Petar was working on about politician’s involvement in covering up 
the real figures for unemployment in the country. He gave Petar 1,000 Euroes. Petar  
accepted and did not publish the article.  
How likely do you think Petar is to work in your best interest, when fulfilling his journalistic 
duties?  
Not likely at all 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Very likely 
VI Please answer the following questions:  
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1. Please indicate how many days per week you discuss news with your 
friends/family?  
   0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
2. Please indicate how many days per week you listen to the radio? 
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
3. Please indicate how many days per week you read newspapers?  
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
4. Please indicate how many days per week you watch television?  
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
5. Please indicate how many days per week you use Internet? 
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
6. Please indicate which medium is your main source of information:  
______________________________ 
7. On a scale from Not at all (1) to Very much (7), please indicate to what extent you 
think you can trust the government in Belgrade to do what is right?  
Not at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Very much  
8. On a scale from Not at all (1) to Very much (7), please indicate how much 
guidance does religion provide you in your day-to-day life?  
Not at all 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Very much 
9. On a scale from Never (0) to Every week (7), please indicate how often do you 
attend religious services?  
Never 0 —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Every week 
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10. On a scale from Not important at all (1) to Very important (7), please indicate 
how important of a role does religion play in your life?  
Not important at all —1—2—3—4—5—6—7- Very important  
11. On a scale from Never (0) to Every week (7), please indicate how often do you 
pray?  
Never  0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Every week 
12. Please tell me on a sale of 1-7 how much you personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out.  1 means you do not trust the institution at all, and 7 means 
you have complete trust in the institution.  
 
No trust 
at all 
     Complete 
trust 
        
…the Parliament 
of Serbia 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…the legal 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…the police 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…political 
parties  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…the European 
Parliament 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…The United 
Nations  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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13. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
Please answer using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means extremely dissatisfied and 
7 means extremely satisfied. 
Extremely dissatisfied   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Extremely satisfied 
14. Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?  
Extremely unhappy   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Extremely happy 
VII Now I will ask you some questions about the democracy in your country. There are no 
right or wrong answers, so just please tell me what you think. To what extent you think 
each of the following statements apply in Serbia. 1 means you think the statement does not 
apply at all and 7 means you think it applies completely.  
1. Elections in  Serbia are free and fair. 
Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Applies completely  
2. Voters in Serbia discuss  politics with people they know before deciding how  
to vote.  
Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Applies completely  
3. Different political parties in Serbia offer clear  alternatives to one another. 
Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Applies completely  
4. Opposition parties in Serbia are free to criticize the  government. 
Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Applies completely  
5. The media in Serbia are free to criticize the government.  
Does not apply at all   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Applies completely  
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VIII Please answer whether you 1 = strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=slightly disagree; 
4=neither agree nor disagree; 5=slightly agree; 6=agree; 7=strongly agree with the 
following statements.  
1. Serbia should prohibit certain racial and religious groups from living in our country.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
2. Racial prejudice may be a good thing for us because it keeps many undesirable foreigners 
from coming to Serbia.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
3. If necessary we ought to be willing to lower our standard of living to cooperate with other 
countries in getting an equal standard for every person in the world.  
              Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
4. My country does not have a moral obligation to share its technological and economic 
riches with the less fortunate people of the world.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
5. Rich nations should share their wealth with the less fortunate people of the world.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
6. Citizens of Serbia should be entitled to pursue whatever materialistic standard of living 
they desire, regardless of the effects on the planet’s environment and natural resources.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
7. Any person should be allowed to live wherever he or she wants in the world.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
8. It would be better to be a citizen of the world than of any particular country.  
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Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
9. All national governments ought to be abolished and replaced by one central world 
government.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
10. An international police force ought to be the only group in the world allowed to have 
armaments.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
11. Concessions on the part of Serbia to other nations are morally right if the concessions 
will promote world peace.  
Strongly disagree –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—Strongly agree 
IX How widespread do you think corruption is in the news media in Serbia? Please rate 
your answer on a scale from (1) Not widespread at all to (7) Extremely widespread.  
Not widespread at all 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Extremely widespread 
X Finally, I would like to ask you some more questions about yourself.  
1. What is your age?  __________ 
2. What is your biological sex?  
a. Male  
b. Female 
3. Which political party do you identify with/you support?  
a. Socialist Party of Serbia  
b. Democratic Party  
c. Democratic Party of Serbia  
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d. Serbian Radical Party 
e. Liberal Party 
f. Serbian Progressive Party  
g. Other. Please indicate _________________ 
h. None 
4. What is your level of education? (highest level) 
a. Less than elementary school  
b. Elementary school  
c. High school  
d. Bachelor’s degree 
e. Master’s degree  
f. Doctoral degree 
5. What is your religion?  
a. Orthodox 
b. Catholic 
c. Muslim  
d. Jewish  
e. Other. Please indicate ____________ 
f. Atheist 
g. Does not want to indicate 
6. What is you ethnicity? 
_____________ 
7. What is the average earning of your household per month?  
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8. Place of birth: ________________________ (village/town/city) 
            ____________________________ (state) 
9. Place of birth of your mother: _________________( village/town/city) 
____________________________ (state) 
10. Place of birth of your father: _________________( village/town/city) 
____________________________ (state) 
11. Are you a citizen of Serbia?  
a. Yes 
b. Now 
c. Does not want to indicate 
  
1. None 
2. Less than 8,000 dinars 
3. 8,001 – 10,000 dinars 
4. 10,001 – 13,000 dinars 
5. 13,001 – 16,000 dinars 
6. 16,001 – 20,000 dinars 
7. 20,001 – 24,000 dinars 
8. 24,001 – 30,000 dinars 
9. 30,001 – 36,000 dinars 
10. 36,001 – 42,000 dinars 
11. 42,001 – 48,000 dinars 
12. 48,001 – 56,000 dinars 
13. 56,001 – 64,000 dinars 
14. 64,001 – 74,000 dinars 
15. 74,001 – 86,000 dinars 
16. 86,001 – 100,000 dinars 
17. Above 100,000 dinars 
18. Does not want to answer 
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Survey questionnaire – Serbian translation  
 
I   Molim da odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7,  gde 1 znači “Uopšte ne verujem” a 7  znači  
“U potpunosti verujem” koliko lično verujete …  
1. … vestima koje se objavljuju u novinama.  
Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7  U potpunosti verujem  
2. … vestima koje se objavljuju na televiziji.  
Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   U potpunosti verujem 
3. … vestima koje se objavljuju na radiju.  
 Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7 U potpunosti verujem 
4. … vestima koje se objavljuju na Internetu.  
Uopšte ne verujem 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   U potpunosti verujem 
II   Imajući u vidu pokrivanje teme ekonomske krize u informativnim medijima u Srbiji 
(uopšteno), molim odgovite da li se 1 = uopšte ne slažete; 2= ne slažete; 3=delimično ne 
slažete; 4=niti slažete niti ne slažete; 5=delimično slažete; 6=slažete; ili se 7=u potpunosti 
slažete, sa sledećim izjavama.  
1. Dovoljno pažnje se posvećuje temi ekonomske krize.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
2. Temi ekonomske krize se daje adekvatan status.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
173 
 
3. Učestalost pokrivanja teme ekonomske krize je adekvatna.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
4. Kada za tim postoji potreba, tema se obrañuje redovno.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se ne slažem 
5. U medijske izveštaje o ekonomskoj krizi uključuju se neophodni elementi.   
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se ne slažem 
6. Pažnja se usresreñuje na važne činjenice.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
7. Daju se sve važne informacije o temi ekonomske krize.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
8. U medijskim izveštajima su predstavljene različite tačke gledišta.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
9. Informacije predstavljene u medijskim izveštajima mogu biti proverene.  
     Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
10. Informacije iznete u medijskim izveštajima su tačne.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
11. Činjenice se iznose istinito u izveštajima informativnih medija.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
12. Činjenice koje dobijam iz informativnih medija o ekonomskoj krizi su tačne.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
13. Kritike u informativnim medijima se izražavaju na adekvatan način.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
14. Mišljenja novinara su dobro utemeljena.  
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Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
15. Novinarski komentari o ekonomskoj krizi su rezultat dubokog promišljanja.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U upotpunosti se slažem 
16. Mislim da su ocene novinara o temi ekonomske krize korisne.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
III   Imajući u vidu ljude koje NE POZNAJETE, molim Vas odogovorite na sledeća 
pitanja.  
1. Uopšteno govoreći, da li smatrate da se većini ljudi može verovati, ili da nikada ne 
možete biti previše oprezni? Molim odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7 gde 1 znači da nikada 
ne možete biti previše oprezni a 7 da se većini ljudi može verovati.  
Nikada ne možete biti previše oprezni 1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Većini ljudi se može verovati 
2. Da li mislite da bi većina ljudi pokušala da Vas iskoristi, ukoliko bi imala priliku, ili bi 
pokušala da bude fer ?  
Većina ljudi bi pokušala  1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Većina ljudi bi pokušala 
da me iskoristi                                                 da bude fer 
3. Da li smatrate da, u većini slučajeva, ljudi pokušavaju da pomognu drugima ili da 
uglavnom gledaju sebe?  
Ljudi uglavnom gledaju                                                        Ljudi uglavnom pokušavaju  
sebe                           1—2—3—4—5—6—7        da pomognu drugima 
IV  Sada bih želeo-la da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja o Vama.  
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1. Koliko često se družite s prijateljima, roñacima i-ili kolegama? (ne poslovno) 
Nikad -1 
Reñe od jednom mesečno– 2 
Jednom mesečno – 3 
Nekoliko puta mesečno – 4 
Jednom nedeljno – 5 
Nekoliko puta nedeljno – 6 
Svaki dan – 7 
2. U poredjenju sa drugim ljudima vaših godina, koliko često učestvujete u društvenim 
aktivnostima?  
Mnogo manje nego drugi – 1 
Manje nego drugi- 2 
Uglavnom podjednako – 3 
Više nego drugi- 4 
Mnogo više nego drugi- 5 
V Sada ću Vam pročitati nekoliko kratkih priča i zamoliti Vas da odgovorite na jedno 
pitanje posle svake od njih.  
1. Miloš je novinar u Srbiji. Prošle godine Miloš je pomogao svom bratu od strica, 
grañevinaru po struci, da se zaposli kao novinar.  
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Miloš spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?  
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman 
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2. Lazar je novinar u Srbiji. Radeći na priči o uspesima naših mladih stručnjaka, Lazar 
je kao primer najuspešnijeg mladog matematičara naveo svog sestrića, iako je znao da 
jedan drugi učenik Matematičke gimazije iz Beograda ima bolje ocene i više 
priznanja sa meñunardonih takmičenja.  
 Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Lazar spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?  
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman 
3. Jovan je novinar u Srbiji. Jednog dana, jedan poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne 
objavi istraživački članak o ljubavnoj aferi koju je imao. Političar je obećao da će 
vratiti uslugu Jovanu. Jovan je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.  
 Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Jovan spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?  
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman 
4. Milan je novinar u Srbiji. Jednog dana poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi 
članak na kojem je radio, a koji se bavio učešćem tog političara u političkim 
prepucavanjima unutar vladajuće koalciije. Zauzvrat, političar je dao Milanu flašu 
viskija i boks cigareta. Milan je prihvatio i nije objavio članak. 
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Milan spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?  
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman 
5. Zoran je novinar u Srbiji. Poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi članak o 
kriminalnim aktivnostima u koje je bio umešan i dao mu 150 evra. Zoran je prihvatio 
i nije objavio članak.  
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Zoran spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?  
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Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman 
6. Petar je novinar u Srbiji. Poznati političar ga je zamolio da ne objavi članak o tome da 
je političar skrivao informacije o pravom stanju nezaposlenosti u zemlji. Političar je 
dao Petru 1000 evra. Petar je prihvatio i nije objavio članak.  
Po Vašem mišljenju, koliko je Petar spreman da kao novinar radi u najboljem interesu grañana?  
Uopšte nije spreman 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Veoma je spreman 
VI   Molim Vas da odgovorite na sledeća pitanja.  
1. Koliko dana u nedelji raspravljate o vestima sa članovima porodice ili sa 
prijateljima?  
   0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
2. Koliko dana u nedelji slušate radio? 
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
3. Koliko dana u nedelji čitate novine?  
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
4. Koliko dana u nedelji gledate televiziju?  
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
5. Koliko dana u nedelji koristite Internet?  
0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 
6. Molim Vas navedite koji medij je Vaš glavni izvor informisanja?  
 _____________________________________ 
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7. Na skali od (1) Ne, uopšte do (7) U velikoj meri, molim Vas navedite u kojoj meri 
verujete da vlada Srbije postupa ispravno?  
Ne, uopšte 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 U velikoj meri  
8. Na skali od (1) Ne, uopšte do (7) U velikoj meri, molim Vas navedite koliko se 
rukovodite verskim načelima u skakodnevnom životu.  
Ne, uopšte 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 U velikoj meri 
9. Na skali od (0) Nikad  do (7) Svake nedelje, molim navedite koliko često 
prisustvujete verskoj službi.  
Nikad 0 —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Svake nedelje 
10. Na skali od (1) Uopšte nije važna do (7) Veoma je važna, molim navedite koliko 
je važna uloga koju religija igra u Vašem životu.  
Uopšte nije važna —1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Veoma je važna  
11. Na skali od (0) Nikad do (7) Svake nedelje, molim navedite koliko se često 
molite.  
Nikad 0—1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Svake nedelje 
12. Molim Vas recite mi na skali od 1 do 7 koliko lično verujete svakoj od  navedenih 
institucija. 1 znači da uopšte ne verujete a 7 znači da imate potpuno poverenje.  
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Uopšte 
ne 
verujem 
     Potpuno 
verujem 
        
…Skupštini 
Srbije 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…pravosudju 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…policiji 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…političkim 
strankama 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…Evropskom 
parlamentu 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
…Ujedinjenim 
nacijama 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
13. Uopšteno govoreći, koliko ste u celini zadovoljni svojim životom? Molim da 
odgovorite na skali od 1 do 7, gde 1 znači da ste izrazito nezadovoljni a 7 znači da 
ste izrazito zadovoljni. 
Izrazito nezadovoljan-na   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Izrazito zadovoljan-na 
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14. Uopšteno govoreći, koliko biste rekli da ste srećni?  
Izrazito neserećan-na   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Izrazito srećan-na 
VII   Sada bih želeo-la da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja o demokratiji u Srbiji. Molim 
Vas da imate na umu da ne postoje tačni ili netačni oddgovori, već samo tražim od Vas da 
mi kažete šta mislite. U kojoj meri se, po Vašem mišljenju, svaka od navedenih izjava 
odnosi na Srbiju? 1 znači da se uopšte ne odnosi a 7 da se odnosi u potpunosti.  
1. Izbori u Srbiji su slobodni i fer. 
Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Odnosi se u potpunosti  
2. Grañani Srbije raspravljaju o politici sa drugima pre nego što odluče kako će 
glasati.  
Uopšte se ne odnosi 1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Odnosi se u potpunosti  
3. Političke stranke nude jasne alternative jedna drugoj.  
Uopšte se ne odnosi   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Odnosi se u potpunosti  
4. Opozicione stranke mogu slobodno da kritikuju Vladu.  
Uopšte se ne odnosi   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Odnosi se u potpunosti  
5. Mediji u Srbiji mogu slobodno da kritikuju Vladu.  
Uopšte se ne odnosi   1—2—3—4—5—6—7  Odnosi se u potpunosti  
VIII Molim odgovite da li se 1 = uopšte ne slažete; 2= ne slažete; 3=delimično ne slažete; 
4=niti slažete niti ne slažete; 5=delimično slažete; 6=slažete; ili se 7=u potpunosti slažete, sa 
sledećim izjavama.  
1. Srbija bi trebalo da zabrani odreñenim rasnim i verskim grupama da žive u našoj zemlji.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
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2. Rasne predrasude mogu biti dobra stvar zato što sprečavaju da mnogi nepodobni stranci 
dodju u Srbiju. 
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
3. U slučaju nužde, trebalo bi da budemo spremni da smanjimo životni standard, kako bi, u 
saradnji sa drugim zemljama, postigli podjednak standard za sve ljude na svetu.  
 Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
4. Moja zemlja nema moralnih obaveza da deli svoja tehnološka i privredna bogatsva sa 
siromašnijim ljudima na svetu.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
5. Bogate zemlje bi trebalo da dele svoja bogatsva sa siromašnijima.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
6. Grañanima Srbije bi trebalo dozvoliti postizanje željenog životnog standarda bez obzira 
na posledice koje to može imati na životnu sredinu i prirodne resurse planete.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
7. Svakoj osobi bi trebalo da bude dozvoljeno da živi gde god hoće na svetu.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
8.  Bolje bi bilo biti grañanin sveta nego neke odreñene zemlje.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
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9. Vlade pojedinačnih država trebalo bi da budu zamenjene jednom centralnom svetskom 
vladom.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
10. Medjunarodne policijske snage bi trebalo da budu jedina oružana grupa na svetu.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
11. Ustupci Srbije drugim državama su moralno opravdani ukoliko je to u interesu mira u 
svetu.  
Uopšte se ne slažem –1—2—3—4—5—6—7—U potpunosti se slažem 
 IX Koliko mislite da je korupcija rasprostranjena u informativnim medijima u Srbiji? 
Molim Vas odgovorite na skali od (1) Nije uopšte rasprostranjena do (7) Izrazito je 
rasprostranjena.  
Nije uopšte rasprostranjena 1---2---3---4---5---6---7   Izrazito je rasprostranjena 
X I za kraj, bih želeo-la da Vam postavim još nekoliko pitanja o Vama.  
12. Koliko imate godina?  __________ 
13. Kog ste pola?  
a. Muški  
b. Ženski 
14. Koju političku partiju podržavate?  
a. Socijalističku Partiju Srbije (SPS) 
b. Demokratsku Stranku  (DS) 
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c. Demokratsku Stranku Srbije (DSS)  
d. Srpsku Radikalnu Stranku (SRS) 
e. Liberalno Demokratsku Partiju (LDP) 
f. Srpsku Naprednu Stranku (SNS)  
g. Neku drugu (molim navedite) _________________ 
h. Nijednu 
15. Koji je Vaš nivo obrazovanja? (najviši dostignuti nivo-diploma) 
a. Manje od osnovne škole  
b. Osnovna škola  
c. Srednja škola  
d. Osnovne studije  
e. Master studije ili magistratura  
f. Doktorat  
16. Koja je Vaše versko opredeljenje?  
a. Pravoslavno  
b. Katoličko 
c. Islamsko 
d. Judaističko (Jevrejsko) 
e. Drugo (molim navedite)____________ 
f. Nisam verski opredeljen-a 
g. Ne želi da navede 
17. Koja je Vaša nacionalna pripadnost? 
________________________________ 
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18. Koja su  Vam prosečna mesečna primanja po domaćinstvu?  
 
19. Mesto roñenja: ________________________ (selo-grad) 
            ____________________________ (država) 
20. Mesto roñenja majke: _________________( selo-grad) 
____________________________ (država) 
21. Mesto roñenja oca: _________________( selo-grad) 
____________________________ (država) 
22. Da li ste državljanin Srbije?  
a. Da 
b. Ne 
c. Ne želi da navede 
 
 
 
  
19. Bez prihoda  
20. Ispod 8000 dinara 
21. 8001 do 10000 dinara 
22. 10001 do 13000 dinara 
23. 13001 do 16000 dinara 
24. 16001 do 20000 dinara 
25. 20001 do 24000 dinara 
26. 24001 do 30000 dinara 
27. 30001 do 36000 dinara 
28. 36001 do 42000 dinara 
29. 42001 do 48000 dinara 
30. 48001 do 56000 dinara 
31. 56001 do 64000 dinara 
32. 64001 do 74000 dinara 
33. 74001 do 86000 dinara 
34. 86001 do 100000 dinara 
35. Preko 100000 dinara 
36. BO (Odbija da odgovori) 
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Appendix C: Tables  
 
Table 1:  Levels of Trust in News Media, Generalized Trust and News Media Performance 
(measured as Trust in Corrupt Journalists and Perceived News Media Corruption) in 
Serbia 
 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Trust in News Media 544 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.7346 1.25976 
Generalized Trust 544 6.00 1.00 7.00 2.8989 1.38031 
Trust in Corrupt Journalists 544 6.00 1.00 7.00 1.6489 .90028 
Perceived News Media 
Corruption 
544 6.00 1.00 7.00 5.26 1.406 
Valid N  544      
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Table 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media 
with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance 
Variable  B    p Partial 
Correlatio
n 
Part 
Correlation 
R2 R2 
Change 
F Change Sign. 
F Change 
Step 1      .148    
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
-.025 .662 -.023 -.021   
  
Income .000 .997 .000 .000     
Gender -.036 .476 -.038. -.035     
Trust in 
Government  
.372 .000 .317 .309   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.041 .418 .043 .040   
  
Religiosity .071 .172 .072 .067     
Media Use .061 .306 .054 .050     
Education -.058 .348 -.050 -.046     
Age -.085 .136 -.079 -.073     
Step 2 
     .192 .045 9.843 .000 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
.012 .825 .012 .011   
  
Income .002 .974 .002 .002     
Gender -.026 .595 -.028 -.025 
 
 
  
 
Trust in 
Government  
.321 .000 .278 .260 
 
 
  
 
Discussion of 
News 
.039 .431 .042 .038 
 
 
  
 Religiosity .075 .145 .077 .070 
 
 
  
 Media Use .033 .570 .030 .027 
 
 
  
 Education -.060 .317 -.053 -.048 
 
 
  
 Age -.082 .141 -.078 -.070 
 
 
  
 Gen. Trust .119 .021 .122 .111     
 
Trust in 
Corrupt 
Journalists 
.163 .001 .173 .158   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 3: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News 
Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with 
Age as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media 
Variable  b     p Partial 
Correlatio
n 
Part 
Correlation 
R2 R2 
Change 
F Change Sign. 
F Change 
Step 3      .192 .000 .006 .937 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
.012 .827 .012 .010   
  
Income .001 .984 .001 .001     
Gender -.026 .597 -.028 -.025     
Trust in 
Government  
.322 .000 .277 .259   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.039 .431 .042 .038   
  
Religiosity .075 .148 .077 .069     
Media Use .033 .570 .030 .027     
Education -.060 .318 -.053 -.048     
Age -.090 .455 -.040 -.036     
Generalized 
Trust 
.109 .452 .040 .036   
  
Trust in 
Corrupt 
Journalists 
.163 .001 .173 .158   
  
Age X 
Gen.Trust 
.014 .937 .004 .004   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 4: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News 
Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with 
Education as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media  
Variable  B     P Partial 
Correlatio
n 
Part 
Correlation 
R2 R2 
Change 
F Change Sign. 
F Change 
Step 3      .195 .002 1.068 .302 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
.012 .838 .011 .010   
  
Income .003 .957 .003 .003     
Gender -.030 .548 -.032 -.029     
Trust in 
Government  
.325 .000 .281 .263   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.038 .450 .040 .036   
  
Religiosity .072 .164 .074 .067     
Media Use .038 .519 .034 .031     
Education .040 .725 .019 .017     
Age -.079 .156 -.075 -.068     
Generalized 
Trust 
.245 .064 .098 .088   
  
Trust in 
Corrupt 
Journalists 
.159 .001 .169 .153   
  
Education X 
Gen. Trust 
-.181 .302 -.055 -.049   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 5: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News 
Media with Trust in Corrupt Journalists as Proxy for News Media Performance and with 
Political Affiliation as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News 
Media 
Variable  B     P Partial 
Correlati
on 
Part 
Correla
tion 
R2 R2 
change 
F 
change 
Sign. 
F change 
Step 3      .193 .001 .279 .598 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
-.042 .722 -.019 -.017   
  
Income .000 .994 .000 .000     
Gender -.024 .625 -.026 -.023     
Trust in 
Government 
.324 .000 .280 .262   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.041 .410 .044 .039   
  
Religiosity .076 .138 .079 .071     
Media Use .030 .602 .028 .025     
Education -.059 .332 -.052 -.046     
Age -.083. .135 -.079 -.072     
Generalized Trust .098 .131 .080 .072     
Trust in Corrupt 
Journalists 
.162 .001 .172 .157   
  
Pol. Party X Gen. 
Trust 
.061 .598 .028 .025   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 6: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News Media 
with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance 
Variable  b     p Partial 
Correlatio
n 
Part 
Correlation 
R2 R2 
Change 
F Change Sign. 
F Change 
Step 1      .148    
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
-.025 .662 -.023 -.021   
  
Income .000 .997 .000 .000     
Gender -.036 .476 -.038 -.035     
Trust in 
Government  
.372 .000 .317 .309   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.041 .418 .043 .040   
  
Religiosity .071 .172 .072 .067     
Media Use .061 .306 .054 .050     
Education -.058 .348 -.050 -.046     
Age -.085 .136 -.079 -.073     
Step 2 
     .237 .089 20.806 .000 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
-.023 .678 -.022 -.019   
  
Income .022 .687 .021 .019     
Gender .001 .976 .002 .001 
 
 
  
 
Trust in 
Government  
.297 .000 .265 .240 
 
 
  
 
Discussion of 
News 
.040 .828 .044 .038 
 
 
  
 Religiosity .064 .196 .069 .060 
 
 
  
 Media Use .038 .504 .035 .031 
 
 
  
 Education -.068 .246 -.062 -.054 
 
 
  
 Age -.082 .127 -.081 -.071 
 
 
  
 Gen. Trust .123 .013 .131 .116     
 
Perceived 
News Media 
Corruption 
-.274 .000 -.289 -.264   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 7: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News 
Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and 
with Age as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News Media 
Variable  b     p Partial 
Correlatio
n 
Part 
Correlation 
R2 R2 
Change 
F Change Sign. 
F Change 
Step 3      .237 .000 .120 .720 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
-.022 .684 -.022 -.019   
  
Income .025 .652 .024 .021     
Gender .001 .979 .001 .001     
Trust in 
Government  
.295 .000 .261 .236   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.039 .417 .043 .038   
  
Religiosity .066 .189 .070 .061     
Media Use .038 .503 .036 .031     
Education -.046 .695 -.062 -.054     
Age -.090 .455 -.021 -.018     
Generalized 
Trust 
.169 .229 .064 .056   
  
Perceived 
News Media 
Corruption 
-.275 .000 -.289 -.264   
  
Age X 
Gen.Trust 
-.059 .729 -.018 -.016   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 8: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News 
Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and 
with Education as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in News 
Media 
Variable  b     p Partial 
Correlatio
n 
Part 
Correlation 
R2 R2 
Change 
F Change Sign. 
F Change 
Step 3      .239 .002 .725 .395 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
-.023 .675 -.022 -.019   
  
Income .023 .676 .022 .019     
Gender -.002 .979 -.002 -.002     
Trust in 
Government  
.300 .000 .267 .242   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.039 .423 .043 .037   
  
Religiosity .062 .214 .066 .058     
Media Use .041 .466 .039 .034     
Education .013 .114 .006 .005     
Age -.080 .138 -.079 -.069     
Generalized 
Trust 
.224 .081 .093 .081   
  
Perceived 
News Media 
Corruption 
-.270 .000 -.285 -.259   
  
Education X 
Gen. Trust 
-.145 .395 -.045 -.040   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 9: Summary of Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Trust in News 
Media with Perceived News Media Corruption as Proxy for News Media Performance and 
with Political Affiliation as Moderating Variable between Generalized Trust and Trust in 
News Media 
Variable  B     p Partial 
Correlati
on 
Part 
Correla
tion 
R2 R2 
change 
F 
change 
Sign. 
F change 
Step 3      .237 .000 .053 .818 
 
Pol. Party 
Affiliation 
-.046 .689 -.019 -.017   
  
Income .021 .703 .000 .000     
Gender .002 .964 -.026 -.023     
Trust in 
Government 
.298 .000 .280 .262   
  
Discussion of 
News 
.041 .400 .044 .039   
  
Religiosity .065 .192 .079 .071     
Media Use .037 .518 .028 .025     
Education -.067 .252 -.052 -.046     
Age -.083 .125 -.079 -.072     
Generalized Trust .114 .069 .080 .072     
Perceived News 
Media Corruption 
-.273 .000 .172 .157   
  
Pol. Party X Gen. 
Trust 
.026 .818 .028 .025   
  
Note: Political party affiliation was dichotomized and coded as 1: those supporting two main political parties in 
power (Serbian progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia) and 0: those supporting all other parties. Gender was 
coded as 1: Male 0: Female.   
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Table 10: Correlation Matrix of Indepedent and Dependent Variables  
 Trust News 
Media 
Gen.Trust Trust in 
Corrupt 
Journalists  
Perception of 
News Media 
Corruption  
Trust News Media 
Pearson Correlation 1 .214** .198** -.332** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
N 544 544 544 544 
Gen.Trust 
Pearson Correlation .214** 1 .183** -.090* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .036 
N 544 544 544 544 
Trust in Corrupt 
Journalists 
Pearson Correlation .198** .183** 1 -.153** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
N 544 544 544 544 
Perception of News Media 
Corruption 
Pearson Correlation -.332** -.090* -.153** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .036 .000  
N 544 544 544 544 
Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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